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ABSTRACT 
 
Galbreath, Jeremy Thomas (2004). Determinants of firm success: A resource-based 
analysis. Supervisor: Dr. Peter Galvin. 
 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) is one the most important areas of research 
content to emerge in the field of strategic management in the last 15 years. The RBV is 
prescriptive. That is, the RBV prescribes that competitive advantage stems from those 
resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (VRIN). With rare 
exception, resources that meet the VRIN criteria are widely purported to be intangible in 
nature.  
 
From a research perspective, the RBV stream tends to be dominated by 
conceptual discussions and advancements. However, empirical tests of the core 
premises, or the main prescription, of the theory are argued to be very limited in 
quantity. To add to the body of empirical research that seeks to verify the main 
prescription of the RBV, this research undertakes a new and different level of analysis, 
one that has not been previously tested. Given that firms compete with both tangible and 
intangible resources, the present study is interested in determining if, as the RBV 
implicitly prescribes, resources that are intangible in nature are more important 
determinants of firm success than tangible resources. Although the research question is 
basic and fundamental, it has rarely been appropriately or adequately tested within the 
RBV stream, as is demonstrated by this thesis. 
 
To carry out the research, this study offers a conceptual model of the firm’s 
resource pool that includes tangible assets (financial and physical assets), intangible 
assets (intellectual property assets, organizational assets, reputational assets), and 
capabilities. A series of hypotheses are posited to explore the proposition that intangible 
resources contribute more greatly to firm success, on the dimensions of sales turnover, 
market share, and profitability, than tangible resources. A field survey, administered to 
2000 manufacturing and services businesses operating in Australia, is used to gather the 
data. Of the 2000 surveys sent, the hypotheses are empirically tested using multiple 
iv 
hierarchical regression analysis on a final sample of 291 firms. Control variables include 
firm age and Porter’s five forces of industry structure.  
 
Based on the results, verification of the RBV’s main prescription can not be 
supported unequivocally. Intellectual property assets, for example, do not have a 
statistically significant association with firm success, after accounting for the effects of 
tangible resources and the control variables. Organizational assets, however, not only 
explain additionally significant variation in firm success, after accounting for the effects 
of tangible resources and the control variables, but make among the greatest, unique 
contribution to firm success based on the size of the beta coefficients. Reputational 
assets offer additional explanatory power to predicting firm success after accounting for 
the effects of tangible assets and the control variables, but only with respect to one 
measure of firm success does its beta coefficient make a larger, unique contribution than 
financial assets. Lastly, contrary to theory, capabilities are not the single most important 
determinant of firm success, after accounting for the effects of intangible assets, and 
tangible and intangible assets, in two separate hierarchical regression equations. This 
finding is surprising and explanations are provided. Overall, the study raises some 
questions with respect to just which resources are the most important determinants of a 
firm’s market and financial success and offers a fruitful avenue for further research. 
 
Keywords: Resource-based view of the firm, tangible resources, intangible resources, 
industry structure, firm success, hierarchical regression analysis, discriminant analysis 
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CHAPTERS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
“Wealth and growth in today’s economy are driven primarily by intangible (intellectual) 
assets. Physical and financial assets are rapidly becoming commodities…” 
 
Baruch Lev 
Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting (2001), p. 1 
 
 
Background and Introduction to the Research Question 
The mission of strategic management research is to uncover explanations as to why 
some firms are more successful than others (Rumelt et al., 1991; Levinthal, 1995; 
Mehra, 1996; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Hawawini et al., 2003). As strategy scholars 
have searched for differentials in firm success, they have looked for the underlying 
sources that lead to competitive advantage.1 Although many different explanations of the 
determinants of firm success have emerged in the last 70 years, two research streams 
have substantially grounded the theoretical treatment in the strategic management 
literature. The first, based upon an economic heritage, is known as industrial 
organization (IO) economics.2  
 
                                                 
1 In the strategic management literature, the terms competitive advantage, sustainable competitive 
advantage, firm performance, superior firm performance, above-average rates of return, supernormal 
profits, economic rents, and even customer reputation and social responsibility are concepts used over and 
over, often in the same article, to describe firm success. The fact of the matter is firm success has many 
meanings and is a relative term at best (Kay, 1993; Hu, 1995; Fahy and Smithee, 1999; Srivastava et al., 
2001; Klein, 2002; Davis, 2004). Powell (2001), for example, strongly argues that empirical studies can 
neither prove nor disprove propositions about firm success. Using logical and philosophical 
considerations, he concisely and persuasively argues that obtaining superior financial success, for 
example, does not in and of itself mean that a firm has a competitive advantage. Conversely, Powell 
(2001) argues that having a competitive advantage does not in of itself mean that a firm has or will 
generate superior financial success. Coyne (1986), Foss and Knudsen (2003) and Ma (2000a, b) argue that 
possessing a competitive advantage does not guarantee superior performance. Furthermore, Day and 
Wensley (1988) suggest that there is no common meaning for competitive advantage in practice or in 
theory. Powell’s (2001) article provides an enlightened argument regarding the difficult issue of proving 
or disproving the sources of firm success. He essentially argues that researchers cannot infer that any firm 
has a competitive advantage without resorting to “ideology, dogmatism or faith” (Powell, 2001, p. 883).    
2 Unless otherwise noted, the use of the term industrial organization throughout this dissertation refers to 
the Bain-type industrial organization (1959). Porter (1981) refers to this as traditional industrial 
organization (IO).  
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Industrial Organization Economics  
Spearheaded by Mason (1939), developed by Bain (1956, 1959), and applied by Porter 
(1980, 1981) to the field of strategic management, IO economics, based on the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, focuses on industry structure as the key 
determinant of the success of firms competing in different industries. The IO tradition 
emphasizes inter-industry structure while ignoring the importance of intra-industry 
heterogeneity. Phillips (1974) argues that in IO economics, firm success ultimately 
depends on structure alone, since conduct is itself seen as uniquely related to industry 
structure. Thus, an IO view on competitive advantage posits that superior performance is 
a function of a firm’s membership in an industry that has an attractive structure relative 
to other industries. An attractive industry structure is one that lends itself to imperfect 
competition, thus allowing firms to appropriate monopoly profits (Caves and Porter, 
1977). 
 
However, criticism has echoed out against IO economics, particularly in light of 
the lack of empirical evidence pointing to industry structure as the key determinant of 
firm success. With few exceptions, the empirical evidence suggests that industry 
structure (external) sources explain from 6 to 30 percent of the variance in performance 
across firms (Mauri and Michaels, 1998; McGahan, 1999a). Based on the empirical 
evidence, a large proportion of the variation in firm performance appears not to be 
explained by various factors of industry structure. Furthermore, in most industries, some 
firms are more profitable than others, regardless of whether the average profitability of 
the industry is high or low (Bharadwaj et al., 1993). The question therefore emerges as 
to what accounts for the unexplained variance. 
 
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989), Mehra (1996), and T.C. Powell (1996) suggest 
that the unexplained variance may be attributed to random error, economic variables that 
cannot be measured, strategic group membership, and even chance. However, an 
argument has been made that factors internal to firms account for much, or at least a 
statistically significant amount, of the remaining variance (Rumelt et al., 1991; Hill and 
Deeds, 1996). Indeed, over the last 10 to 15 years academics have paid considerable 
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interest to the presence of firm-level resources in order to understand why some firms 
perform better than others. The resource-based view of the firm (RBV), first theorized 
by Wernerfelt (1984) but drawing upon the earlier work of Penrose (1959), postulates 
such a position. The RBV is the second stream in the strategic management literature 
that has substantially grounded the understanding of the differences in the success levels 
of firms. 
 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
The RBV focuses on firm-level factors in understanding firm success. While not 
altogether excluding industry structure, the RBV principally theorizes that internal, 
idiosyncratic resources explain the variation in success among firms competing within 
the same industry (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Firms are viewed in 
terms of their unique bundles of tangible and intangible resources being the source of 
their competitive advantage, rather than the product market combinations chosen for 
their deployment (Barney, 1991). This implies that the locus of attention of the firm 
should shift from building market power (via manipulation of industry structure) to 
leveraging those resources that could be used efficiently and effectively in competing in 
their given industry, regardless of the industry’s ‘attractiveness’ (Whittington, 1993).  
 
The RBV necessarily focuses attention on internal resources versus industry 
structure as the determinants of firm success. Firm resources can be tangible, such as 
physical or financial resources, or intangible, such as organizational culture, employee 
know-how, and brand name reputation. The literature argues that not all resources are of 
equal importance in explaining firm success. Resources can be important factors of a 
given firm’s advantage only if they posses certain special characteristics (Barney, 1991). 
Thus, the RBV is prescriptive.  
 
The RBV’s main prescription holds that resources possessing certain special 
characteristics are the critical determinants of firm success. Resources that exhibit value, 
rareness, inimitability, and nonsubstitutability are considered to be strategic assets (Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993; Michalisin et al., 1997; Coff, 1999). Amit and Schoemaker 
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(1993, p. 36) define strategic assets as “the set of difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, 
appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities that bestow the firm’s 
competitive advantage.” Such assets are largely viewed as intangible, rather than 
tangible, in nature (Itami and Roehl, 1987; Hall, 1992; Spender, 1996a; Chakraborty, 
1997; Michalisin et al., 1997; Srivastava et al., 1998; Teece, 1998a, Barney, 2001b; 
Conner, 2002; Ray et al., 2004). 
 
 Throughout the course of its development, the RBV has branched into many 
different directions including the core competency concept (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), 
‘dynamic’ capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994), and the knowledge-based theory of the 
firm (Grant, 1996a). Nanda (1996) argues that these various branches of the RBV add 
confusion to its understanding and therefore limit its usefulness in strategic thinking. 
Furthermore, Fahy (2000) argues that significant ambiguity exists with respect to the 
focal constructs of the RBV, namely resources, which has likely led to the RBV being 
called inherently vague (Hax and Wilde, 2001). Lastly, Porter (1991) calls the RBV 
circular because the theory posits that successful firms are successful because they have 
unique resources. This argument, according to Porter (1991), is true by nature; therefore, 
if the RBV is circular, it can not be empirically falsified.  
 
In spite of these criticisms, the RBV has gained prominence in the strategy 
literature. Particularly, the RBV gained much attention in the 1990s as an alternative 
explanation to IO economics in the search for explaining why some firms outperform 
others. Indeed, RBV theorists argue that resources—and predominately intangible 
resources—rather than external market structure, are the most critical determinants of a 
firm’s success. Such a view of competitive advantage closely parallels another widely 
debated topic in the 1990s, namely that of the emerging ‘new economy,’ where theorists 
strongly supported intangibles as the preeminent source of firm success.   
 
The New Economy  
Neoclassical economics is built upon a few key assumptions including maximization—
firms can make rational decisions because the world is fairly clear to understand (e.g., 
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information is free and symmetrical); and optimization—success is determined by the 
optimization of tangible, physical resources—land, equipment, buildings, machinery, 
raw materials—and only by the optimization of such resources (Hunt, 1997; Mailath, 
1998; Makadok, 1999). Such assumptions were largely developed in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The assumptions of neoclassical economics have not gone 
unchallenged.3  
 
Industrial economies were born as a result of the development of production 
machinery, thus transforming economic output from agrarian goods, or goods from the 
land, to manufactured goods, or goods from machines. The key assets of the Industrial 
Age were land, machines and raw materials. Neoclassical economics focuses upon the 
optimization of such physical resources. That the optimization of physical capital is 
central to neoclassical economics may be explained in part by the fact that Adam Smith, 
moral philosopher and one of the earliest economic theorists, believed that physical 
capital was the foremost form of capital and one of the most important sources of wealth 
creation (Smith, [1776] 1963). Today, many hold a different view of wealth creation. 
 
D’Aveni (1994, 1995a) argues that the contemporary business world has changed 
radically given major developments in economic systems, international politics, 
technology, and telecommunications. The combination of these factors in most of the 
developed nations of the world (and even in some of the emerging nations) has created a 
firestorm of debate regarding the transition to a new economy—one where the 
assumptions of neoclassical economics are said to no longer hold true (Clement et al., 
1998).  
 
Largely, an analysis of the new economy debate suggests that: 1) the world 
today, and particularly the global business environment, is moving at such speed that 
clear-cut decisions regarding production are not so easily understood; 2) traditional 
factors of production (i.e., tangible resources) no longer form the basis of competitive 
                                                 
3 Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 205), for example, in their critique of neoclassical economics and firm 
growth, state, “the neoclassic approach to growth theory has taken us down a smooth road to a dead end.” 
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advantage; therefore, 3) firms must now compete on the basis of other resources. Indeed, 
success in the new economy is argued to be primarily based on the development and 
utilization of intangible resources (Canals, 2000; Eustace, 2000; Teece, 2000; APEC, 
2001; Blair and Walman, 2001; Daley, 2001; OECD, 2001). 
 
The fundamental assumption that can be inferred from a new economy view—
and the RBV—is that tangible resources such as land, property, and machinery, cannot 
form the basis of competitive advantage because they are observable and suspect to 
imitation. Based on this argument, intangible resources are left as the key determinants 
of firm success (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Michalisin et al., 1997; Goldfinger, 1997; Conner, 2002). Indeed, 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Quinn (1992), and Stewart (1997) have argued that the 
sources of competitive advantage have shifted unmistakably from tangible resources to 
intangible resources.  
 
Likewise, Eustace (2000) and Lev (2001) suggest that in the new economy, 
tangible assets such as land, labor, machinery, and raw materials have become mere 
commodities, contributing little if at all to competitive advantage. Ittner et al. (2000) 
also claim that physical tangible assets have become a liability in the new economy. One 
corporate executive even commented that in today’s competitive environment tangible 
assets are bad, while intangible assets are good (Zellner et al., 2001). These views 
suggest that tangible assets contribute little or nothing to firm success in the current 
economic climate while intangible resources are responsible for the vast majority of 
value creation.  
 
Whether the industrialized nations of the world find themselves in an ‘old,’ or 
so-called new economy, much of the debate surrounding firm success in the twenty-first 
century is tied directly to intangible resources. And while the high-technology industry 
is widely discussed in the new economy literature, Leadbeater (1999) argues that 
intangible resource trends are not confined to high-tech industries, but rather are evident 
in all industries, from high-tech to low-tech, manufacturing and services, retailing, and 
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agriculture. However, Fingleton (1999) has suggested that the claims made regarding the 
new economy and intangible resources have been subjected to remarkably little checking 
against reality. 
 
In an economic era in which tangible resources are hypothesized to offer no 
contribution to the overall success of firms, little empirical evidence within the RBV 
stream exists to falsify the claim. For example, with few exceptions (see, for example, 
Fahy, 2002; Galbreath 2004a; Galbreath and Galvin, 2004), research within the RBV 
stream has largely ignored examining the effects of tangible and intangible resources on 
firm success in the same study, although the justification for such an approach is 
compelling (Foss, 1997; Andersen and Kheam, 1998; Makhija, 2003), particularly for 
validation of the main prescription of the RBV. Thus, given the main prescription of the 
RBV and its theoretical framework that points to the most likely sources of firm success, 
the ultimate research question might be: are resources that are intangible in nature more 
important determinants of firm success than tangible resources? 
 
Research Objectives 
The main prescription of the RBV points to intangible resources as the most likely 
sources of competitive advantage (Michalisin et al., 1997; Ray et al., 2004). However, 
little research within the RBV stream tests the importance of intangible resources to firm 
success after simultaneously accounting for the effects of other resources available to 
the firm—namely, tangible resources (Andersen and Kheam, 1998; Morgan, 1999). If, 
as argued, or at least implied, by the majority of RBV scholars, intangible resources are 
the most likely sources of competitive advantage, then validation of the RBV’s main 
prescription will come through empirical testing with both intangible and tangible 
resources.  
 
Because firms rely on both tangible and intangible resources to execute market 
strategies, examining both sets of resources together offers a more robust test of the 
RBV, one that can more precisely untangle which type of resources are most important 
to firm success; this approach is necessary in order to control for the biases associated 
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with studying a resource in isolation and the potential overestimation of the significance 
of the results of such studies (cf. Huselid, 1995). If, according to Foss (1997), Makhija 
(2003), and Lippman and Rumelt (2003b), it is entirely possible that tangible resources 
can underlie a firm’s competitive advantage, then this raises a compelling case for 
empirical tests that examine the relative effects of tangible and intangible resources on 
firm success in the same study. Little research, however, within the RBV stream, has 
taken such an approach. 
 
Therefore, recognizing the rather narrow and limited testing of the main 
prescription of the RBV (Hoopes et al., 2003), particularly with respect to the larger 
resource pool that firms leverage to execute a given market strategy, this dissertation has 
the following objectives: 
 
1. To develop an integrative resource-based model of a firm’s success, 
including both tangible and intangible resources, in which to more effectively 
operationalize the RBV. 
2. Empirically test the model with an approach not previously applied in RBV 
research. 
3. Statistically determine if intangible resources are more important 
determinants of firm success than tangible resources, as per RBV theory, by 
examining firms in a variety of industries. 
 
Drawing upon the RBV, and the various resource-based sub-streams, this study 
develops a conceptual model that explores the relationship between resources and firm 
success (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Resource-based framework of firm success 
 
Figure 1 suggests that firms leverage a variety of resources, including those that 
are tangible and intangible, as they pursue market strategies. However, while a variety of 
resources may be required to execute a given market strategy, the RBV argues that not 
all resources contribute equally to firm success (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  
 
As pointed out, RBV theory prescribes that only those resources that exhibit 
certain special characteristics can earn firms a favorable position against competitors 
(Barney, 1991). Such resources are argued to be intangible in nature (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Chi, 1994, Hall, 1992; Michalisin et al., 1997; Ray et. al., 2004). 
Others, however, suggest that tangible resources may afford firms superior positions in 
the market relative to competitors (Foss, 1997; Boulton et al., 2000; Makhija, 2003). 
Little empirical research within the RBV stream, however, has attempted to 
appropriately and adequately operationalize tangible and intangible resources in the 
same study so that relevant empirical insight can be obtained, particularly for validation 
of the RBV’s main prescription. 
 
Tangible
Resources
Tangible
Assets
Intangible
Resources
Firm Success
Performance:
• Market
• Financial
Intangible
Assets
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In order to address the gap in the literature described above, the proposed 
research seeks to empirically test a series of hypotheses, derived from the conceptual 
model. The proposed research tests the hypotheses using multiple hierarchical regression 
analysis. A cross-sectional field study is used to accomplish this goal. In order to 
measure the various constructs in the model and their relationship to firm success, a 
questionnaire is developed and validated, and is administered to key informants in a 
sample of manufacturing and service firms in Australia. 
 
Potential Contributions to Knowledge 
The RBV, although ‘officially’ introduced in the literature by Wernerfelt in 1984, 
emerged in the 1990s as one the most important content areas for strategic management 
research (Zajac, 1995; Hoopes et al., 2003). Hoskisson et al. (1999) eloquently describe 
that although the central question of strategic management research—why some firms 
are more successful than others—began with its origins in firm-level factors but over the 
years has ‘swung like a pendulum’ to external factors (industry structure) based on the 
principles of IO economics, the RBV has brought the focus back to the internal factors 
of the firm. However, despite significant attention given the RBV, many theoretical, 
empirical, and practical questions remain unanswered (Porter, 1991; Black and Boal, 
1994; Nanda, 1996; Foss, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Morgan, 1999; Silverman, 1999; 
Williamson, 1999; Hax and Wilde, 2001; Priem and Butler, 2001a, b; Hoopes et al., 
2003). 
 
To address some of these unanswered theoretical, empirical, and practical 
questions, this dissertation aims to make potential contributions to the field of strategic 
management, and specifically resource-based theory, in three main areas: 1) solidifying 
a framework within which resources may be more adequately conceptualized and 
measured for this study and future ones; 2) validation of the main prescription of the 
RBV through using a empirical approach that has not been previously utilized; and 3) 
helping managers better understand where investments may be most appropriately made 
with respect to their resource base. Each of these three potential areas of contribution is 
briefly discussed below. 
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(1)  Hax and Wilde (2001) suggest that the RBV is inherently vague, while Fahy 
(2000) argues that there is little agreement among scholars with respect to the 
conceptualization of resources. That the RBV is vague or lacks robust conceptualization 
may be apparent due to the definition of resources. Wernerfelt (1984) states: 
 
By a resource is meant anything which could be thought of 
as a strength or weakness of a given firm. More formally, a 
firm’s resources at a given time could be defined as those 
(tangible and intangible) assets which are tied 
semipermanently to the firm. (p. 172) 
 
While Wernerfelt acknowledges that anything considered a strength or weakness of the 
firm may be considered a resource, Barney (1991) acknowledges that for resources to 
make a significant contribution to the firm’s success, they must be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and nonsubstitutable. Identifying which resources meet the special 
characteristics should, in theory, considerably narrow the potential determinants of firm 
success.  
 
In addition Barney (1991), drawing upon the earlier work of Becker (1964), 
Williamson (1975) and Tomer (1987), offers an effort to conceptualize resources in a 
more constructive fashion. However, much of the literature in the RBV stream describes 
a broad range of resource types by way of illustration, paraphrasing much of Barney’s 
(1991) work, rather than being based on a more extensive analytical approach (Combs 
and Ketchen, 1999). In an attempt to develop a robust conceptual framework for 
exploring resource-based determinants of firm success, this dissertation draws upon the 
work of economic, management and marketing scholars, and the finance and accounting 
literature. This research, then, potentially represents an interesting contribution to the 
RBV in that the conceptual framework may offer guidance as to how to more effectively 
classify resources and ultimately how to consistently operationalize the factors for future 
empirical testing.  
 
(2)  The RBV has been dominated by conceptual work (Hoopes et al., 2003), which 
is perhaps symptomatic of a management ‘fad,’ or at least a field that is immature 
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(Priem and Butler, 2001a). Thus, in order to validate the RBV’s ‘lawlike’ 
generalizations, as with any theory, empirical testing must occur. Rudner (1966, p. 10) 
states, “a theory is a systematically related set of statements, including some lawlike 
generalizations, that is empirically testable.” Lockett and Thompson (2001, p. 730, 731) 
further note, “However, it is important in evaluating any theory to determine how far it 
yields predictions that are general, testable and helpful in identifying key characteristics 
necessary in analyzing future problems. This is especially so if the theory is to be 
defended from charges of tautology.” Although some have questioned whether the RBV 
carries validity as a theory (Priem and Butler, 2001a, b), nonetheless, Barney (2001a) 
argues that the primary assertions of the RBV are indeed capable of empirical testing.  
 
Williamson (1999) argues that given the many theories of the firm, of which the 
RBV is one, the ‘wheat needs to be separated from the chaff.’ Williamson (1999, p. 
1093) suggests that “predictions, data, and empirical tests provide the requisite screen.” 
His argument implies that theories of the firm need to be operationalized in order that 
their prescriptions may be tested. However, Miller and Shamsie (1996) have complained 
that the concept of resources is amorphous and is rarely operationalized or tested for its 
implications, particularly with respect to understanding which resources impact the 
greatest on firm success given the very broad resource pool firms leverage to execute 
market strategies. Conner (1991, p. 145) also argues that “in the end everything in the 
firm becomes a resource and hence resources lose explanatory power.”  
 
To counter some of the above criticisms, researchers have certainly studied the 
effect of resources—as the unit of analysis—on firm success. However, two potential 
problems with empirical work on the RBV are identified. First, studies with the RBV 
stream that do take resources as the unit of analysis tend to be very idiosyncratic in that 
they operationalize a single resource or a very limited number of resources—and with 
few exceptions, intangible resources—to fit the domain of the specific study. While such 
an approach may offer encouraging results for the RBV, the approach excludes many 
other potential resources that could otherwise be important to competitive advantage. 
Thus, studies that consider only the effect of a single resource (or a few select few) on 
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firm success, to the exclusion of other potentially important resources, may be 
overestimating the results found and may be undermining the complexities of 
competitive advantage. To address this oversight, this research factors for a variety of 
tangible and intangible resources in order to empirically verify if, as the RBV prescribes, 
intangible resources do in fact contribute the most to firm success. A potential 
contribution, then, might be to add insight into whether the main prescription of the 
RBV can be verified by using an empirical approach that has gone previously untested. 
 
Second, many studies within the RBV stream utilize single industries, and even 
single firms, in their samples. Studying resources within single industry contexts and 
even single firms does allow for tighter control. However, single industry or single firm 
studies limit the generalizability of the results. Generally, the core of resource-based 
theory does not discriminate between which types of resources (e.g., financial assets, 
organizational assets, reputational assets) are more important than others given the 
context of industries (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Priem and Butler, 
2001a). Thus, this research aims to improve the generalizability of the results by 
examining resources in a wide variety of manufacturing and services firms. By including 
a multi-industry sample, the results may add knowledge as to whether or not the core 
premises of the RBV can be verified in a general sample, as opposed to single firm or 
industry contexts.  
   
(3)  Finally, the RBV has certainly ignited a great deal of interest among strategic 
management researchers. However, the RBV has also appealed to executives and 
managers who are constantly engaged in the practical world of competitive struggle and 
survival. With respect to managerial implications, one area this research seeks to address 
is in the area of resource investment. As with any investment decision, the opportunity 
costs must be weighed. It is expected that the results of this research will offer some 
insights as to where investments may be best placed; namely, with respect to 
investments in resources.   
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Dissertation Structure 
Having introduced the context of the research, including background, objectives, and 
contributions, the remaining sections of the dissertation are as follows. The theoretical 
underpinnings supporting the conceptual model are examined in Chapter II. Particular 
emphasis is given to the RBV literature, the new economy literature, and important 
works from the accounting, finance and marketing fields. The work in Chapter II 
supports the development of the framework and its related set of hypotheses, presented 
in Chapter III. The research design and methodological approach used to empirically test 
the framework is presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents the results of the 
statistical analysis of the data. Finally, Chapter VI elucidates findings, discusses 
implications, describes study limitations, and offers suggestions for future research.
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II. Review of the Literature 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical underpinnings and 
empirical research that seeks to explain why some firms are more successful than others.  
In particular, a discussion will be presented first on the economic tradition. Second, and 
more specifically, the resource-based view of the firm is explored from which the 
conceptual model is based.   
 
The first section examines the economic tradition of performance heterogeneity, 
with a specific focus on traditional industrial organization (IO) economics and Michael 
Porter’s five forces framework. The second section turns attention to the major 
criticisms leveled at the economic tradition. Following the second section, an 
exploration of the so-called new economy will be presented in order to extrapolate 
recent views and claimed determinants of firm success in the current economic era and 
its importance to resource-based theory. The third section addresses the firm factor 
explanation of the determinants of firm success. The fourth section elucidates the 
mainline criticisms leveled at the RBV. Finally, the last section explores the relevant 
empirical evidence within the RBV stream. 
 
Determinants of Firm Success: Industry Structure Factors 
Levinthal (1995) points out that the primary mission of strategic management is the 
analysis of performance diversity among firms. Two main theoretical explanations have 
heavily influenced the answer to the question of performance differences among firms. 
One tradition theorizes that differences in the performance of industries—and by 
extension, firms—are attributable to the economic attractiveness of the structural factors 
of the industries within which they are a member. This stream belongs to the school of 
economic explanations of performance heterogeneity, particularly with respect to 
performance differences between industries.  
 
 Drawing upon economic roots but shifting the locus of attention away from 
industry structure, another stream has theorized that differences in firm success are 
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attributable to internal or firm-level factors. This stream concentrates on resources as the 
unit of analysis in determining performance heterogeneity among firms. Thus, two 
dominant explanations of the sources of competitive advantage have emerged in the 
literature, particularly in the last 25 years.  
 
 The first major category follows the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm of traditional industrial organization (IO). The second is known as the 
resource-based view of the firm (RBV), based on a firm factor tradition. Although the 
primary focus of this dissertation is with respect to the RBV, in this section of Chapter 
II, a brief discussion will be presented on the economic tradition, specifically focusing 
on Bain-type industrial organization (IO) and Porter’s five forces framework. 
 
Traditional Industrial Organization Economic Theory 
Economic theory has a long and rich tradition and includes a variety of ‘schools’ to 
which individual theorists have contributed over the last 70 years (Figure 2). Although 
some schools seek to understand the persistence of performance variance among firms 
with a degree of focus on firm-level factors, strategic management has been particularly 
influenced and grounded by industrial organization economics (Porter, 1981). Industrial 
organization economics focuses on industry structure as the main determinant of 
performance across industries, while ignoring the importance of intra-industry 
heterogeneity. As such, the external environment is argued to be a central theme within 
traditional IO (Mauri and Michaels, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Major schools in the economic tradition 
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Mason (1939) was among the first to argue that there is a deterministic 
association between industry structure and firm performance. Later, Bain (1959), one of 
Mason’s doctoral students at Harvard University, produced his seminal work which 
emphasized the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. The SCP paradigm 
affirms the importance of industry structure as the key determinant of the performance 
variance among firms competing in different industries.4  
 
In the Bain-type industrial organization (IO), because industry structure 
determines firm conduct, conduct can largely be ignored as performance is determined 
solely by structure (Porter, 1981). Indeed, most of the scholarly work has examined the 
structure-performance association, effectively ignoring conduct (Scherer, 1980). Phillips 
(1974) suggests that firm performance depends on industry structure alone, therefore, 
conduct is deterministic. Summarizing the SCP, Porter (1981) states: 
 
The essence of the [Bain] paradigm is that a firm’s 
performance in the marketplace depends critically on the 
characteristics of the industry environment in which it 
competes…Industry structure [Bain proposed] determined 
the behavior or conduct of firms, whose joint conduct then 
determined the collective performance of the firms in the 
marketplace. (p. 610, 611) 
 
Within the structure-performance paradigm, the roles of firm size and industry 
concentration are particularly emphasized. Bain (1954, 1956), for example, emphasizes 
that industry concentration and barriers to entry interact to increase the performance of 
large firms. Similarly, Martin (1993) claims that economies of scale, product 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that the threads of discussion in this subsection, such as monopolistic behavior and 
collusion, were not advocated by Bain, but were practices of industries in the United States that Bain 
uncovered in his research. In fact, Bain (1959) suggested that government policy was necessary in order to 
restrict anticompetitive behavior. However, Bain’s development of IO theory (e.g., barriers to entry, 
collusion, concentration) have been largely interpreted, particularly among researchers with an interest in 
strategy and competitive advantage, as a means to create and protect supernormal profits. Porter (1981) 
points out that Bain himself advocated public policy designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior such as 
monopoly power and collusion. Barney (1991) suggests that the original purpose of Bain’s (1956, 1959) 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm was to isolate and address violations of perfectly competitive 
markets so that the benefits of social welfare could be restored.  
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differentiation, and absolute capital requirements act as barriers to entry. In this respect, 
larger firms tend to be the benefactors of such structural phenomenon.  
 
The creation of high levels of industry concentration, on the other hand, tends to 
encourage collusive and even monopolistic behavior, which allows firms to exercise 
market power while purposively restricting competition (Conner, 1991; Jacobson, 1992; 
Martin, 1993; Grant, 2002). High levels of industry concentration and difficult barriers 
to entry leading to collusive agreements and monopoly power increase the performance 
of large firms. Indeed, embedded in the Bain-type IO view is that firms exist to restrain 
productive output through collusive agreements that ultimately lead to larger firms and 
monopoly power (Conner, 1991). Firms who restrain output can then charge higher 
prices, thus gaining a profit through an artificially high market price. Furthermore, the 
restriction of competition forces customers to accept poorer quality products (at high 
prices) because the benefits of innovation are constrained in the market (Jacobson, 
1992). 
 
The motivation for firm expansion is to increase monopolization, either through 
vertical integration of downstream industries (Vernon and Graham, 1971), acquiring the 
source of the firm’s raw materials (Comanor, 1967), or through building other barriers to 
entry such as the use of advertising and product differentiation (Comanor and Wilson, 
1974, Sutton, 1991). The ability to build strong barriers to entry and the pursuit of 
monopoly control tends to favor larger firms, given the assumption of relatively stable, 
static market environments within the Bain-type IO theory (Porter, 1981; Sampler, 1998; 
Jacobson, 1992; Makadok, 1999). Applying IO logic to the development of a 
competitive strategy, the key then, is to select a domain whose structure is conducive to 
imperfect competitive dynamics whereby monopoly rents can be extracted. 
 
From a resource perspective, whereas neoclassical perfect competition theory 
suggests that firm resources are essentially homogeneous and thus perfectly mobile and 
transferable between firms, Bain-type IO theory ‘relaxes’ this assumption in that degrees 
of firm resource heterogeneity may exist; for example, in the form of legally protected 
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assets such as patents, which are unique to individual firms (Bain, 1959). However, 
while degrees of firm resource heterogeneity may be recognized in Bain-type IO theory, 
these differences do not matter as the economic strength or weakness of industry 
structure ultimately determines the profit potential of firms within a given industry 
(Phillips, 1974; Porter, 1981). 
 
The aforementioned conditions and assumptions form the basic tenets of the 
Bain-type IO model and constitute the theory of the determinants of performance 
variability in industrial organization economics (Figure 3). Traditional IO economic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The ‘outside in’ traditional industrial organization (IO) model5 
 
theory and particularly Bain’s SCP paradigm suggest that firm conduct can essentially 
be ignored as industry structure dominantly influences the strategic behavior of firms, 
which in turn determines their performance.6 Consequently, traditional IO theory 
                                                 
5 Figure 3 is designed to represent the traditional IO view in that industry structure, the outer ring, 
ultimately influences and determines firm conduct, the inner ring. It is the structure of the industry, 
including barriers to entry, that determines the advantage of one industry over another and thus the profit 
potential of firms in that industry.  
6 Some thinking within the ‘new’ industrial organization suggests that firm conduct does matter as a 
determinant of competitive advantage and performance variability, even in oligopoly situations (see, for 
example, Jacquemin, 1987; Tirole, 1988; Sutton, 1991; Norman and La Manna, 1992; Martin, 1993; Seth 
and Thomas, 1994; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Also, within the economic tradition, Chicago 
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concentrates on examining the effects of concentration, firm size, and entry barriers as 
the determinants of firm success (Hill and Deeds, 1996). 
 
Although much of the theoretical underpinning of the traditional IO model was 
developed in the 1930s through the 1950s, Michael Porter’s work in the 1980s signaled a 
major ‘revival’ of the Bain-type IO model in that he applied IO principles to the field of 
strategic management, particularly in the areas of corporate strategy and competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1980, 1985). Largely referred to as the ‘five forces’ framework, 
Porter’s early research has dominated the teaching and practice of strategy for more than 
25 years and is deeply rooted in the traditions of Bain-type IO economics. 
 
Porter’s Five Forces Framework 
As with IO economics, Porter focuses much of his attention on industry structure. 
Viewing the degree of competition within an industry as being based on five forces, he 
suggests it is the combined strength of the five forces that determine the profit potential 
of any industry and thus firms’ relative opportunity for superior performance (Porter, 
1980).  
 
The first structural force, threat of new entrants, focuses on the strength of an 
industry’s barriers to entry. That is, the first force focuses on the favorability of industry 
barriers that may restrict the influx of new entrants, thus protecting the industry’s profit 
potential. Barriers to entry can include economies of scale, product differentiation, and 
customer loyalty to established brands (Hill and Deeds, 1996; Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
The higher the barriers to entry, the more likely firms within the industry will seek to 
tacitly collude to maintain those barriers, thus making it difficult for outsiders to gain 
entry, which preserves industry performance (Hill and Deeds, 1996; Grant, 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                
School (or ‘Revisionist’) economists acknowledge firm-specific resource differences (Stigler, 1964, 1968; 
Demsetz, 1973, 1975). Chicago School economists suggest that instead of industry structure determining 
firm conduct and profits, firm conduct determines industry structure (Hill and Deeds, 1996; Gonzales-
Fidalgo and Ventura-Victoria, 2002). However, Chicago School economists do not believe that above-
average profits earned by idiosyncratic firm-level resources can be sustained in the long run but rather that 
they will be competed away by imitators (Stigler, 1966; Demsetz, 1973). The resource-based view of the 
firm, described later in this dissertation, argues that above-average profits can be earned and sustained 
precisely because of the inimitability of resources (Barney, 1991; Hill and Deeds, 1996). 
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Conversely, the lower the barriers of entry, the higher the influx of new entrants 
bringing new capacity and the wherewithal to gain market share, which erodes margins, 
which in turn negatively impacts industry performance and ultimately firm performance. 
 
 The second structural force, threat of substitute products or services, focuses on 
the amount and level of competition within and between industries. In industries where 
few product or service substitutes are available, industry profitability is protected. In 
industries where many product or service substitutes are readily available, industry 
profitability can suffer. Competition then, depends on the extent to which products or 
services in one industry can be replaced by products or services from another (Mintzberg 
et al., 1998; Digman, 1999).  
 
The third structural force, bargaining power of suppliers, focuses on the relative 
power and control that suppliers can or cannot impose within an industry. Assuming that 
suppliers wish to maximize their own profits, achieving the highest price for their 
products or services is desired. If suppliers are few and strategic, the bargaining power 
of firms in the industry is muted, therefore pricing advantage can be achieved by 
suppliers which in turn negatively impacts overall industry performance (Bennett, 1996). 
If suppliers are plentiful and commoditized, choice and bargaining power over price 
favors firms in the industry, which in turn positively impacts overall industry 
performance.  
  
The fourth structural force, bargaining power of buyers, focuses on the firm’s 
customers and their relative purchasing power. Buyers endeavor to bargain for lower 
prices while demanding higher quality from the producers of goods and services. Firms 
making concessions to buyers with bargaining power necessarily increases industry 
rivalry, which ultimately erodes industry profit margins (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1995; Digman, 1999). This can be a particular problem in industries where the threat of 
substitute products or services is high, thus placing higher bargaining power in the hands 
of buyers at the expense of producers, as alternative choice drives competitive price 
wars resulting in lower overall profit potential.   
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 The fifth structural force, rivalry among existing competitors, focuses on the 
competition of firms within an industry.  The four other forces converge on rivalry, 
which has been likened to competition as ‘war’ (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Hax and Wilde, 
2001).  Essentially, the fifth force seeks to explain the conduct of firms engaged in the 
battle for market share and performance.  
 
 By way of example, in industries where market share is similar or where 
products are homogenous, pricing battles may be engaged in to acquire an improved 
share position. Such actions may include higher advertising or marketing expenses and 
higher sales costs, thus eroding profits (see the fourth force). In industries where a few 
leaders dominate the market while others follow at a relatively far distance, higher prices 
may be obtained by the market leaders without the likelihood of the threat of customer 
defection, thus improving performance. Depending on industry structure, firms may 
engage in an attacking posture or may agree to form alliances. If the threat of substitutes 
is high, for example, coalitions or partnerships may be formed to protect profits while 
deterring would-be competitors from market entry. Where suppliers and buyers have 
strong bargaining power, severe competition may arise among rivals, thus penalizing 
industry performance.  
 
The aforementioned five structural forces are the key determinants of long-term 
industry advantage and profitability. Porter (1990, p. 35) states, “the strength of each of 
the five competitive forces is a function of industry structure, or the underlying 
economic and technical characteristics of an industry…the strength of the five forces 
varies from industry to industry and determines long-term industry profitability 
[emphasis in the original].” 
  
The important point to note is that the five forces are a function of industry.  It is 
industry structure—the five forces—that determines industry profitability (Digman, 
1999). Furthermore, because firm conduct is constrained by external structural forces, 
the favorability or unfavorability of the profit potential of the firm is influenced by the 
attractiveness of the industry structure within which it competes (Porter, 1985; Spanos 
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and Lioukas, 2001).7 Similar to Bain’s structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, 
the five forces of industry structure affects overall industry performance, and thus the 
performance of firms within the industry.  
 
Porter’s (1980; 1985) work, however, does place special emphasis on firm 
conduct, particularly with respect to strategy development and strategic choice within 
the framework of industry structure.8 Known as ‘generic’ strategies, Porter (1980) 
argues that firms must choose among three generic strategies: 1) cost leadership; 2) 
differentiation; and 3) cost or differentiation focus. Lastly, in order to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage and thus the accrual of long-term, above-average  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Conceptual representation of Porter’s key works9 
                                                 
7 According to Grant (1991, 2002), if the layers of Porter’s (1980) five forces model are peeled back, 
monopoly profits ultimately stem from the ownership of scarce resources. 
8 Porter (1980) suggests that although the analysis of the five forces of industry structure focuses on the 
industry as a whole, most, if not all industries, contain firms competing with similar strategies. As such, 
the industry must be analyzed further, namely by focusing on strategic groups (i.e., by examining the 
degree of variations of strategies of firms competing in the industry and the influence of the five forces on 
each group identified). In some cases there may be only one strategic group. In others, there may be 
several. Once this level of analysis is conducted, selecting appropriate strategic positions (i.e., the generic 
strategies) that can be defended is necessary to earn sustainable profits. 
9 Figure 4 is designed to depict that although the external industry structure (outer ring), or five forces, 
heavily influences firm strategy, firms must nonetheless choose defensible positions and execute value 
chain activities (inner rings) within the confines of the five forces of industry structure to achieve high 
levels of success. In this sense, Porter’s (1980, 1985) theory is not entirely exogenously focused, as is the 
case with traditional IO economics. 
Threat of Substitute
Products
Bargaining Power
of Suppliers
Potential
Competitor
Outbound
Logistics
5 Forces of
Industry
Structure
Potential
Competitor
Firm Value
Chain
Activities
Firm
Infrastructure
Threat of
New Entrants
Rivalry Among
Existing
Competitors
Level
of Industry
Attractiveness
Cost Leadership
Differentiation
Focused
Differentiation
Relative Firm
Position/
Advantage
Firm
Performance
Marketing &
Sales
Inbound
Logistics
Procurement
Bargaining Power
of Buyers
Firm
Strategy
(Position)
HRM
Operations
Technology
Development
After-Sale
Service
Cost 
Focus
    
24 
profitability, Porter (1985) argues that firms must perform various discrete activities 
(e.g., marketing and sales, logistics, human resource management, after-sale service), 
known as the value chain, more efficiently or more uniquely than rivals (Figure 4). Thus, 
Porter (1980, 1985) does focus attention on intra-industry heterogeneity, unlike the IO 
economic model from which his work is based.  
 
Porter’s work represents one of the most widely discussed theoretical 
foundations for explaining the performance variance among firms in the strategic 
management literature. Most of his techniques and frameworks have also been used 
extensively in practical business settings. While clearly influenced by Bain-type IO 
economics, Porter does depart from the central tenets of the IO model (Table 1). 
Dimensions Traditional 
Industrial Organization (IO) 
Porter’s Work on Competitive 
Advantage 
Unit of analysis  Firms 
 
 Firms 
Level of analysis 
 
 Industries 
 
 Industries – Primary  
 Strategic groups – Secondary   
Primary sources of 
competitive 
advantage 
 Collusion 
 Bargaining/market power 
 Concentration 
 Market power via membership in 
an attractive (i.e., favorable five 
forces) industry  
Type of rents  Monopoly  Implied Monopoly 
Mechanisms that 
preserve advantages 
Entry barriers: 
 Economies of scale 
 Product differentiation 
 Vertical integration 
 Control of distribution 
 Government intervention 
Entry/mobility barriers: 
 Economies of scale 
 Product differentiation 
 Brand identify 
 Switching costs 
 Capital requirements 
 Access to distribution 
 Absolute cost advantages 
 Government policy 
Firm conduct   Ignored (firm behavior 
determined by industry structure) 
 Necessary (e.g., to choose and 
execute a defendable position and 
to alter industry/group structure in 
the firm’s favor, when 
appropriate) 
Resource 
heterogeneity 
 Degrees of heterogeneity 
recognized but irrelevant to 
advantage (industry structure 
solely determines advantage) 
 Heterogeneity may exist but 
equated to the execution of value 
chain activities (i.e., strength of 
the value chain determines 
advantage) 
Implication for 
strategy making 
 Erect entry barriers to restrict 
competition in order to protect 
industry profits 
 Erect entry/mobility barriers to 
restrict threats from the five forces 
in order to protect industry/group 
profits and overall firm position 
Table 1 Comparison between traditional IO and Porter’s theory 
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In Porter’s theory, for example, industry structure is neither viewed as entirely 
exogenous nor stable, unlike the view held in IO theory (Bain, 1959; Caves, 1972). 
Porter (1985) views the external environment as partly exogenous and partly subject to 
the influences of firm actions. Porter (1985, p. 7) states, “a firm is usually not a prisoner 
of its industry structure. Firms, through their strategies, can influence the five forces. If a 
firm can shape structure, it can fundamentally change an industry’s attractiveness for 
better or for worse.” 
 
Hence, external industry structure can be ‘altered’ based on firm actions, an idea 
similar to that of ‘choice situation,’ posited by Hrebriniak and Joyce (1985), or strategic 
choice, advanced by Child (1972). Porter’s view also suggests a degree of agreement 
with Chicago School theory in that industry structure is or can be the result of efficiency 
seeking (i.e., firm conduct) and stochastic events (Stigler, 1968; Demsetz, 1973; 1975). 
 
Furthermore, Porter (1980, 1985) does not treat the firm as a black box or as a 
‘representative’ firm as in neoclassical economics. Porter’s framework clearly 
recognizes the role of firm conduct in influencing its own destiny. Porter (1980), for 
example, argues that firms must choose a strategy with which they can create a unique, 
defendable position against industry rivals. Porter (1985) also suggests that the ability to 
achieve and sustain a competitive advantage over rivals largely rests in the firm’s ability 
to either more cost effectively, or more uniquely, execute a series of interrelated value 
chain activities. Lastly, Porter (1985; 1996) does recognize the importance of internal 
activities, as represented in his discussions on the value chain, but this recognition does 
not place the same importance on resources as does the resource-based view of the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  
 
Porter’s views on the firm represent a major departure from Bain’s (1959) 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Schendel (1992) and Thomas and 
Pollock (1999) suggest that Porter’s focus on managerial choice in an explicitly 
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environmental context turned the original positions of IO economics upside-down.10 Or 
at least in Porter’s view, managerial choice (conduct) can affect structure, thereby 
making the structure-conduct relationship bi-directional. 
 
In summary, Porter’s five forces framework emphasizes the attractiveness of 
industry structure as the main determinate of the profit potential of firms. Porter’s work 
implies that a market entry strategy begins with carefully analyzing an industry in terms 
of its structural attractiveness (i.e., the five forces) in order to assess its profitability 
potential. Once this is achieved, a competitive position that can effectively align the firm 
to the industry and generate superior performance should be selected. If not already 
possessed, the firm should acquire or otherwise obtain the necessary resources to 
implement its strategy. Teece et al. (1997, p. 514) state that Porter’s approach to strategy 
is “nothing more than choosing rationally among a well-defined set of investment 
alternatives. If assets are not already owned, they can be bought.”   
  
Essentially, Porter’s position is focused on the quest for monopoly rents through 
industry and segment selection and the manipulation of market structure to create market 
power. Porter’s work and the IO economic work of Bain in general, have had 
considerable influence on the field of strategic management and in particular have made 
a significant contribution to the theoretical basis for explaining why some firms 
(industries) are more successful than others. However, criticism has certainly been 
leveled at the economic tradition. 
 
Criticisms of Industry Structure  
IO economics and its dominant offshoot, Porter’s five forces framework, have been in 
existence for over 70 years. First introduced by Mason and Bain in the 1930s and 1950s 
and adopted and applied to the field of strategic management by Porter in the 1980s, the 
focal emphasis of the tradition is the external environment, or industry structure. 
                                                 
10 It should also be noted that Porter (1980, 1985) turned Bain’s (1959) structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm upside-down as well. That is, the SCP paradigm benefited the work of anti-trust 
politicians who were trying to reduce or totally remove barriers to entry (i.e., restore competitive 
environments). Porter (1980, 1985), however, turned the paradigm upside-down by demonstrating that 
barriers to entry should be built in order to gain and protect above-normal profits. 
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Industry structure is seen to determine an industry’s performance potential, which 
ultimately impacts on firm profits. Much of the economic tradition has not only 
influenced generations of students and scholars, but has formed a basis of understanding 
in which businesses formulate strategy and compete in given markets. However, 
traditional IO economics is not without its critics.  
 
The literature reveals that essentially two broad criticisms of IO economics and 
the five forces framework have emerged: 1) weak/inconclusive empirical evidence for 
industry structure as the key determinant of firm success; and 2) relevance of the 
industry structure position given changed and changing economic and competitive 
conditions. 
 
 In spite of the longevity of IO theory, a thorough examination of industry 
structure as the main determinant of firm performance variability did not occur in 
thoroughly until the 1980s (Foss, 1996a; Hill and Deeds, 1996). It was at this time that 
IO theory began to influence the research agenda within the field of strategic 
management (Hoskisson et al., 1999). A number of the major empirical studies from the 
1980s to the present will be briefly presented in the following paragraphs. As will be 
noted, the findings are inconclusive with respect to verifying that industry structure 
factors are the main determinants of performance variability. 
  
In a widely cited study, Schmalensee (1985) examines the accounting profits of 
American manufacturing firms that are covered in the Federal Trade Commission’s Line 
of Business Report (FTC LB) for the year 1975. He finds that industry effects explain 
19.46 percent of the variance in firm profitability of firms whereas firm effects account 
for only 0.62 percent of the variance.11    
  
To confirm Schmalensee’s (1985) findings, Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) 
access data from the 1976 FTC LB and other sources but use Tobin’s q as a measure of 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that Schmalensee (1985) attributes the remaining percent of his findings to random 
error. Many studies described in this section attribute anywhere from 30 to 60 percent of their findings to 
random error. 
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profitability. They find that industry effects, from a sample of 2-digit industries to 
capture focus effects of firm diversification, account for between 12.3 percent and 19.5 
percent of the variance of firm profitability, depending on the measure of Tobin’s q, 
while firm-level effects account for only 2.4 percent to 3.6 percent of the variance.  
 
 Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989), using a sample of 600 Fortune 1000 firms, study 
the relative importance of economic factors such as industry profitability, market share, 
and firm size effects and organizational factors (firm-level factors) such as goal 
emphasis and human resources emphasis. Using data from Compustat and the Survey of 
Organizations (SOO) developed by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, they find that firm-level effects account for approximately twice as much of 
the profitability variance as industry effects, 38 percent to 18.5 percent, respectively.  
  
Rumelt (1991), challenging Schmalensee’s (1985) findings and using FTC LB 
data for the years 1974-1977, argues that differences in firm profitability are not based 
on the structural characteristics of an industry but rather on the unique endowments of 
resources found in independent firms or single business units. Rumelt finds that industry 
effects account for only 4 percent of the variance of profitability while firm-level effects 
account for 46 percent of the variance.12  
 
In more recent studies, Roquebert et al. (1996) compare the work of 
Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991) by using the same methodology (variance 
component analysis); however, data from Compustat on manufacturing firms from 1985-
1991 is used rather than data from the FTC LB. Examining the relative effects of 
industry, corporate, and business unit on firm profitability, they find that industry effects 
explain 10 percent of the variance and corporate effects account for 18 percent of the 
variance in firm profitability. The researchers also find that business-unit effects account 
for 37 percent of the variation of firm profitability. Thus, firm factors account for 55 
                                                 
12 Earlier, in a survey of 1,292 United States corporations, Rumelt (1987) finds that industry structure 
explains 3.9 percent (3-digit firms) and 4.7 percent (4-digit firms) of the profit variance while firm effects 
within industries explains 19.2 percent (3-digit firms) and 17.6 percent (4-digit firms) of the profit 
variance. 
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percent of the variance in profitability while industry structure factors account for 10 
percent of the variance.   
 
McGahan and Porter (1997) also analyze the earlier work of Schmalensee (1985) 
and Rumelt (1991), using Compustat data but with a larger sample including 
manufacturing and services industries in America and a longer time period, including the 
years 1981-1994. The results show that industry effects account for 19 percent of 
business segment profitability variance while firm-level effects account for 36 percent of 
the variance in profitability across all industries. 
 
In other recent studies, Mauri and Michaels (1998) study 264 nondiversified 
companies over 5- and 15-year periods. Using data from Compustat, they find that in the 
5-year data, industry effects explain 6 percent in the variation of profitability while firm-
level effects explain 37 percent of the variation. In the 15-year data, industry effects 
explain 6 percent of the profitability variation while firm-level effects explain 25 percent 
of the variation.  
 
Brush et al. (1999) examine corporate and industry effects on business segment 
profitability using Compustat data on firms with three or four business segments—using 
the years 1986-1995 for the sample. They find that corporate effects explain 12 to 19 
percent of the variance in profits while business segment effects explain 25 to 36 percent 
of variance in profits. They also find that industry structure effects explain 16 to 19 
percent of the variance in profits.   
 
McGahan (1999a), using Compustat data, studies 4,947 U.S.-based firms from 
the period 1981-1994. Examining industry, corporate/parent, and firm effects, she finds 
that industry effects account for 30 percent of explained variance on accounting profit. 
Firm effects account for 66 percent of explained variance on accounting profit. 
Corporate/parent effects explain less than 2 percent of the variance.  
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Hawawini et al. (2003), reinvestigating the work of Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt 
(1991) and McGahan and Porter (1997), analyze 562 firms across 55 industries over a 
ten-year period, 1987 to 1996. They find that firm effects account for 36 percent in the 
explained variance in return on assets (accounting profits) while industry effects account 
for just over 8 percent of the variation in accounting profits. 
 
In research conducted outside of the United States, Gonzalez-Fidalgo and 
Ventura-Victoria (2002), studying industry, strategic group, and firm-level effects on 
firm performance in Spanish firms, find industry and strategic group effects explain 13 
percent and 15 percent in the variance in firm profitability, respectively, while firm-level 
effects explain 31 percent of the profitability variance. In another study of Spanish firms, 
Claver et al. (2002) finds that firm-specific resources explain more than 40 percent of 
profitability variance while industry effects explain about 5 percent of profitability 
variance. Lastly, in an examination of SMEs and large firms in Greece, Caloghirou et al. 
(2004) find that firm-specific factors have around 2.5-3 times the influence on firm 
performance than industry structure factors. 
 
An examination of these major research studies suggests that the industry 
structure explanation of performance variability is somewhat inconclusive. Some studies 
find that industry effects leave a significant portion of variance in performance 
unexplained, while other studies find that firm factors explain a more significant portion 
of performance variation than industry structure. Conner (1991, p. 124), in her overview 
of research within traditional IO, namely the study of industry structure effects on firm 
performance variability, states, “the empirical results have been, however, less than 
conclusive, revealing at best a weakly positive association.”   
 
The majority of the studies described above tend to be skewed towards a pre-
occupation with either segmenting out firm and industry influences on business unit 
performance or just examining the role of various industry variables in explaining firm 
performance. Furthermore, a common methodology used in the studies to extract firm 
and industry effects is variance components analysis (VCA), the estimates of which have 
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been criticized because of instability and unreliability (Brush and Bromiley, 1997; Brush 
et al., 1999; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Finally, strategic management researchers 
clearly acknowledge that both firm-level and industry structure factors affect 
performance (Hansen and Wernerfelt; 1989; Barney and Griffin, 1992; Barney, 1992).  
 
With respect to firm factor and industry structure, the two paradigms have been 
likened to two sides of the same coin. Maijoor and van Witteloostuijn (1996, p. 550) 
state, “both the factor and product market imperfections are crucial and both the firm 
and industry level of analysis are important.” Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) argue that 
firms that can demonstrate excellence in both firm resources and their competitive 
position in the external environment will do significantly better than those that strive for 
more unidimensional concepts of excellence.  
 
Intuitively, firm success is achieved from an appropriate fit of internal resources 
to the external competitive environment. Therefore, research that compares firm factor 
and industry structure will likely continue to be a fruitless effort because both resources 
and industry structure are important to shaping strategy and performance (Henderson 
and Mitchell, 1997). Finally, although studies that compare industry factors with firm-
level factors may provide empirical value, such studies do not effectively isolate which 
resources contribute most to firm success. 
 
The second criticism leveled at IO economics—and Porter’s five forces 
framework—is the very essence of the dynamics of competition itself. The theoretical 
development of the IO position occurred in the 1930s through to the 1950s during a time 
of the large reach of communism, government-imposed trade restrictions, national 
protectionism, growing industry concentration, manufacturing as the dominant industry 
in most developed nations and relatively stable competitive environments. Certainly one 
must examine the tenets of IO economics within the context of the age and 
circumstances of the era in which they were first theorized. As Boyacigiller and Adler 
(1991) imply, the ‘parochialism’ inherent in the Bain-type IO framework—a model 
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based on the 1950s American national system of industrial organization—should 
certainly be challenged given today’s economic climate. 
 
From an historical context, traditional IO was developed during a period where 
the United States had shifted from a rural, agrarian economy based on small, family 
enterprises to an urban economy dominated by large, industrial business enterprises 
(Chandler, 1962, 1990). Indeed, many economists during the period reflected on the 
collusive/monopolistic practices in a diverse group of industries including meatpacking, 
tobacco, sugar, aluminum and oil (Ripley, 1905; Jones, 1922; Wallace, 1937).  
 
Bain’s structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, for example, was rooted 
in the belief that the central economic forces in the U.S. economy were based on 
monopolistic power and control, which deterred competition and thus artificially inflated 
prices, rather than encouraging competition that would seek to produce a lower cost 
product that consumers preferred. Much of U.S. public policy, for example, continued to 
embrace Bain’s IO view through the 1970s by seeking to discourage monopoly and 
oligopoly industries (Conner, 1991). Today, the fundamental beliefs about industry 
structure, competition, and firm success have changed and are continuing to change 
(Sampler, 1998). 
 
Sampler (1998), for example, argues that the rate of change has increased 
dramatically in product markets in recent years. This pace of change tends to create a 
higher propensity for competitive instability and less of an opportunity to create 
monopolistically or oligopolistically controlled industries. A major empirical study 
undertaken by McGahan (1999b) revealed that competitive business conditions changed 
in many industries during the 1980s and early 1990s, leading to increased competition, 
fragile markets, and an increased struggle for firm success.  
 
Bettis and Hitt (1995) claim that traditional industry boundaries were blurring as 
many industries converged or overlapped, therefore making the determination of just 
exactly what constitutes an ‘industry’ increasingly difficult and less recognizable. 
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Additionally, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) and Sampler (1998) challenge the structural 
determinism of IO theory by suggesting that markets and industry structures are not a 
given nor are they stable, but rather are created, shaped, and transformed by firms 
through long-run processes of innovation.13  
 
In terms of the major sources of economic growth within the industrialized 
nations of the world, services industries have surpassed manufacturing as the largest 
percentage of GDP growth and employment (Hufbauer and Warrant, 1999). The 
fundamental resources or ‘factors of production’ and sources of competitive advantage 
in many services industries are argued to be intangible resources, rather than the more 
traditional financial and physical resources of manufacturing industries (APEC, 2001; 
OECD, 2001). As Canals (2000, p. 118) notes, “as the industrial society becomes a 
services society, where knowledge and information are the mainstays of business 
growth, the importance of intangible resources will come increasingly to the forefront.”  
 
Intangible resources such as employee know-how, intellectual property, or 
organizational culture are considered difficult to replicate between firms and are thus 
major, if not definitive, sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Today, 
intangible resources, rather than tangible resources, are adamantly argued to be the 
reason firm performance differentials exist (Teece, 1998a).  
 
Other areas of criticism of IO economics, in lieu of the dynamics of competition 
argument, include the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the increased 
privatization of many state-owned industries, deregulation in many economic sectors, 
and the emergence of East Asia as the most dynamic trading bloc in the world. Scholars 
suggest that the resulting globalization of trade and the liberalization of developing 
economies have radically increased competition on a level previously unseen or 
unanticipated (Hope and Hope, 1997; Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Hitt et al., 1998; Grant, 
2002). D’Aveni (1994, 1995a,b, 1997) argues that ‘hypercompetition’ had drastically 
                                                 
13 Of course, Schumpeter (1934, 1942), many years earlier, posited a similar theory. 
    
34 
changed the stability of industry structure, thereby significantly decreasing competitive 
advantage based on traditional barriers to entry.  
 
Many scholars (Bourgeois, 1984; Chia, 1995; Thietart and Forgues, 1995) also 
argue that shifts in management paradigms have occurred from linear, certain 
environments to nonlinear, uncertain environments. Nonlinear environments shift the 
source of sustainable competitive advantage from the deterministic influence of industry 
structure to the dynamic, voluntaristic strategic choices of managers. From a capital 
perspective, Daley (2001) argues that the free flow of financial capital to small and 
medium-sized businesses has dramatically increased thus eliminating difficult barriers to 
entry held by only the largest firms in many industries. Finally, Sawhney and Zabin 
(2001) suggest that the decrease of transaction costs in the economy has led to the 
significant rise of outsourcing, thus reversing the common and advantageous practice of 
creating barriers to entry via vertical integration.  
 
Piore (1986) argues that many changing conditions in competitive, technological, 
and organizational landscapes of business pose a significant challenge to traditional 
economic theory. Whether warranted or not, the assertion that an increasing emphasis 
being placed on shifting and changing competitive environments casts doubt on 
traditional IO economics, requires deeper examination to bring to light the definite shift 
towards the resource-based view of the firm in the strategic management literature over 
the last several years (Srivastava et al., 2001). 
 
Economic Transition: Competitive Dynamics in a New Economy 
Largely, neoclassical economic theory places emphasis on production optimization—the 
optimization of tangible, physical resources including land, equipment, buildings, 
machinery, and raw materials. In neoclassical economic theory little, if any, attention is 
paid to intangible resources. Furthermore, IO theory argues that competitive advantage 
is created by external structural factors rather than internal resources. As noted in 
Chapter I and the above section on the criticisms of industry structure as a dominant 
determinant of firm success, the assumptions of neoclassical and IO economic theory 
    
35 
have not gone unchallenged. To further draw attention to a major shift in thinking about 
competition and competing in a so-called new economic environment, as well as for the 
development of the arguments to be empirically examined in this research, the following 
section highlights major discussions among scholars about the ‘new economy’ and its 
implication for the firm. 
 
The first industrial revolution, largely launched in Britain and extending from 
about 1760 to 1830, saw the development of great inventions such as the steam engine 
and the power loom. The second industrial revolution, dated roughly from 1860 to 1900 
and occurring simultaneously in both Europe and the United States, launched many 
more great inventions, such as electricity, the internal combustion engine, chemicals, 
movies, and radio. Gordon (2000) and Grant (2002) suggest that the world may now be 
in the middle of a ‘third’ industrial revolution, or a so-called new economy.  
 
Although never cast as a theory per se, emphasis on a new economy reached 
unparalleled heights in many industrialized economies of the world in the second half of 
the 1990s. However, no formal date for such an economic transition has been 
established. Some pundits describe the arrival of a new economy having occurred as far 
back as the 1970s and 1980s (Toffler, 1971; Bell, 1973; Toffler, 1981; Handy, 1989), 
while others ‘officially’ date the birth of the new economy during the year 1995, a point 
in time in which the Internet was commercialized and legitimized (Sveiby, 1997; 
Mandel, 2000).  
 
To be sure, during the second half of the 1990s, a business, economic, and 
technological phenomenon occurred largely in the United States, but also in other parts 
of the world such as Australia and parts of Europe. The phenomenon was largely based 
on the development of the Internet—particularly its commercial aspects—and Internet 
technology, significantly rising multi-factor productivity trends, the rise of the ‘dot com’ 
business, and the rapid growth of stock market indices—particularly in the United 
States. Terms such as ‘digital age,’  ‘wired economy,’ ‘knowledge age,’ ‘Internet 
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economy,’ and ‘intangible economy’ were bantered about to describe the ushering in of 
a new economic era.  
 
A major emphasis of the new economy was the rapid rise of technology—
particularly Internet technology—and the influence of intangible resources on value 
creation. For example, in the U.S., a Wall Street Journal article claimed, “when it comes 
to technology, even the most bearish analysts agree the microchip and Internet are 
changing almost everything in the economy” (Ip, 2000, p. C1). Wadia (in Sullivan, 
2000, p. ix) states, “we are living in a New Economy—an economy characterized by 
new technologies, globalization, and an ever increasing emphasis on intangibles.”  
 
Blair and Wallman (2001, p. 1), working on the Intangibles Project at the U.S.-
based Brookings Institution, state that “as the United States and other developed 
economies move into the twenty-first century, the factors that have become most 
important to economic growth and societal wealth are ‘intangible,’ or ‘nonphysical’: 
intellectual capital, research and development (R&D), brand names, human capital are 
examples.” The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC Secretariat, 2001) stated: 
 
There is no doubt that the revolution in information and 
communication technology is dramatically boosting the 
development of the global economy.  It carries with it 
unprecedented opportunities in a new style of economy with 
new forms of markets, higher levels of productivity and new 
demands for knowledge, entrepreneurship and innovation. 
(p. 1) [emphasis in original] 
 
Furthermore, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OPEC, 
2001) argue that evidence suggested that something new was taking place in the 
structure of OECD economies.  
 
The previous quotes and observations are merely reflective of the general tone on 
the part of practitioners, academics, policy-makers, and professional and government 
bodies as to the influence of a new economy on the global business environment.  While 
history will undoubtedly observe that something ‘unusual’ did occur in the latter half of 
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the 1990s (particularly in the United States), by the second half of 2000 and into the year 
2001 the economic climate around the world, and much of the Internet hype, had 
significantly changed.  
 
By 2001 the Internet ‘bubble’ had burst. At least one major U.S. stock market 
index fell some 70 percent from its highs, an all-time record drop which erased trillions 
of dollars of wealth while causing both personal and business bankruptcies on a wide 
scale. The euphoria of the claimed dramatic economic change in the years before had 
waned considerably, causing some to question, “What happened to the new economy?” 
(Meyer, 2001; Farrell, 2002). Porter (2001) argues that the new economy appeared less 
like a new economy than like an old economy that had access to new technology, and 
that phrases like ‘new economy’ and ‘old economy’ had all but lost their relevance, if 
they ever had any.  
 
 A report issued from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC Secretariat, 
2001) covering new economy issues argues that some saw the fall of stock markets in 
advanced economies in the 2000-2001 timeframe—especially in the United States—as a 
sign that the new economy was an illusion. As a result, the report claims, the urgency to 
emulate experiences that changed underlying economic performance in the U.S. and 
other economies such as Finland and Australia had subsided in some places. Upton 
(2001) describes that many prominent economists had begun to question whether the 
new economy was really as ‘new’ or significant as claimed and were arguing that many 
of the new economy’s value drivers had the look of old wine in new bottles.  
  
The bursting of the Internet bubble and the extreme downturn of the new 
economy euphoria now withstanding, a few key areas can be examined that are argued 
to be creating revolutionary change in the foundations of modern business; areas that 
might point to ‘new’ sources of competitive advantage and firm performance which may 
be relevant to this study. The two areas are the impact of new technologies and the 
spread of economic globalization. 
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The Impact of New Technologies 
Although technology has long been an important source of innovation, economic 
growth, and competitive differentiation (Gordon, 2000), the late twentieth century saw 
technology serve as a mechanism to create strategic discontinuities that changed the 
nature of competition on an unprecedented scale (Hitt et al., 1998). Such technologies 
are not only changing the nature of production, but the nature of work itself.  
 
By way of example, new manufacturing technologies have changed the nature of 
the economics of product variety, thus enabling the mass customization (Pine, 1993). 
Computer, telecommunications, and data networking technologies (effectively known as 
information and communication technologies, or ICT), on the other hand, are altering 
how firms, employees, and managers interact and work, both within the boundaries of 
the firm and with constituents in the external environment, such as alliances, 
distributors, and suppliers (Galbreath, 2002). In short, scholars argue that new 
technologies are altering the competitive landscape and the factors that are required for 
competitive success (Hitt et al., 1998; Zahra, 1999). 
  
Changes in technology have occurred at an increasing rate (Prastacos et al., 
2002). Similarly, the speed of technological diffusion has also increased in recent years 
(Carlsson, 2002). These two self-reinforcing phenomena create particular patterns of 
change within firms: as the speed of technological innovation increases, so does the 
speed of technological diffusion. Bettis and Hitt (1995, p. 8) state that the “increased 
speed of change necessitates more rapid acquisition of relevant technologies by firms, 
and hence motivates diffusion-increasing behavior.” Such behavior by firms can lead to 
the never ending pursuit of shortened product life cycles through faster innovation 
(Slater, 1996).  
  
Rapid technological change and the rise in the speed of technological diffusion in 
the late twentieth century essentially point to greater knowledge intensity for most firms. 
Mokyr (1990) argues that technology does not, in and of itself, reside outside of people’s 
brains suggesting that technological change should be regarded as a change in 
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knowledge. Thus, the growing technological orientation in most industries and the rapid 
increase in the use of information and communications technology in most firms have 
created greater knowledge intensity (APEC, 2001; OPEC, 2001). Some scholars suggest 
that the current economic landscape is indeed best defined as a ‘knowledge economy’ 
(Houghton and Sheehan, 2000). Kelly and Leyden (2001, p. 1) state, “in the last couple 
of decades we have witnessed an extraordinary transition from an industrial, nation-
based, resource-orientated economy to a global, networked, knowledge-intensive 
economy.” 
  
When the scale and speed of technological change and diffusion creates 
significant upheavals in industries and firms, as occurred in the late twentieth century, 
Lei et al. (1995) argue that knowledge, or know-how, becomes the basis of gaining and 
maintaining a competitive advantage. Essentially, when product quality, price, and even 
specialization can be quickly and easily matched by competitors (Ghemawat, 1986; 
Slater, 1996)—largely through the application of technology—other means of 
competitive advantage must be found. Scholars have suggested that the ability to 
continually build, destroy, and rebuild new resource combinations that are valuable to 
customers and defensible against would-be rivals is critical. This ability has been 
defined as a dynamic capability (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000). 
 
Globalization 
Considerable attention has been paid to the idea of globalization in recent years. 
However, the world was arguably more globalized a century ago than it is today (Bordo 
et al., 1999). In 1900 the world was full of colonial empires. Britain was directly or 
indirectly running half the world—India, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Australia, 
Canada, and Burma. The French, Germans, and Japanese each had their empires. 
America was running Cuba and the Philippines. Governments led the march to 
globalization and companies followed. These political empires were dismantled in the 
aftermath of WWII. Indeed, after WWII, globalization of the modern era has taken a 
different course altogether. 
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 Globalization today is more about business firms and economic reform than 
government control and power. ‘Recent’ globalization has largely been bolstered by 
economic developments around the world and the relaxing of restrictive trade barriers 
between nations and foreign firms (Hitt et al., 1998). For example, free-trade agreements 
such as GATT and NAFTA and the toppling of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
growing market liberalization in China are creating unprecedented opportunities for the 
flow of goods and services around the world.14  
  
Economic developments, as mentioned above, afford firms easier opportunities 
to enter international markets, often through alliances or partnerships or acquisition of 
firms operating in foreign markets. With the increase in the number of connected 
economies, financial capital is more easily and readily available for those who would 
choose to compete in markets anywhere in the world (Fraser and Oppenheim, 1997). 
Furthermore, the explosive growth of information and communications technology in 
the last 20 years has reduced transactions costs and geographic barriers, thus enabling 
improved cross-border productivity while decreasing the costs of competing in 
international markets (Daley, 2001). The ever-increasing globalization of economic 
markets suggests that new means of competitive advantage may be necessary (Hitt et al., 
2001). 
 
Witness the Rise of Intangible Resources? 
The dynamics of the current competitive environment, particularly driven by technology 
and increasingly integrated global economic transactions, appear to be creating a 
landscape where the predictability and stability of markets, and the identification and 
assessment of competitors, is increasingly difficult (Hitt et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
scholars suggest that the increased flow of financial capital around the world, the 
lowering of transactions costs, and rapid technological change and diffusion are 
crumbling barriers to entry in many industries while blurring many traditional industry 
boundaries (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Daley, 2001).  
                                                 
14 Rondinelli and Behrman (2000) find that the number of economic transactions across country borders is 
indeed rising, which might confirm the phenomenon of economic globalization.  
    
41 
D’Aveni (1995b, 1997), for example, argues that the effects of technological 
change, comparable factor endowments (i.e., a majority of global trade taking place 
among advanced nations with similar factor endowments), and the richness and 
availability of capital, transportation, raw materials, machinery, and services—
regardless of the country a firm chooses to compete in—have created an environment 
where rather than competing on the similar factor endowments of financial and physical 
resources, firms must find new sources of competitive advantage. Holding to such a 
view, Upton (2001, p. 59) states, “the importance of intangible assets is the 
distinguishing feature of the new economy.” 
  
Hitt et al. (1998) and Prastacos et al. (2002) argue that new technology and 
increased globalization have created a competitive environment that essentially requires 
two critical imperatives for business success in the twenty-first century. First, in an era 
of discontinuous change, firms must be able to continuously adapt to ever-shifting 
environments, be they internal or external. Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) suggest that 
firms need to strike a balance between reacting, anticipating, and leading change. The 
ability to adapt to such discontinuous change requires organizational flexibility (De 
Meyer et al., 1989; Hitt et al., 1991; Sanchez, 1995; Volberda, 1997), the first so-called 
imperative for business success in the new economy. 
 
 Flexibility is essentially the ability of a firm to respond quickly to substantial, 
uncertain, and fast-occurring changes in the environment, which may impact their 
performance (Aaker and Mascarenhas, 1984; Hitt et al., 1991; Sanchez, 1995). While 
the notion of flexibility is not a new concept, Hitt et al. (1998) argue that the current 
competitive landscape is such that firms must rely on flexibility to continuously adapt to 
discontinuous change more than in any previous competitive era. In order to create an 
environment of organizational flexibility, the second so-called imperative, innovation, is 
vital. 
  
Like flexibility, innovation is not a new concept or corporate imperative. 
However, the rate at which innovation must occur is argued to be different than in 
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previous economic periods (Ghemawat, 1986). For example, research suggests that firms 
that are able to introduce innovative products faster than their competitors earn greater 
returns (Franko, 1989). Unfortunately, Mansfield (1985) claims that today, competitors 
usually obtain 70 percent of the information required to develop a new product within 
one year, if not sooner. Indeed, Slater (1996) suggests that most product innovations are 
copied in less than one year. Thus, if firms wish to keep ahead of competitors with an 
eye on earning superior returns, it appears that they must introduce new product 
innovations at an increasingly quicker rate (Slater, 1996, 1997).  
  
Product innovation aside, other scholars suggest that innovation today is required 
in areas of the firm as diverse as culture (Fiol, 1991), human resource management 
practices (Huselid, 1995), leadership (Petrick et al., 1999), business processes (Hammer, 
1996), and information technology systems (Prastacos et al., 2002). Hitt et al. (1998, p. 
36) state that “when markets shift, new technologies are introduced, the number of 
competitors continues to increase, and new products become rapidly obsolete, firms 
must consistently create new knowledge (innovate), diffuse it throughout the 
organization and find ways to capitalize on it.” Essentially, Hitt et al. (1998) argument 
implies that firms must turn attention to the effective use of intangible resources in 
today’s competitive environment. 
  
Harvey et al. (2001) argue that given the ready availability of financial capital 
and the rather equal factor endowments of the industrialized nations of the world today, 
the ease with which they are made or bought makes physical assets relatively more 
prevalent and less valuable than in competitive eras of the past. On the other hand, Daley 
(2001) claims that intangible resources (e.g., human know-how, brand names, 
reputation) become more valuable as interaction (or transaction) costs and global 
boundaries fall, which appears to be the case in the current competitive climate (Hitt et 
al., 1998).  
 
 In a similar argument, Daley (2001, p. 8) states, “the same intangible asset can be 
used productively over a wider scope, without reducing its value, if there are fewer 
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obstacles to interaction. Consequently, the economic value that can be added by a 
particular intangible asset has increased.” By way of example, the British-based 
company Virgin has leveraged its brand beyond air travel to such diverse operations as 
music superstores, cola drinks, and mobile telephone services, thus giving the firm 
immediate access to new and widely diverse markets.15  
 
 In another example, while the development of a major software program 
(considered an intangible asset) may require a large capital investment and considerable 
human know-how to create, the program itself can be replicated at extremely low 
incremental cost. Furthermore, the software code itself may be used in the development 
of additional software programs, thus reflecting the exponential use of such an intangible 
resource. Itami and Roehl (1987) and Wernerfelt (1989) argue that financial and 
physical assets have a relatively fixed long-run capacity whereas intangible resources 
have relatively unlimited capacity. In other words, intangible resources have the 
potential to be used simultaneously in more than one area without reducing value in 
other areas. Thus, the first advantage of intangible resources appears to be their economy 
of scale and scope (Grant, 1996a). 
 
 The second apparent advantage of intangible assets is that unlike physical assets, 
they are argued to be more difficult to ‘build’ and thus less easily duplicated by 
competitors (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; 
Michalisin et al., 1997). In an era where scholars (see, for example, D’Aveni, 1997; 
Teece, 1998a) argue that access to financial capital is not reserved for only large 
companies and the ability to buy or build physical assets is a relatively easy proposition, 
the debate extrapolated in this section would seem to suggest that intangible resources 
should be more valuable, and contribute more significantly to firm success, than either 
financial or physical—tangible—assets. However, evidence should bear out if the 
arguments are valid.  
  
                                                 
15 Virgin’s entry into the cola market was not successful, however. 
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The first source of evidence suggests that the value of intangible resources is 
found by examining a firm’s market capitalization. By comparing public firms’ market 
value (total number of common shares outstanding times current stock price) to their 
book value (accounting value of financial and physical assets minus liabilities), Daley 
(2001) found that the average market-to-book ratios for public firms in the United States 
and Australia, for example, had steadily risen since the 1950s. While the historical 
average is about 1.6, many firms had achieved market-to-book ratios well above five in 
the 1990s (Lev, 2001). High market-to-book ratios, according to some scholars (see, for 
example, Blair and Wallman, 2001; Lev, 2001), suggest that intangible resources are far 
more valuable than financial or physical assets and thus constitute the most valuable 
store of capital in many firms.  
 
 The second source of evidence comes from the investment activities of member 
OECD countries. Croes (1999, 2000) found that generally, investments in intangibles 
such as research and development, software, education and training, advertising, and 
marketing have increased while investments in gross fixed tangible resources have 
decreased over the period 1985 to 1997.16 Croes (1999, 2000) concluded that a 
noticeable rise in intangible investments points towards the presence of an evolving 
‘knowledge-based’ economy, in which intangible resources need to be leveraged to gain 
a competitive advantage and to sustain growth. 
 
Does a so-called new economy exist? Whether a new economy does in fact exist, 
or whether the current economy is merely traversing a normal evolutionary path, is 
certainly an argument open for debate. However, the fact that a considerable amount of 
attention has been paid to prominent economic issues in a rapidly changing global 
environment suggests that the notion of a new economy should not be dismissed as mere 
conjecture. Indeed, a primary concern of firms—if not governments—is in the 
understanding, development, and exploitation of the sources of economic growth as the 
world moves into the twenty-first century (Figure 5).17 
                                                 
16 Similarly, Nakamura (1999) found that investments in intangibles in the United States, from the 1950s 
to the late 1990s, grew at a much faster rate than in fixed, tangible investments. 
17 Figure 5 is adapted from Hitt et al. (1998). 
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Figure 5 The new competitive dynamics 
 
Perhaps Teece (in Leadbeater, 1999) best sums up the views of many scholars 
regarding the new economy by stating: 
 
The decreased cost of information, the increase and spread 
in the number and range of markets in which companies can 
buy production inputs, the liberalization of product and 
labor markets and the deregulation of financial flows, is 
stripping away traditional sources of competitive 
differentiation and exposing a new fundamental core to 
wealth creation. That fundamental core is the development 
and astute deployment of intangible assets, of which 
knowledge, competence and intellectual property are the 
most significant. Other intangibles such as brands, 
reputation and customer relationships are also vital. Special 
access to natural resources and skilled labor, economies of 
scale and scope, are fading as sustainable bases for 
competitive advantage. In the end, wealth creation in a 
world of heightened competition comes down to 
developing, orchestrating and owning intangible assets 
which your competitors will find it hard to imitate but 
which your customers value. (p. 9)  
  
In light of the changing business conditions described in this subsection and the 
rhetoric that points to the growing importance of intangibles to achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage, many scholars have argued that firms would be prudent to focus 
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attention on the strategic resources that they might acquire, develop, and deploy as part 
of a market strategy, rather than focusing too much attention on the structural 
characteristics of industries that might restrict or prohibit their ability to compete in a 
given market. One such position, and the central focus of this dissertation, is the 
resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
 
Determinants of Firm Success: Resource-Based Factors 
Background and History 
The development of resource-based theories, and in particular the resource-based view 
of the firm (RBV), although first posited in the strategic management literature by 
Wernerfelt (1984), draw their theoretical roots from work dating as far back as Ricardo 
(1817) (Figure 6).18 Indeed, according to Hoskisson et al. (1999), the RBV is not new. 
For example, Selznick’s (1957) early work on management theory highlights the idea of 
distinctive competencies, which is directly related to the RBV. Even the economists 
Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) discuss some of the key resources of the firm 
(e.g., know-how, reputation, brand image, intellectual property) in their works, which 
have been clearly revisited by RBV theorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Early contributors to the RBV and other resource-based streams 
 
In order to more fully elaborate the historical roots of the RBV, the discussion 
concentrates on contributions that have been emphasized in the extant literature. First, 
                                                 
18 Ricardo is included in the contributions to the RBV for the reason that rents that are earned due to the 
ownership of valuable resources that are scarce are called Ricardian rents—which is applied extensively to 
the concept of rents within the RBV stream. The foundation for the observation of such rents can be traced 
back to Ricardo’s work in the nineteenth century (Ricardo, 1817). 
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the work of Edith Penrose is highlighted. Penrose (1959) is identified as one of the 
earliest major contributors to the theoretical underpinnings of the RBV (Kor and 
Mahoney, 2000; Rugman and Verbeke, 2002). Next, seminal works from business 
policy researchers are highlighted. Finally, select researchers within the field of 
economics are explored. Of particular interest here is that all of the contributions below 
focus on resources, though perhaps from different perspectives and in varying degrees, 
which lead to firm heterogeneity (Conner, 1991; Hoskisson et al., 1999). Thus, each 
stream discussed below is similar in that resources constitute a dimension of the firm’s 
ability to gain a competitive advantage, which is a critical implication for the theoretical 
underpinnings of the RBV.19  
   
Edith Penrose 
Although the contemporary roots of the RBV can be traced as far back as Selznick’s 
(1957) Leadership in Administration, Penrose’s (1959) seminal work, The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm, introduced many of the concepts applied to resource-based thinking 
in later years. Penrose (1959) was perhaps one of the first to provide a rich theory of 
firm growth tied to the efficient management of resources. Partly in response to her 
dissatisfaction with stochastic theories of firm growth, Penrose (1959) emphasized that 
firms are institutions created by people to serve the purposes of people. Human 
decisions and motives are stressed, particularly management motives, by the struggle for 
survival and by the need for achievement and recognition to generate both creative 
innovations and adaptive responses to competition or environmental factors via new 
resource combinations (Kor and Mahoney, 2000). Penrose (1959) notes that:  
 
A firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a 
collection of productive resources the disposal of which 
between different uses and over time is determined by 
administrative decision. When we regard the function of the 
private business firm from this point of view, the size of the 
firm is best gauged by some measure of the productive 
resources it employs. (p. 24) 
 
                                                 
19 Of course, the discussion here of early contributors to the RBV is not exhaustive. Other noted 
contributions in the extant literature include, for example, Barnard (1938) and Richardson (1972). 
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Such dynamic interactions between resources and the administrative, or managerial, 
decisions in the coordination of resource use offer an explanation of heterogeneity 
between firms. The coordination effort—and the growth of the firm—is largely 
dependent on human resources, other resources such as land, labor and capital, and the 
knowledge capacity of managers, individuals, and work groups.  
 
 Firm growth then, is duly constrained by the absorption of new personnel, new 
knowledge, and experience. According to Penrose (1959), the growth of the firm is 
directly related to the resources under control and the administrative framework used to 
coordinate resource use. The interaction of resources provides firms with unique 
advantages relative to competitors. Transferring and monitoring resources between firms 
is thus made difficult, denying rivals the chance of replication, and resource inimitability 
secures and protects superior returns—each of which is a theme of the modern RBV. 
 
Business Policy Researchers 
Other work in the 1950s, particularly the work conducted at Harvard University in the 
area of business policy (see, for example, Smith and Christensen, 1951), which 
emphasizes the match between a firm’s strategy and its external environment, created a 
foundation upon which other important contributions to the field of strategic 
management—and the RBV—were developed in the 1960s. 
  
 Perhaps the most influential work in the field of strategy in the 1960s was the 
development of the ‘design school’ (Mintzberg, 1990). At the most basic level, the 
design school suggests that firm ‘fit’—fit between internal capabilities and external 
opportunities—determines competitive advantage. The origins of the design school can 
be traced to Selznick (1957) and Chandler (1962).  
 
 Selznick (1957), for example, introduced the notion of distinct firm-level 
competencies and the need for fit between these competencies and external expectations. 
Chandler (1962) discussed a contingency perspective focused on strategy (long-term 
goals and objectives of a firm) and structure (the design of the organization through 
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which the firm is administered). Changes in strategy are responses to changes in the 
external environment. Thus, fit between the strategy and structure of the firm and its 
external environment is necessary to attain competitive advantage. However, the work of 
Kenneth Andrews and his colleagues in the General Management group at the Harvard 
Business School, in the 1960s, formed the real impetus of the design school. 
  
Andrews and his colleagues introduced the concept of strategy as formulation 
and implementation, where a focus on the internal resources of the firm and the external 
environment are interrelated (Learned et al., 1965, 1969). Their work in the 1960s not 
only provided the foundation for what is known today as the field of strategic 
management, but also led to the development of one of the most widely used strategic 
tools to this day: the SWOT analysis (Ghemawat, 1999).  
  
The SWOT analysis focuses the exercise of strategy formulation by examining 
and ultimately matching a firm’s strengths and weaknesses with its opportunities and 
threats in the marketplace. Andrews (1971) combined these internal and external 
elements in a way that emphasizes the match between competencies, or resources, to the 
external environment in order to generate value. Thus, a focus on the firm’s unique, 
internal resources and their fit with the environment serves as a foundation for 
developing competitive strategies. This perspective has certainly contributed to the 
underpinnings of the RBV (Hoskisson et al., 1999).  
 
Economics Researchers  
Although the influence of Edith Penrose and the work of various business policy 
researchers on the RBV is particularly well documented, others researchers, namely in 
the fields of neoclassical, industrial organization (IO), and evolutionary economics, have 
also influenced the formulation of the theory (Conner, 1991; Rumelt et al., 1991; 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Rumelt et al., 1994). Of particular interest are the 
neoclassical economists Chamberlin and Robinson, Chicago School economists, 
evolutionary/neo-Austrian economists, and Oliver Williamson of the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) school of thought. 
    
50 
In the 1930s, the economists Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) 
acknowledged the importance of firm-specific resources in explaining performance. 
Unlike their contemporaries, Chamberlin and Robinson do not emphasize market 
structures, but rather highlight firm heterogeneity and propose that unique firm resources 
are important factors which give rise to imperfect competition and the attainment of 
abnormal profits. Chamberlin (1933), for example, particularly emphasizes firm-specific 
resources such as technical know-how, reputation, brand awareness, and patents and 
trademarks as sources of superior performance. All of these resources have been 
revisited in the recent strategy literature (e.g., Hall, 1992, Hall, 1993; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002; Galbreath, 2004a; Galbreath and Galvin, 2004).  
  
Evolutionary economics rejects neoclassical perfect competition theory and 
instead posits a theoretical viewpoint based on a dynamic view of competition (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Although this school of thought continues to expand, evolutionary or 
neo-Austrian economists largely share many of Schumpeter’s (1934, 1942) original 
theories and postulates (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). The essence of the Schumpeterian view 
is that the purpose of firms is to take control of competitive opportunities by creating or 
adopting innovations (or technological change) that obsolete rivals’ positions. This 
adaptive approach to innovation and technological change emphasizes the evolutionary 
concept of creative destruction (Bloch, 2000). As agent to such evolutionary processes, 
the firm relies on the strength of the entrepreneur as a manager of change. To initiate 
change, entrepreneurs are only limited by access to financial capital and their ability to 
leverage resources to produce new products, processes, or forms of organization 
(Waters, 1994).  
  
Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of innovation, technological change, and 
entrepreneurialism implies that the role of management is particularly important in 
influencing strategy and firm conduct. For Schumpeter (1934), factors such as 
entrepreneurialism and the use and control of resources in introducing innovation are 
critical in influencing change in the external environment and thus, the dynamics of 
competition and economic growth. Firm success then, is not necessarily associated with 
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market power or the attractiveness of industry structure, but rather is the result of 
innovation and the discovery of new technologies, products, or uses for resources 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
 
Additionally, evolutionary economists highlight the role of knowledge, and 
organizational routines and capabilities, as firm-based resources that may enhance the 
survival of firms, as well as their superior performance (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Winter, 1987). The evolutionary growth theory’s focus on firm knowledge and 
capabilities that are exercised through routines has importance for resource-based 
theory, particularly with respect to dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece 
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and the knowledge-based theory of the firm 
(Grant, 1996a; Spender, 1996a). 
 
Economists in the Chicago School of industrial organization (Stigler, 1961, 
1968; Demsetz, 1973), not being satisfied with the SCP paradigm introduced by Bain 
(1959), and its related strict anti-trust legislation, introduced a different theory of 
explaining the existence of superior performance. Stigler (1961), for example, 
introduced the theory that information is costly and that perfect information does not 
exist in the market—contrary to the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory. 
Stigler (1961) suggested that effective collusion cannot persist over time because of the 
existence of monitoring costs and incentives to cheat. Thus, superior performance cannot 
be explained by effective collusion, but rather by the firm’s efficiency differentials in 
production or distribution. That is, superior performance can ultimately be explained by 
the accrual of rents to specialized, high quality resources (Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt et al., 
1991).20 Of importance to the Chicago School is the notion of the existence of non-
homogeneous inputs or factors, and the existence of forces (costly or imperfect 
information) that impede the mobility of resources. These concepts give justification for 
the observation of firm heterogeneity, which is vital to the RBV.   
                                                 
20 However, Chicago Revisionists do not believe that above-average profits earned by idiosyncratic firm-
level resources can be sustained because imitative entry will drive economic profits to zero in the long run 
(Stigler, 1966; Demsetz, 1973). The resource-based view of the firm, described later in this chapter, argues 
that above-average profits can be sustained for indefinite periods (Barney, 1991; Hill and Deeds, 1996). 
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Building upon Coase’s (1937) seminal argument that firms and market exchange 
are alternative methods for coordinating production, Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) 
offered transaction cost economics (TCE) as a means to explain why firms exist. The 
fundamental premise of TCE is that opportunism in the market is defined by the 
efficiency of institutional arrangements that minimizes the sum of organizational and 
production costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Such organizational and production 
costs stem from the firm-level dyadic transaction, wherein minimization of transaction 
costs is the efficient outcome (Hoskisson et al., 1999; Lockett and Thompson, 2001).  
  
Given that firms (hierarchies) and markets are considered alternative means of 
the organization and facilitation of production, TCE’s notion of hierarchical governance 
suggests that firms have the occasion to develop assets that are idiosyncratic, which in 
turn can capture economic rents. Indeed, TCE assumes that independent managerial 
behaviors affect transaction modes—market versus hierarchy—and thus outcomes 
(Hoskisson et al., 1999). Such a view departs from traditional IO economics where the 
conduct and behaviors of managers are determined by industry structure. Combs and 
Ketchen (1999) point out that TCE is relevant to the RBV in that it focuses attention on 
asset specificity, which can lead to the development of difficult to trade or imitate 
resources. Resource inimitability is a vital theme within RBV theory (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). 
 
With an historical introduction now covered (see Table 2 for a summary), the 
following subsections will focus on elucidating the main theoretical tenets of the RBV, 
concluding with a discussion of recent, resource-centric streams that constitute the 
broader resource-based ‘family.’ 
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Author Contribution to the RBV 
Penrose (1959)  Firms as bundles of resources 
 Firm growth is based on the effective use of resources and limited by 
managerial resources  
Andrews 
(Learned et al., 
1965, 1969; 
Andrews, 1971) 
 Strategy as a process of formulation and administrative implementation 
(emphasizing internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and 
threats) 
 ‘Fit’ between the firm’s unique, internal resources and the external 
environment serves as the basis of competitive advantage  
Chamberlin 
(1933); Robinson 
(1933) 
 Imperfect competition due to firm-specific resources, not market structure 
 Superior firm performance attained via unique resources 
Schumpeter 
(1934, 1942); 
Nelson and 
Winter (1982) 
 Technological innovation and ‘creative destruction’ basis of competitive 
advantage 
 Managerial actions and entrepreneurialism influence firm success rather than 
market power or industry structure 
 Firms viewed as bundles of resources and hierarchies of activities governed by 
routines and rules (repositories of systematic knowledge); performance is 
determined by firm-specific, idiosyncratic routines and rules (capabilities and 
embedded knowledge) 
Stigler (1961, 
1968); Demsetz 
(1973) 
 Firms as a combination of heterogeneous resources 
 Superior performance attained via efficiency gains (e.g., via ownership of 
superior and efficient resources) 
Williamson 
(1975, 1985) 
 Firms seek to minimize transaction and production costs while avoiding 
opportunism in economic exchanges 
 Hierarchical governance of economic exchanges can mitigate the threat of 
opportunism while creating high levels of asset specificity 
 Asset specificity can lead to idiosyncratic, inimitable resources  
 
Table 2 Highlighted summary of early contributors to the RBV 
 
The Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, traditional IO economics heavily influenced 
strategic management thinking and research (Hoskisson et al., 1999). Borrowing from 
IO economics but creating his own distinct view, Porter’s (1980, 1985) seminal works 
emphasize strategic choices that are predicated on industry analysis as the starting point. 
Strategy is thus based upon identifying whether an industry is attractive or not, and then 
determining the viability of a potential competitive position within the external 
constraints imposed by industry structure. However, Chakaborty (1997) suggests that 
industry structure paradigms cannot be expected to provide all the answers as to why 
some firms are more successful than others. Chakaborty (1997, p. 33) states, “a little 
reflection should convince most people that it cannot be freighted with such a burden.”  
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Frustrated with IO economic theory and the lack of definitive empirical evidence 
to support its position, strategic management scholars began to look to factors inside the 
firm—although not to the exclusion of external factors—to better understand the 
performance variability among firms. One theoretical development is the resource-based 
view of the firm (RBV). 
 
In an effort to position a different view of firm success, one that provided an 
alternative explanation vis-à-vis IO economics, the RBV was ‘formally’ introduced in 
the strategic management literature by Wernerfelt (1984). However, the role of industry 
structure was not entirely dismissed as an important consideration in determining 
differences in firm performance.  
  
 Wernerfelt’s (1984) main emphasis, however, is to move beyond the treatment 
of the firm as largely a ‘black box’ (as in the Bain-type IO model) to one that explained 
performance and growth on the basis of the idiosyncratic resources of the firm. 
Although Wernerfelt’s (1984) contribution to the development of the RBV is widely 
acknowledged, Minzberg et al. (1998) suggest that the RBV became a full-fledged 
theory in 1991. In that year, Barney (1991) posited a general theoretical view of 
resources and sustained competitive advantage in a special issue of the Journal of 
Management, which focused on the emerging resource-based view of firm. 
  
 Barney (1991) argues that from a resource perspective, neoclassical economics, 
and even Porter’s work on strategy, essentially treats the resources that firms control as 
identical. Furthermore, neoclassical economics suggests that if resource heterogeneity 
develops within an industry, differences will be short-lived as resources are highly 
mobile. In other words, firms can easily acquire the resources needed to implement their 
chosen strategies. Firms are assumed to have the same resources or access to the same 
resources needed to compete. RBV theorists reject such a position. The fundamental 
tenets of the RBV suggest that resource heterogeneity between firms does exist and that 
the rents attained from such heterogeneity can be sustained (Peteraf, 1993). 
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From a definitional perspective, resources are generally classified as tangible or 
intangible (Itami and Roehl, 1987). Tangible resources include financial assets such as 
cash and physical assets such as buildings and land. Intangible resources include 
intellectual property assets such as patents and trademarks; organizational assets such as 
culture and organizational structure; reputational assets such as brand name reputation 
and company reputation; and capabilities and competencies which consist of know-how 
and routines.  
  
 Obviously, from the aforementioned list, most firms have resources that fit 
many, if not most, of the classifications. However, RBV theorists argue that although 
each firm leverages a broad spectrum of resources in executing a given market strategy, 
not all resources can be sources of competitive advantage (Reed and Defillippi, 1990; 
Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993; Black and Boal, 1994). For 
example, while a consultant may need a laptop computer—a tangible, physical asset—to 
effectively complete client engagements, it is unlikely that a laptop computer is a 
significant contributor to a firm’s competitive advantage. To understand which 
resources might be sources of competitive advantage, RBV logic must be applied. 
Barney (1991) suggests that to be sources of competitive advantage, resources must be: 
1) valuable; 2) rare; 3) inimitable; and 4) nonsubstitutable.21 The so-called ‘VRIN’ 
thesis is the RBV’s main prescription. 
  
 Resources that are valuable allow a firm to create or implement strategies that 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991); enable customer needs to be 
better satisfied (Bogner and Thomas, 1994; Verdin and Williamson, 1994); satisfy 
customer needs at a lower cost than competitors (Barney, 1986a; Peteraf, 1993); or 
“exploit opportunities or neutralize threats” in the firm’s environment (Barney, 1991, p. 
106). The bundle of resources that a firm accumulates or acquires to execute a given 
market strategy must be more valuable, relative to the rest of the competitors in the 
                                                 
21 In a critique of Barney’s (1991) article, Foss and Knudsen (2003) argue that there are only two, not four, 
necessary conditions for the expression of sustainable competitive advantage, namely uncertainty and 
immobility. 
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market, in order for the firm to enjoy a competitive advantage and superior 
performance. 
 
 Resources are rare if they are possessed by a small number of current or 
potential competitors or, ideally, by only one firm. Rareness then, is a matter of degree. 
It is a function of the number of other firms in the competitive arena holding the same 
resource. If a large number of firms in the competitive arena have the same particular 
resource (even if it is valuable), then the resource’s ability to generate a competitive 
advantage for any one firm is diminished. Generally, if the number of firms possessing a 
particularly valuable resource is small, that resource is considered rare and has the 
potential of generating a competitive advantage.  
  
While resources that are valuable and rare provide opportunities to gain a 
competitive advantage, for a firm to be in a position to exploit valuable and rare 
resources, there must be a resource position barrier to prevent other competitors from 
imitating those resources. Thus, the sustainability of a resource-based advantage is 
predicated on the condition of inimitability (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 
1986b). 
 
 Resource inimitability refers to the degree to which a resource can be imitated by 
competitors. The easiest way to try to gain a competitive advantage is to acquire a 
resource with attributes and levels of attributes similar to some desired resource which 
produces a competitive advantage (Barzel, 1997). However, if a focal firm’s strategy is 
based upon resources that competitors can readily and easily buy, that firm’s ability to 
sustain a competitive advantage will be considerably diminished and probably short-
lived.  
 
The ability to buy a resource depends on its availability. Resources such as 
buildings, equipment, and even standardized skills—such as a data entry clerks or word 
processing temps—are generally readily available and can be bought and even 
transferred from one firm to another (Grant, 2002). However, other resources are not so 
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mobile. Some resources are highly context specific (and therefore not mobile), 
depreciate on transfer or may not, despite considerable effort, offer the same benefits to 
the acquiring firm as were achieved in the firm from which they were acquired. 
Although Barney (1991) describes three sources of resource inimitability—causal 
ambiguity, history, and social complexity—five widely discussed mechanisms are:22 
 
 Causal ambiguity – For competitors trying to imitate successful firms’ resources, 
causal ambiguity may limit their understanding of exactly what it is that makes 
successful firms successful (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed and Defillippi, 1990). In 
order words, causal ambiguity exists when the link between the resources controlled 
by a firm and a firm’s competitive advantage is not understood or understood only 
very imperfectly. 
 
 History – Resource inimitability may result from path dependencies, such as 
historical events or unique historical circumstances (David, 1985; Arthur et al., 
1987). By way example, some firms may gain inimitable advantages through the 
historical acquisition of a physical location.  
 
 Legal property rights – In some cases, a resource may be clearly identified and 
understood by competitors. However, imitating the resource may be prevented 
through the legal system of property rights. Intangible legal assets, such as patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights, are all protected by intellectual property laws.  
 
 Social complexity – Can be found where resources are based on very complex social 
phenomena (Klein and Lefler, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Barney, 1986b; 
Hambrick, 1987). Although it may be possible to specify how a socially complex 
resource, such as culture, adds value to a firm, that does not mean that other firms 
can replicate or ‘engineer’ a similar culture to attain similarly valuable benefits. 
Competitors may commit significant amounts of time and money to replicate a 
competitor’s resource(s) without ever achieving similar benefits.  
                                                 
22 The five mechanisms described here are among the most featured sources of resource inimitability in 
the extant literature. For a more complete review of resource inimitability, see Mahoney and Pandian 
(1992). 
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 Time compression diseconomies – This refers to the time needed to develop 
resources through learning, experience, firm-specific knowledge, or trained 
proficiency in a skill (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Resources based on time 
compression diseconomies may be inimitable sources of competitive advantage—at 
least for some period of time—due to the necessary time, effort, and investment 
competitors must make in the attempt to duplicate such resources (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989).23 
 
The final test of a resource’s ability to sustain a competitive advantage is its 
degree of nonsubstitutability. In other words, for a resource to be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage, it must have no equivalents. However, similar to the rare 
condition, nonsubstitutability is a matter of degree. Clearly, perfect substitutes would 
undermine the rent-generating capacity of another resource.24 But perfect substitutes 
rarely exist. As such, the rent-generating capacity of resource X is only lessened to the 
extent that resource Y can provide strategically equivalent benefits to those of resource 
X.  
 
A second observation is that if two resources are equivalent substitutes and 
provide the same strategic benefits but are also rare, they can still afford both firms 
rent-generating capacity. For example, resource X may be an equivalent substitute for 
resource Y; however, both resource X and resource Y are rare. Thus, although both 
resources are equivalent substitutes, because they are also both rare it is still possible 
that they can be sources of sustainable competitive advantage. In this sense, similar to 
the rareness condition, nonsubstitutability has degrees of difference.  
                                                 
23 Of course, a firm may attempt to acquire resources rather than build them from scratch. However, given 
that a large majority of mergers and acquisitions fail to achieve shareholder value (Arikan, 2002), there is 
no guarantee that acquiring a specific resource will payoff as intended. 
24 Rents, or economic rents, have been identified as Ricardian rents (discussed in footnote 20) (Peteraf, 
1993), monopoly rents (Bain, 1959), Schumpeterian (entrepreneurial) rents (Makadok, 2001), and 
Marshallian/Paretian rents (quasi-rent) (Lewin and Phelan, 1999). Generally, economic rents are defined 
as differential profits of a factor in excess of its opportunity costs that are sustained in equilibrium (Foss 
and Knudsen, 2003; Peteraf and Barney, 2003). Although the concept of economic rents is important to 
RBV theory, a thorough discussion of the various rent concepts is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Lewin and Phelan (1999), Lippman and Rumelt (2003a), and Peteraf and Barney (2003) provide excellent 
discussions of the concept of rents. 
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By way of practical representation, firm X has developed a highly complex 
decision-making support system, encompassing information technology that is deeply 
embedded in the firm’s formal and informal decision-making processes. This socially 
complex technology allows firm X to consistently perform at the highest levels among 
its peers. Firm Y, on the other hand, relies solely on a tightly knit, highly experienced 
management team to make concomitant adjustments to the firm’s strategies. Firm Y is 
also one of the highest performing firms in the market. In this example, the 
sophisticated decision support system and the highly experienced management team 
may be considered substitutes, but if they are also both rare, may still afford the two 
firms a sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
Barney’s (1991) work solidified the groundwork for the theoretical 
understanding of what explains—from a resource perspective—the differences between 
successful and unsuccessful firms. This key theoretical contribution constitutes the 
RBV’s main prescription (Michalisin et al., 1997). However, Peteraf (1993) 
subsequently added two additional conditions to understand the rent-generating capacity 
of resources: 1) ex ante limits to competition; and 2) ex post limits to competition. 
  
Peteraf (1993) argues that in order for a firm to attain a competitive advantage, 
ex ante limits to competition must exist. Peteraf (1993, p. 185) defines ex ante limits to 
competition as “prior to any firm’s establishing a superior resource position, there must 
be limited competition.” By way of example, if two or more competing firms in an 
industry know prior to the acquisition of a given resource that the resource will endow 
them with an inimitable resource position over current and future rivals, the firms will 
compete for those resources in such a way that any anticipated returns will be bargained 
away.  
  
Rumelt (1987) suggests that if there are no differences between the value (ex post 
value) of a venture and its costs (ex ante costs), the rents will be zero. In other words, 
“resources have to be acquired below their discounted net present value in order to yield 
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rents. Otherwise, future rents will be fully absorbed in the price paid for the resource” 
(Foss, 1997, p. 10).  
 
 In order for the firm to sustain economic rents, ex post limits to competition 
must exist. Ex post limits to competition are the forces that limit competition and rent 
generating potential after a firm gains a competitive advantage and accrues above-
normal profits (Peteraf, 1993). Peteraf (1993) suggests that the ability to sustain rents 
may be restricted if competition increases the supply of scarce resources. Alternatively, 
competition may undermine the monopolist’s ability to restrict output through 
increasing the elasticity of the demand curve. However, as argued by Barney (1991), 
Peteraf (1993) also suggests that from a resource-based perspective, there are two 
essential factors that limit ex post competition: 1) imperfect imitability; and 2) 
nonsubstitutability. 
 
The aforementioned conditions and assumptions form the core premises of the 
resource-based view of the firm (Figure 7).25 The RBV suggests that:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991), and Peteraf (1993) are widely credited as the seminal works in terms 
of the development of the RBV as a stand-alone theory. However, other works have certainly contributed 
to the development of the view. Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and Rumelt (1984), for example, were 
among the first to explain intra-industry differences in firm performance by discussing the concepts of 
causal ambiguity, uncertain imitability and isolating mechanisms in describing resource heterogeneity 
among firms, all of which are important concepts within resource-based thinking. Barney (1986a) 
suggests that the characteristics of the strategic factor markets determine the possibilities for a firm to 
earn rents from idiosyncratic resources. He particularly emphasizes private or asymmetric information 
and firm-specific knowledge of buyers and sellers and worker’s capabilities as strategic resources that can 
be leveraged to exploit above normal returns in imperfect factor markets. In other works, Rumelt (1987) 
and Dierickx and Cool (1989) describe imitability barriers (e.g., casual ambiguity and isolating 
mechanisms such as asset interconnectedness and asset stock efficiencies) that impede—or make very 
costly—imitation from rivals. Day and Wensley (1988), Aaker (1989), and Grant (1991) posit strategy 
formulation models that have firm resources as the central concept as the sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage. These works and many others (see, for example, Teece, 1980; Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990; Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Black and 
Boal, 1994; Hunt and Morgan, 1995; Oliver, 1997; Srivastava et al., 1998) have certainly contributed to 
the resource-based view of the firm beyond the seminal works of Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991), and 
Peteraf (1993). 
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Figure 7 The ‘inside out’ RBV model26 
 
1)  The firm’s primary objective is to attain a sustainable competitive advantage that 
affords above-normal performance (Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992); 
2)  There are systemic differences across firms in the extent to which they control 
resources that are necessary to implement strategies (i.e., resource heterogeneity 
exists) (Barney, 1991); 
3)  These differences can be sustained over time (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993); 
4)  These differences create environments where resources cannot be transferred from 
firm to firm without cost (Peteraf, 1993);  
5)  Differences in firms’ resource endowments explain performance variation (Barney, 
1991); and 
6) In the search for the sources that explain performance variation, one should look to 
intangible rather than tangible resources (Ray et al., 2004).  
 
Given the above tenets of the RBV, the view necessarily concentrates on firm- 
level factors in order to explain why differences in firm success exist. Although the 
                                                 
26 Unlike IO economics which views industry structure as the main determinate of firm performance, 
Figure 7 depicts the logic that it is the firm’s internal, idiosyncratic resources (the inner ring) that 
determine its advantage, and thus its success, in the product market (the outer ring). 
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theoretical underpinnings of the RBV can be traced back several decades, the RBV was 
largely developed in the 1990s. As such, the RBV is a relatively new development 
among the theoretical explanations of why some firms are more successful than others. 
 
Since the seminal works of Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991) and Peteraf 
(1993), the RBV continues to progress on many fronts. For example, many books have 
been published which further explore the theoretical and conceptual dynamics of 
resource-based thinking (Hamel and Heene, 1994; Montgomery, 1995; Foss, 1997; 
Heene and Sanchez, 1997). The attempt to more fully integrate economics and the RBV 
has also been examined (Lewin and Phelan, 1999; Lockett and Thompson, 2001; 
Mathews, 2002). Furthermore, special issues focusing on the RBV have been published 
in the Journal of Management and Strategic Management Journal, in 2001 and 2003 
respectively, addressing emerging trends in the theory.27  
 
Of particular interest is the specific development of strategic thinking with 
respect to resources. Various streams of discussion have emerged in the last decade that 
share a common viewpoint of resources as sources of competitive advantage and firm 
differentiation. In the section that follows, the three general streams that have emerged; 
namely, the capabilities school, the core competency concept, and the knowledge-based 
theory of the firm, are explored. These streams are discussed for the purpose of helping 
to further theoretically ground the hypotheses for this study, which are presented in 
Chapter III. 
 
Additional Streams Within Resource-Based Theory 
The Capabilities School 
Dosi et al. (1988) argue that during the course of the 1980s, many economists and non-
economists became dissatisfied with the treatment of innovation and technological 
change in mainstream economics. Although Schumpeter (1934, 1942) had posited the 
ideas of endogenous technological innovation and creative destruction as central to 
                                                 
27 However, it is interesting to note that Hoopes et al. (2003) suggest that while conceptual advancements 
of the RBV have been steadily growing over the last 15 years, empirical research testing the core premises 
(e.g., value, rareness) of the theory has not kept pace. 
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capitalism, neoclassical economic theory largely ignored the phenomenon of technical 
change, merely treating it as “part of the rag-bag of ‘residual’ or ‘exogenous’ factors” 
(Freeman, 1988, p. 1). Similarly, Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that neoclassical 
economic theory had largely been unsuccessful in explaining the phenomenon of 
technological change.   
  
Throughout the decade of the 1980s, in order to explore technical change more 
adequately, a growing number of researchers focused attention on the issue of 
technological change and innovation as an endogenous phenomenon of the firm (see, for 
example, Teece, 1980; Sahal, 1981; Dosi, 1982; Scherer, 1982; Elster, 1983; Saviotti 
and Metcalfe, 1984; Teece, 1986). They primarily address the issue of change and 
innovation derived from the individual and collective efforts of firm, university, 
government, and private laboratory research and development (R&D) activities. 
 
 Early researchers in the capabilities field essentially sought to discover if 
technology, or research and development, capabilities could provide growth in size, 
markets, and industries. Teece (1988), for example, explores the implications of in-
house versus contract R&D. Teece (1988, p. 277), following the logic of Williamson’s 
(1975) transaction cost economics, argue that R&D naturally belongs inside the 
corporation, thus avoiding the costs and “difficulties associated with writing, executing 
and enforcing R&D contracts.” Furthermore, he argues that the expansion and growth of 
the firm—namely, through diversification—is driven by the research and development 
capabilities within the firm.  
 
 Teece (1988) and other scholars in the 1980s (see, for example, Kay, 1988; 
Coombs, 1988) posit that corporate growth and expansion is an endogenous 
technological imperative, in which the research and development capabilities of firms 
largely determine the degree and level of their innovation in product markets. While 
attention in the area of capabilities in the 1980s largely focused on technological, or 
research and development capabilities, the 1990s saw a shift in the locus of attention to 
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‘dynamic’ capabilities (Teece et al., 1991; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
  
In the 1990s, the dynamics of global competition, particularly among high 
technology industries, is argued to have been a ‘hypercompetitive’ environment; one in 
which the development of new strategies becomes necessary for competitive survival 
(D’Aveni, 1994, 1995a). Teece and Pisano (1994) argue that simply owning the right 
technological assets guarded by property rights (e.g., patents) is not enough to support a 
competitive advantage. They state that firms with a significant competitive advantage 
are ones that “can demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product 
innovation, coupled with the management capability to effectively coordinate and 
redeploy internal and external competencies” (p. 538). Thus, the ability to sense and 
adapt to ever-changing competitive environments through the integration and 
continuous re-configuration of organizational skills, assets, and functional competencies 
is the core of a dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Fiol, 2001). Furthermore, many scholars (D’Aveni, 1994, 1995a, Teece et al., 1997; 
Makadok, 1998; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) claim that competitive advantage cannot 
be sustained over the long-term; therefore, small, temporary advantages must be 
continually and dynamically ‘rebuilt.’ It is the dynamic capability, then, that is argued to 
be the key source of performance, if not survival, in the modern, hypercompetitive 
economy.  
 
 Other scholars in the 1990s looked beyond a purely technological notion or 
dynamic view of capabilities. Day (1994), for example, describes capabilities in a more 
general sense. He suggests that capabilities are the complex bundles of knowledge 
within the firm that are exercised through organizational processes that enable firms to 
coordinate and make productive use of their assets. Rather than referring to merely 
technological or dynamic capabilities, Day (1994) suggests that capabilities are as 
diverse as new product development, service delivery, and order fulfillment. Collis 
(1994) describes capabilities as three-fold. In the first category, capabilities are basic 
functional activities of the firm such as plant layout and distribution logistics. The 
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second category includes those activities that allow the firm to learn and adapt to 
changing environmental conditions over time. Lastly, Collis (1994, p. 145) suggests that 
‘metaphysical’ capabilities allow the firm “to recognize the intrinsic value of other 
resources or to develop novel strategies before competitors.” However, a common 
theme among scholars positioned in the capabilities camp is the notion of routines.  The 
notion of routines is not a new concept. 
  
Nelson and Winter (1982) first formalized the notion of routines in their work on 
an evolutionary theory of economic change. They define routines as “all regular and 
predictable behavioral patterns of firms” (1982, p. 14) and posit that routines are the 
core services (cf. Penrose, 1959) with which the firm generates value from a firm’s 
factor stocks, this being achieved through the application of organizational know-how 
and skills. However, are routines capabilities or are capabilities routines? 
 
Within the capabilities school, the concept of capabilities may be delineated with 
respect to factor stocks and routines. According to some scholars (see, for example, 
Penrose, 1959; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Collis, 1994; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) 
factor ‘stocks,’ which may be thought of as tangible inputs, such as labor, property, or 
capital, are those that can be readily acquired from the factor markets. Tangible factor 
stocks, in and of themselves, are seen as being ‘static’ in the sense that they cannot 
independently exist as sources of economic rents (cf. Penrose, 1959).  
 
To be brought to bear on a value-creating strategy that affords the firm economic 
rents, it is held that factor stocks must be transformed into outputs (Davenport, 1993; 
Collis, 1994). Outputs may be intermediate goods such as context-specific information, 
new learning or routines, or final end products or services that are sold directly to 
customers (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  However, converting tangible input stocks 
into intermediate or final outputs relies on operational routines (Zollo and Winter, 1999; 
Bhatt, 2000; Galbreath, 2004b).  
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For the purposes of this research, operational routines are described as common 
or general-purpose know-how. Operational routines “enable the continuous repetition of 
certain tasks which have already been previously carried out” (Fernandez et al., 2000, p. 
83). As such, routines are the repeatable processes and decision rules for how a firm’s 
day-to-day activities are completed. For example, firms in similar industries are likely to 
develop common operational routines (Zuboff, 1988). These common business 
processes may be transferred and replicated from one context to another, from one firm 
to another or from one department or group to another within a single firm. Firms may 
consist of many common sets of routines, despite possessing diverse sets of activities 
(Starbuck, 1983; Budros, 1999).  
 
The firms various activities (Collis, 1994), on the other hand, are developed 
when firms match and integrate knowledge from operational routines and the context-
specific know-how of individuals and groups. Thus, although routines are described in 
their own nomenclature, they are considered a capability in that they underlie, build, and 
reconfigure the firm’s activities (Collis, 1994).  Such functional, dynamic, and strategic 
or metaphysical activities, while possibly comprising many common operational 
routines, may become capabilities that are difficult to imitate by competitors as they are 
shaped by a firm’s history, culture, and interaction patterns.28 Although it may be 
possible for a competitor to copy common routines by replicating specific capabilities, 
these are unlikely to provide any advantage until they can be modified to the unique 
history, contexts, and circumstances of the replicating firm (Wernerfelt, 1989).  
 
Reflecting on firm capabilities, Collis (1994) and Day (1994) suggests that not 
all capabilities are sources of competitive advantage. Some capabilities will be 
performed adequately and others will be performed poorly. However, a few must be 
performed with superiority in order to outperform competitors (Day, 1994). In essence, 
a firm must have distinctive capabilities to achieve superior levels of success in 
competitive markets (Day, 1994; Galbreath, 2004b).
                                                 
28 Polanyi (1966) and Itami and Roehl (1987) refer to this as the level of tacitness of a firm’s knowledge. 
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Figure 8 Conceptualization of capabilities 
 
In summary, Nelson and Winter’s (1982) routine hierarchy model is 
reconfigured to posit a general view of capabilities (Figure 8). In the view of the 
capabilities school, basic inputs can be described as factor stocks such as property or 
capital. Factor stocks are considered static factors of production. That is, they must be 
converted, or transformed, into outputs to realize their full value-creating or economic 
potential. Operational routines, themselves a capability, are the enabling, knowledge-
based processes used by specific firm activities to affect a desired end-state (Lehmann, 
1997; Srivastava et al., 1999). Operational routines are regular and predictable patterns 
of activity that are made up of a sequence of coordinated actions by individuals and 
groups (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Firm activities are the functional, dynamic, and 
metaphysical (or strategic) activities that, via operational routines, transform inputs into 
value-creating outputs (Day, 1994). Capabilities, consisting of routines and activities, 
are the embodiment of individual, group, and firm-wide know-how. Finally, given their 
history and context, capabilities may be idiosyncratic to the firm and may exhibit high 
degrees of value, rareness, inimitability, and nonsubstitutability. Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) argue that capabilities are built rather than bought and, therefore, profits that 
accrue to positions of competitive advantage based on capabilities are much less likely 
to be dissipated in the competition to acquire those capabilities in factor markets 
(Barney, 1986a). 
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The Core Competency Concept 
The core competency concept largely emerged in the 1990s as a novel means of re-
thinking the notion of the corporation and the roots of competitive advantage (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990). Since the release of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) seminal article, 
“The Core Competence of the Corporation,” the core competency concept has become a 
major topic of scholarly pursuit within the field of strategic management.  
 
 In essence, Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) article on core competencies sought to 
redefine the roots of competitive advantage of the corporation—particularly 
multinational or multiproduct firms—or using their term, to ‘rethink’ the corporation 
and the fundamental roots of competitive advantage. For decades, the common view of 
the roots of competitive advantage was that they lie in a firm’s ability to gain a cost- 
leadership position (Boston Consulting Group, 1968, 1975) or a differentiation 
advantage (Porter, 1980, 1985).  
  
The basis of a cost-leadership position or differentiation advantage lies in the 
product market arena, where competition is essentially a contest to gain market share 
(Buzzell et al., 1975). Gaining market share is assumed to be the key-driver of superior 
performance (Jacobson and Aaker, 1985; Buzzell and Gale; 1987). Furthermore, 
competitive advantage is viewed as simply a matter of solving the single equation of 
how to trade off quality for cost. However, De Leo (1994) argues that the ‘single 
equation’ principle is too simplistic to explain the roots of sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
  
 Traditional strategy approaches that are built upon the product market as the 
dominant arena of competition have difficultly explaining persistent performance 
differences across firms within the same industry (Rumelt, 1987). Furthermore, 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) and Hax and Wilde (2001) argue that such an incessant focus on 
the product market as the locus of strategy necessarily shifts managers’ attention away 
from the process of value creation to one of positioning and maneuvering against the 
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backdrop of competitive ‘war,’ as if positioning and maneuvering are the only relevant 
dimensions of competition.  
 
 The act of positioning and maneuvering in product markets drives strategy to a 
choice of either emphasizing efficiency, which is generally achieved through performing 
activities at a lower cost than competitors, or of performing similar activities better than 
competitors (differentiation) which affords a premium price (Porter, 1985). Basically, 
the product market strategy framework posits that low cost and differentiation positions 
are mutually exclusive objectives and that not choosing between the two will leave a 
firm ‘stuck in the middle’ (Porter, 1985). Such a choice and commitment to a product/ 
market strategy suggests that competitive advantage can be achieved through either a 
low cost or differentiation position, but not through both positions simultaneously.  
 
 The steadfast assumptions of the product market strategy framework of low cost 
or differentiation positions have not gone unchallenged. Several scholars (see, for 
example, Murray, 1988; Gilbert and Strebel, 1988; Miller, 1992; Cronshaw et al., 1994) 
suggest that obtaining positions of low cost and differentiation may indeed be 
simultaneously possible. Evidence suggests that the most resilient firms are good at 
everything: they are superb ‘all rounders,’ not just good at low-cost or differentiation 
(Murray; 1988; Cronshaw et al., 1994). Indeed, in the 1980s, Japanese firms like Canon, 
Casio, NEC, and Sony, among others, were able to introduce highly differentiated 
products while consistently achieving low-cost positions, largely through the use of 
sophisticated manufacturing technology and advanced quality control processes 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; De Leo, 1994; Ellsworth, 2002).  
 
 The strategic positions of many Japanese firms suggested that new forms, or new 
sources, of competitive advantage existed beyond the traditional product market strategy 
framework. While modern manufacturing technology and quality control processes were 
a large contributor to Japanese firms’ success, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argued that 
Japan’s competitive success rested largely in their ability to view themselves in terms of 
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their core competencies rather than the product markets they served.29 Thus, the core 
competency concept was born. 
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, p. 81) define core competencies as “the collective 
learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies.” The definition implies that core 
competencies are a bundle of constituent skills and technologies, rather than a single, 
discrete capability or technology. Furthermore, the definition implies that a core 
competency represents the integration of a variety of individual capabilities that must be 
coordinated, through routines or operational processes, to achieve a desired end-state.  
 
 Given the above, a core competency is unlikely to reside, in its entirety, in a 
single individual or small team but rather is an assemblage of individual, group, and 
organizational know-how, routines and capabilities. The definition also implies an 
activity (or ‘doing’) component, which focuses on exploiting skills better than 
competitors, and a cognitive component which relies on cognitive traits such as values, 
recipes, and understandings to drive collective organizational learnings (Bogner and 
Thomas, 1994).  
 
The original conclusion or normative implication of the core competency 
concept was that firms should strive to build world-class leadership positions in the 
design and development of a particular class of product, referred to as ‘core products’ 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Bogner et al., 1999). Coyne et al. (1997, p. 43) state that 
core competencies are “a combination of complementary skills and knowledge-bases 
embedded in a group or team that results in the ability to execute one or more critical 
processes to a world-class standard.” Building such a world-class position then affords 
firms the opportunity to apply their unique core competencies to a variety of potential 
product markets.  
                                                 
29 Although Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) article largely points to the success of many Japanese companies 
in the 1980s, Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) imply that many of Japan’s leading companies had been 
building their core competencies for decades before the 1980s. 
    
71 
 Hamel (1994) argues that core competencies are not product-specific but rather 
contribute to the competitiveness of a range of products or services and thus, transcend 
any particular product, service, or single business unit within the firm. By way of 
example, core competencies may be held in miniaturization, optical-media design, 
microprocessor design, operating systems development, optomechatronics, package 
transport and delivery, logistics, operations management, and electromechanical design 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Stalk et al., 1992; Hamel, 1994; Chiesa and Manzini, 1997; 
Petts, 1997). Although the basic concept of core competencies may be grasped relatively 
easily, the logic behind what makes a competency core is not as easily understood. The 
task of understanding the competencies that lie at the center, or the core, of a firm’s 
competitive success requires the test of three factors: 1) a core competency must make a 
significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end product; 2) a core 
competency should be imperfectly imitable; and 3) a core competency should provide a 
gateway to a wide variety of markets (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, Hamel, 1994). 
  
The first test of a core competency revolves around customer value or perceived 
customer benefit. Hamel (1994, p. 13) states, “a core competency must make a 
disproportionate contribution to customer-perceived value.” Thus, a core competency is 
a skill which firms leverage to deliver fundamental customer benefit. Customer value 
has been described in many ways (Zeithaml, 1988; Gale, 1994). Following Hunt and 
Morgan (1995), customer value can be described as the worth that customers as 
individuals, as market segments, or as a mass, place on the consequences they attribute 
to a product.  
  
Customer value stems from either the perceived or expected performance in 
satisfying customers’ functional and psychic needs (Sheth et al., 1991). Customer value 
perceptions or evaluations can be made along several performance, or benefit, 
dimensions. The importance of such dimensions can vary dramatically over time, across 
situations, and among customer segments (Dickson, 1982; Dickson and Ginter, 1987; 
Gale, 1994; Hunt, 2000). Thus, core competencies not only need to contribute 
significantly to customer value in the present, but they must also evolve and change to 
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contribute significantly to customer value in the future, as individual, market segment, 
and ‘mass’ tastes and preferences shift over time.  
  
Hamel (1994), however, argues that core competencies don’t always have to 
contribute significantly to customer value alone. Competencies such as manufacturing 
skills and business processes, which yield substantial cost benefits to producers, may 
also be considered core competencies. Therefore, while customer value designates the 
first test of a core competency, there are exceptions to the rule. 
   
The second factor that determines whether a competency is core is its ability to 
resist imitation. In other words, a core competency must be competitively distinctive or 
unique. Collis and Montgomery (1995) argue that inimitability is at the heart of value 
creation because it limits competition. If a core competency can be imitated, any value 
derived and customer value provided –and thus any profit stream—will be short lived. 
Therefore, as was discussed in the RBV subsection, certain characteristics or isolating 
mechanisms must be present in order to enable core competencies to remain inimitable 
for long periods of time, and thus to be sources of sustained above-average performance.  
  
 First, regulatory conditions, in the form of legal protection, may help to sustain 
the inimitability of a core competency (Hall, 1992). Because core competencies are built 
over time rather than bought, path dependent conditions may block competitors from 
easily copying a core competency (Barney, 1989; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Second, 
core competencies may be causally ambiguous (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed and 
Defillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Chi, 1994). Because core competencies consist of 
complex webs of social interactions, technology, and individual, group and 
organizational learning, competitors will likely encounter high degrees of difficulty in 
disentangling what the core competency is let alone how to re-create it. Thus, causal 
ambiguity can act as a resource-position barrier for a core competency (Wernerfelt, 
1984). 
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The final determinant of a core competency is its ability to provide a channel or 
‘gateway’ to enter new markets. Hamel (1994, p. 15) states, “core competencies are the 
gateways to new products.” For example, Sharp’s core competency in designing and 
developing flat-screen displays has served as a channel to enter a variety of product 
markets such as camcorders, laptop computers, video projection screens, and pocket 
televisions (Hamel, 1994). Casio leverages its core competencies in miniaturization, 
microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision-casting to enter a 
variety of product market—from card calculators to pocket televisions to digital watches 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  
  
The ability to leverage core competencies to exploit new market opportunities 
carries similar logic to Wernerfelt’s (1984) concept of the resource-product matrix. 
Wernerfelt (1984) has argued that rather than viewing firms’ market opportunities in 
light of product portfolios, they should be viewed through the lens of the resources 
controlled by the firm that can be leveraged across a variety of product markets. Looking 
at portfolios of resources rather than products, firms get a different, richer perspective on 
growth prospects, as they can more readily identify under which conditions which 
resources may be exploited to enter new markets (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
 The resource-product matrix is the same argument posited by the core 
competency concept (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel, 1994). That is, rather than 
create an end product that may only ‘fit’ a single market segment, firms should develop 
core competencies that can be leveraged to create ‘core’ products (e.g., Sharp’s flat 
screen displays and Honda’s power trains) that may be ultimately exploited to build end- 
products in many different market segments. Finally, similar to the RBV’s test of value, 
rareness, inimitability, and non-substitutability (Barney, 1991), core competencies may 
not be core if they only pass the customer value and inimitability tests. Competencies 
must also be able to provide a gateway to new product markets to be considered core.
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Are core competencies capabilities? 
If ever the terminological haze surrounding resource-based theory is apparent, it is in the 
discussion of competencies and capabilities. Since Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) original 
contribution to the concept of core competencies, scholarly work has essential grown 
into a ‘competency’ stream unto itself. Unfortunately, this stream often overlooks or 
neglects the intent behind Prahalad and Hamel’s central thesis. For example, books by 
Hamel and Heene (1994) and Heene and Sanchez (1997) have highlighted the diverse 
paths the competency stream has taken. 
  
A variety of articles have focused on competencies, core competencies, dynamic 
core competencies, meta-competencies, and organizational competencies to explain 
sustainable competitive advantage and firm growth (Lado et al., 1992; Lei et al., 1996; 
Marino, 1996; Petts, 1997; Wilcox-King et al., 2001). Sanchez and Heene (1997) have 
introduced a full-fledged theory of competence-based competition. However, a common 
and recurring theme is the acknowledgement that competencies and capabilities may be 
used interchangeably.    
  
Capabilities and competencies may reflect similarities on the conceptual surface. 
In fact, some scholars (see, for example, Day, 1994; Bogner et al., 1999) consider the 
concepts to be synonymous. In other cases, what is described as a competency could just 
as easily be viewed as a capability (for an example, see Wilcox-King et al., 2001). 
Unfortunately, the comparison between competencies and capabilities is a misdirected 
issue. The issue is whether there is a difference between capabilities and core 
competencies. When juxtaposed with core competencies, capabilities may indeed be 
strategically important to a firm. However, it is unlikely that a single capability will 
provide a firm any long-term competitive advantage (Day, 1994).  
 
 By way of example, while sales management may be strategically important to a 
firm and a firm may be uniquely competent in this capability, it is unlikely that a sales 
management capability alone will provide a firm sustained competitive advantage or 
yield any sustainable differentiation in the market. However, such an observation misses 
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the intended idea behind core competency altogether. In theory, a core competency is 
only core when it can capture customer value supremely better than competitors, resist 
replication attempts from would-be imitators and enter new product markets that exploit 
growth and further competitive advantage. In this sense, firms will likely have to 
compete on the basis of more than a single core competency.30 That is, they will have to 
combine and integrate many capabilities to develop a few unique, core competencies.  
 
Indeed, the central idea of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) thesis is that over time 
firms may develop key areas of expertise in a few competencies (e.g., miniaturization, 
logistics, microprocessor design, operations management) which when combined and 
integrated across business units and products, become core to that firm and critical to the 
firm’s long term development. Indeed, capabilities serve as an integral component in 
developing these key areas of expertise (Bhatt, 2000). Thus, while capabilities may be 
different to core competencies conceptually, and should not be confused with them, core 
competencies and capabilities are inextricably linked (Petts, 1997; Bhatt, 2000). 
 
 Any attempt at conceptualizing core competencies, while noble, is fraught with a 
wide array of challenges. That there is little agreement on what core competencies are 
(let alone capabilities) necessarily makes any attempt at conceptualizing them difficult at 
best. However, drawing upon the work of earlier subsections within this chapter, an 
effort will be made to posit a conceptual model of core competencies, in light of the 
resource-based view of the firm and the capabilities school. 
  
In order to provide a structure through which to conceptualize core 
competencies, the firm is viewed as a hierarchy of input and output activities. Borrowing 
from basic marketing concepts, firms must produce products and services that customers 
value to be successful (Zeithaml, 1988; Sheth et al., 1991; Gale, 1994; Hunt and 
Morgan, 1995). Therefore, in seeking to gain a competitive advantage that affords the 
accrual of superior performance, the hierarchy of the firm can be viewed as a conversion 
process of basic inputs (assets) to final end product outputs (Ramsay, 2001).  However, 
                                                 
30 Hamel (1994) argues that firms will typically have between five and fifteen core competencies. 
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the hierarchy is not merely a ‘production function,’ but rather includes the dynamics of 
management and organization (Williamson, 1999). This notion of hierarchy suggests the 
firm is then a bundle of factor stocks, routines, and activities—the firm’s resources—
which when integrated and coordinated, produce unique core competencies. 
 
 Borrowing from the posited model of capabilities in the previous subsection, 
basic factor stocks, which can be acquired readily in the factor markets, serve as the 
lowest layer in the value creation conversion process. Routines comprise operational 
processes and decision rules for how activities, including the conversion of basic factor 
stocks, may be completed to create value flows. The firm’s activities are the coordinated 
individual and group-level activities that are built and reconfigured by knowledge-based 
routines to create outputs, either intermediate or final.31  
  
Where a firm develops, coordinates, and integrates a diverse set of factor stocks, 
routines, and various activities that can effectively convert inputs into final end products 
that capture disproportionate amounts of customer value, lack competitive equivalents, 
and transcend many product markets, such an assemblage of effort may be considered a 
core competency. Figure 9, then, presents a representative conceptualization of core 
competencies in light of factor stocks and capabilities. 
 
The core competency concept has become an important stream within resource-
based theory in that it seeks to explain why some firms consistently perform better than 
others by looking at unique resource endowments (Petts, 1997). Although not explicitly 
stated, Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) original work focused on core competencies that 
were technical in nature and that were applied to the manufacturing process in order to 
exploit new product opportunities in a wide range of markets. However, as with 
capabilities, a much broader competency conceptualization has developed, allowing the 
concept to be applied more broadly; for example, to services firms as well (Elfring and 
Baven, 1997).  
                                                 
31 In the core competency concept, output at the capability level would not necessarily be considered a 
final end product, but rather some type of final output (e.g., the end of a process), would used by a core 
competency to ultimately create a final, end product. 
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Figure 9 Conceptualization of the core competency concept 
 
  
 With respect to research studies within the stream, they tend to become very 
focused and idiosyncratic (e.g., case studies) with little generalizability (see, for 
example, Sanchez et al., 1996). Furthermore, the multitude of definitions of core 
competencies, competencies, and even capabilities creates confusion as to the 
differences and similarities of the concepts (Lewis and Gregory, 1996). Aside from the 
lack of generalizable findings and the definitional differences, one common theme that 
can be found between the various conceptualizations of competencies, core 
competencies, and capabilities is the notion of the integration of learning and 
knowledge. With this commonality in mind, the next subsection will discuss the final 
major stream within resource-based theory, that of the knowledge-based theory of the 
firm. 
 
The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm 
In the mid 1990s, the knowledge-based theory of the firm (KBT) garnered support 
among academics who sought to explain organizational phenomena beyond the 
traditions of competitive advantage and firm performance (Langlois, 1992; Foss, 1993; 
Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996a; Liebeskind, 
1996; Spender, 1996a, b). Spender (1996a, p. 59), for example, argued that the KBT 
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“can yield insights beyond the production-function and resource-based theories of the 
firm by creating a new view of the firm as a dynamic, evolving, quasi-autonomous 
system of knowledge production and application.” Largely, the KBT argues that the firm 
exists because markets are inefficient in the creation, application, and transference of 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Nonaka, 1994; 
Spender, 1994; Nonaka and Takeucki, 1995; Foss, 1996c; Kogut and Zander, 1996; 
Choi and Lee, 1997).32 
 
In a similar vein, Kogut and Zander (1996, p. 503) propose “that a firm be 
understood as a social community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the creation 
and transfer of knowledge.” Choo (1998, p. xi) describes a knowing organization as one 
that possesses “information and knowledge that confer a special advantage, allowing it 
to maneuver with intelligence, creativity, and, occasionally, cunning.” The KBT posits 
that knowledge, or know-how, is the primary source of value and is the resource which 
explains performance heterogeneity among firms (Williams, 1992; Grant, 1996a, Jensen 
and McGuckin, 1997). 
 
The above views represent a relatively new perspective on the theory of the firm. 
Those who hold to a KBT stand in sharp contrast with established theories, such as 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975), which is grounded in the assumption of 
human opportunism and the resulting conditions of market failure. Knowledge-based 
theorists, on the other hand, argue that “organizations have some particular capabilities 
for creating and sharing knowledge that give them their distinctive advantage over other 
institutional arrangements, such as markets” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 242). 
Thus, the KBT differentiates itself from other theories of the firm in that it shifts the 
focus from the historically dominant view of value appropriation to one of value creation 
(Moran and Ghoshal, 1996).  
 
                                                 
32 For an excellent discussion on the knowledge-based theory of the firm, see Strategic Management 
Journal, volume 17 (Winter Special Issue), 1996. 
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Essentially, the KBT is considered the ‘climax’ of resource-based theory (Grant, 
1997). However, as mentioned above, while the other streams within resource-based 
theory are largely concerned with strategic choice and competitive advantage, the 
knowledge-based view addresses other fundamental aspects of the theory of the firm, 
and in the spirit of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), seeks to explain: 1) why the 
firm exists; 2) the nature of coordination within the firm; 3) organizational structure, 
hierarchies, and decision-making authority; and 4) the determinants of firm boundaries 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Foss, 1996b; Grant, 1996a, 1996b). To understand the 
KBT, each of these aspects needs to be explained as each can impact on the firm’s 
ability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage. 
  
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) argue that any theory of the firm must resolve to 
address two central questions: 1) why the firm exists; and 2) what determines its scale 
and scope. Based upon the characteristics of knowledge described above, the KBT 
asserts that knowledge is the critical input into all production processes. Production 
efficiency requires that knowledge is created and stored by individuals in specialized 
form. The transformation of inputs into outputs (production) requires the coordination 
and assembly of many types of knowledge while preserving specialization by 
individuals.  
  
Given the above conditions, the firm exists to resolve this production dilemma. 
In other words, the reason the firm exists is to integrate knowledge. Grant (1996b) 
argues that because knowledge is difficult to integrate across markets and that, for 
example, the value of explicit knowledge is difficult to appropriate through market 
contracts, the firm acts as a more efficient mechanism for knowledge integration than 
the market. Grant (1996a, p. 112) states, “firms exist as institutions for producing goods 
and services because they can create conditions under which multiple individuals can 
integrate their specialist knowledge.”  
 
 The firm, hence, exists to integrate individual, specialized knowledge in order to 
transform inputs into outputs. However, the integration of specialized knowledge from 
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many different individuals in the production process requires organizational 
coordination, which is explored next. 
  
Under the assumption of specialized, individual knowledge as the necessary 
requirement for efficient production, the fundamental task of the organization is to 
coordinate the activities of many specialists (Grant, 1996a). Organizational learning 
theorists, for example, while exploring the transfer and diffusion of knowledge within 
organizations, have made limited progress in addressing how organizations integrate 
specialized knowledge between the members of the firm (Kay, 1979; Levitt and March, 
1988; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Nonaka, 1994; Boisot, 1995).   
 
 On the other hand, scholars examining the integration of specialized 
organizational units suggest that the effort of coordination is dependent upon the 
characteristics of the process technology deployed (Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 
1976). For example, Thompson (1967) argues that coordination may be based on pooled, 
sequential, or reciprocal interdependence, while Van de Ven et al. (1976) argue for team 
interdependence. However, from a KBT perspective, Grant (1997) argues that there are 
four mechanisms for integrating specialized knowledge: 1) transfer; 2) direction; 3) 
sequencing; and 4) routines. 
 
 From a knowledge coordination perspective, transfer mechanisms consist of 
rules (e.g., plans, procedures, standards) that facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge 
into readily comprehensible explicit knowledge. To increase the efficiency of transfer 
mechanisms, direction involves knowledge specialists in one area issuing rules to non-
specialists and specialists in other fields in order to guide their productive behavior.  
 
 On a more complex plane, where direct transfer does not take place between 
specialists and non-specialists, sequencing can act as an integration mechanism. 
Sequencing is basically a mechanism in which specialists’ input occurs independent of 
any time-sequenced production patterns (Thompson, 1967; Nonaka, 1990; Clark and 
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Fujimoto, 1992). Routines, on the other hand, are the regular and predictable behavioral 
patterns of coordinated activity among many individuals (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
According to Grant (1997), the general observations, as described above, form 
the general foundation of the KBT. However, many ideas of the KBT challenge classic 
organizational theory. For example, the KBT challenges agency theory and much 
management theory, which posit that firms are owned and controlled by their 
stockholders. The KBT suggests that knowledge is the pre-eminent productive resource 
that resides at the individual level. Therefore, employees are the key stakeholders, not 
stockholders (Grant, 1997).  
  
 The assumption that employees are the key stakeholders of the firm challenges 
traditional notions of organizational structure as well. If organizations exist to integrate 
individual, specialized knowledge, then bureaucratic, hierarchical coordination fails. 
Grant (1996a, p. 118), states, “When managers know only a fraction of what their 
subordinates know and tacit knowledge cannot be transferred upward, then coordination 
by hierarchy is inefficient.”33  
 
 Furthermore, if employees control knowledge, which is the pre-eminent source 
of production, decision-making rights within the firm do not rest solely in the hands of 
the owners or managers. Decision making within the firm, then, is jointly owned 
between stockholders, managers and employees (Aoki, 1990), and depending on the 
importance of the decision and the nature of the requisite knowledge, requires ‘co-
location’ between centralized and decentralized approaches (Jensen and Meckling, 
1992). 
  
 Based on the Holmstrom’s and Tirole’s (1989) requirements of a theory of the 
firm, the above assumptions of the KBT explain why the firm exists. However, to meet 
                                                 
33 The fact that hierarchies continue to be relatively successful indicates that either: 1) there is something 
else that makes hierarchies efficient (e.g., culture); or 2) some of the assumptions of knowledge-based 
theorists are incorrect or misguided. 
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the two requirements of a theory of the firm, the KBT must also explain what determines 
the firm’s scale and scope.  
 
  In contrast to conventional transaction cost economics, whereby firms are 
argued to be avoiders of transaction costs that result from market exchanges and 
opportunism, the KBT permits the expansion of the optimal boundaries of the firm by 
allowing entrance into any number of transactions in the market. In this respect, at least 
part of a firm’s competitive advantage may rest in sources outside of its boundaries; for 
example, in the resources of a strategic alliance partner (Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). Thus, the KBT views the scope of the firm as potentially very broad. 
 
 Although Arrow (1971) argues that there is a market for knowledge, knowledge-
based theorists argue that markets are inefficient in transferring knowledge (Grant, 
1996a; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Combining inefficiency in the markets for 
knowledge along with the economies of scale and scope of most knowledge types, firms 
are encouraged to expand product lines in order to maximize the utilization of their 
internal knowledge resources (cf. Arrow, 1962). However, different types of knowledge 
are applicable to different types of products.  
  
Given the dichotomy between products and knowledge needs, achieving 
congruence between a firm’s knowledge domain and product domain is a significant 
challenge. Grant (1996a, p. 120) states, “typically, perfect congruence does not exist: the 
firm’s knowledge is not fully deployed by the products it supplies, and the knowledge 
required by the products supplied is not entirely available from within the firm.” Thus, 
rather than avoid market transactions because of transaction costs and opportunism, the 
KBT suggests that firms seek out collaborative arrangements with other market 
participants in order to both better utilize their internal knowledge resources and to 
access and leverage the knowledge resources of other firms in the market.  
  
External, collaborative arrangements necessarily increase the scope, or vertical 
and horizontal boundaries, of the firm. Also, unlike standard transactions in which one 
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firm gives up its rights to a particular asset, in the exchange of knowledge, the 
originating firm retains the benefits of the knowledge it generates as well as gaining the 
benefits of the knowledge acquired from the purchaser in the transaction exchange 
(Bontis, 1998a). However, the value of knowledge exchange and subsequent learning is 
predicated upon the extent to which member firms have direct and intimate contact to 
further an exchange (Arrow, 1974); such an exchange is dependent upon the level and 
extent of firms’ relationship capital (Kale et al., 2000).   
  
The above tenets constitute the KBT. To offer a conceptual representation of the 
theory, concepts have been borrowed from previous streams within this chapter. 
Foremost, the dissection of the KBT reveals that the integration of knowledge forms the 
basis of firm capabilities (Grant, 1996b). As such, the basis of the conceptualization 
adheres to the concept of hierarchy; not administrative hierarchy, however, but rather the 
hierarchical components necessary for the conversion of inputs into value creating 
outputs.  
  
Similar to the capability and competency hierarchies, basic factor stocks that can 
be readily obtained in fungible factor markets serve as the base.  At the next levels, 
routines and specialized, know-how (individual, managerial, firm-wide) are held. 
Moving up the hierarchy, capabilities are developed when individual, managerial, and 
firm-wide know-how is integrated through a variety of additional routines. At the 
highest level of the knowledge hierarchy, highly specialized knowledge and routines are 
coordinated and integrated to form the core competencies of the firm. The culmination 
of the conversion process results in a final output. Thus, Figure 10 illustrates a 
conceptual interpretation of the KBT.
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Figure 10 Conceptual interpretation of the KBT 
  
Based on the conceptual interpretation of the KBT, the fundamental tenet of the 
theory is that knowledge is the critical input in production and the primary source of 
competitive advantage and value creation. Grant (1996a) states: 
 
Indeed, if we were to resurrect a single-factor theory of 
value in the tradition of the classical economists’ labor 
theory of value or the French Physiocrats land-based theory 
of value, then the only defensible approach would be a 
knowledge-based theory of value, on the grounds that all 
human productivity is knowledge dependent, and machines 
are simply embodiments of knowledge. (p. 112) 
  
Although the KBT is receiving growing treatment in the literature, various forms 
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2000; St Leon, 2002). Other scholars are focusing on the issues of knowledge 
management (Rogers, 1996; Teece, 1998b; von Krogh et al., 1998) while others are 
even focusing on the emerging structure of the organizational network as knowledge 
(Kogut, 2000). 
 
Summary 
Economic theories of the firm are concerned primarily with predicting the behavior of 
firms in external markets (Mason, 1939; Solow, 1956; Bain, 1959). On the other hand, 
organizational theories of the firm analyze the internal structure of the firm and the 
relationships between its constituent units and departments (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975). Although the field of strategic management has drawn upon both economic and 
organizational theories, its primary area of interest is explaining why some firms 
outperform others and the determinants of strategic choice. The most recent thinking on 
explaining performance variability and the determinants of strategic choice, largely 
developed in the last decade, has been the resource-based view of the firm (see Table 3). 
 
In the area of resource-based theory, there are essentially three common areas 
that can be highlighted between the various streams (Table 4). First, the locus of 
strategic attention is the resource. Although not altogether excluding the external 
environment, the primary emphasis shared among the various streams in resource-based 
theory is that firm-specific resources ultimately explain performance variability among 
firms. Thus, it is the idiosyncratic resources that firms control and deploy that are the 
sources of their competitive advantage. 
 
A second shared assumption is that resources are more likely to be sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage and superior firm performance if they are bounded by 
isolating mechanisms (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984). Isolating 
mechanisms create environments where the replicability of resources, or their purchase 
in factor markets by competitors, is largely undermined; thus, the generation of above-
average rents for potentially long periods of time is afforded. 
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Dimensions Traditional 
Industrial Organization  
Porter’s Work on Competitive 
Advantage 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Unit of analysis  Firms  Firms  Resources 
Level of analysis 
 
 Industries 
 
 Industries—Primary  
 Strategic groups—Secondary  
 Firms  
Primary sources 
of competitive 
advantage 
 Collusion 
 Bargaining/market power 
 Concentration 
 Market power via membership in an 
attractive industry 
 Idiosyncratic resources 
Type of rents  Monopoly  Implied Monopoly  Ricardian, Monopoly, Schumpeterian, or 
Marshallian (Pareto) 
Mechanisms that 
preserve 
advantages 
Entry barriers: 
 Firm size 
 Economies of scale 
 Product differentiation 
 Vertical integration 
 Control of distribution 
 Government intervention 
Entry/mobility barriers: 
 Economies of scale 
 Product differentiation 
 Brand identify 
 Switching costs 
 Capital requirements 
 Access to distribution 
 Absolute cost advantages 
 Government policy 
Resource position barriers: 
 Resource— 
Æ Inimitability 
Æ Nonsubstitutability 
Isolating mechanisms: 
 Asset inter-connectedness 
 Asset mass efficiencies 
 Casual ambiguity 
 Social complexity 
 Specificity/history 
 Time compression diseconomies 
Firm conduct  
 
 Deterministic  Not entirely deterministic  (e.g., firms, 
through their independent actions, can 
attempt to alter industry structure in the 
their favor) 
 Voluntaristic 
Resource 
heterogeneity 
 Degrees of heterogeneity recognized 
but irrelevant to advantage (industry 
structure solely determines advantage) 
 Heterogeneity may exist but is equated 
to the execution of value chain activities 
(i.e., resources are not sources of  
advantage in and of themselves) 
 Heterogeneity is not only present, but can 
sustain a competitive advantage (i.e., 
resource heterogeneity is sustainable) 
Implication for 
strategy making 
 Erect entry barriers to restrict 
competition in order to protect 
industry profits 
 Erect entry/mobility barriers to restrict 
threats from the five forces in order to 
protect industry/group profits and overall 
firm position 
 Erect resource position barriers to restrict 
competitive resource duplication in order 
to protect firm profits 
Table 3 Comparing traditional IO, Porter and the RBV
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Resource 
Stream
 
 
Main 
Themes 
 
Resource-Based View of the 
Firm 
 
Capabilities 
School 
 
Core Competency Concept 
 
Knowledge-Based Theory of 
the Firm 
Locus of 
attention is the 
firm and its 
resources 
 
 Firms are bundles of 
resources including 
tangible and intangible 
resources 
 
 Firms are comprised of 
individual and group-level 
knowledge which leverage 
resources and routines to 
create strategic and functional 
capabilities  
 Firms embody collective 
organizational learning that 
coordinates diverse 
production skills and multiple 
streams of technology  
 Firms exist to integrate and 
coordinate individual, 
specialized knowledge  
Source of 
competitive 
advantage  
 Strategic resources 
(theorized to be intangible 
resources) 
 Knowledge and operational 
routines (intangible 
resources) 
 Knowledge and business 
processes (intangible 
resources) 
 Individual knowledge and 
operational routines 
(intangible resources)  
Isolating 
mechanisms  
 
 History, specificity, 
immobility, path 
dependency, causal 
ambiguity, non-
equivalency 
 Path dependency, causal 
ambiguity, embeddedness of 
resources 
 
 Time compression 
diseconomies, path 
dependency, causal 
ambiguity, embeddedness of 
resources 
 Span of knowledge 
integration, internal 
knowledge replication, non-
transferability of knowledge, 
time compression 
diseconomies 
Key 
management 
challenge 
 Accumulating, developing, 
and deploying rent-yielding 
(i.e., strategic) resources 
 Develop, integrate, and 
exploit know-how 
 Commitment to 
communication and working 
across organizational 
boundaries  
 Coordination and internal 
transfer of specialist 
knowledge 
Table 4 Comparing the resource-based family 
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Finally, while the emphasis on firm-specific resources includes both tangible and 
intangible resources, the various streams share the assumption that not all resources can 
be sources of sustainable competitive advantage and superior firm performance. 
Therefore, based on the above isolating mechanisms, the assumption is that intangible 
resources are the key sources of competitive advantage. Such resources are strategic 
resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Michalisin et al., 1997). The key managerial 
challenge, then, is to maximize value through the optimal deployment of existing 
resources, while developing the firm’s strategic resource base for the future. 
 
Criticisms of the Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Although the RBV was formally introduced into the strategic management literature by 
Wernerfelt in 1984, Williamson (1999), Priem and Butler (2001a), and Foss and 
Knudsen (2003) have argued that the perspective has gone surprisingly unchallenged 
and that research within the field has been exempt from sustained critique. That is not to 
say, however, that the RBV has not been met with some degree of criticism. The 
literature brings to light three major criticisms of the RBV: 1) vagueness of terms; 2) 
tautological nature; 3) individual resources as the unit of analysis; and 4) the ‘newness’ 
of the theory. These four major criticisms will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
From a scientific perspective, Kuhn (1970, p. 156) states, “the early versions of 
most new paradigms are crude.” Having now had at least 20 years behind it, the RBV 
may or may not be considered a ‘new’ paradigm. However, a common criticism in the 
literature is directly concerned with the relative vagueness or lack of agreement on the 
definition of its terms (Foss, 1998; Williamson, 1999; Fahy, 2000; Priem and Butler, 
2001a; Rugman and Verbeke, 2002; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Hoopes et al., 2003). By 
way of example, the composition of the RBV stream includes concepts such as strategic 
firm resources (Barney, 1986a), core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), 
corporate capabilities (Nohria and Eccles, 1991), combinative capabilities (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992), organizational capabilities (Stalk et al., 1992), architectural competence 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994), core 
capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1995), dynamic core competencies (Lei et al. , 1996), 
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dynamic competency (Bogner et al., 1999), and organizational competencies (Wilcox- 
King et al., 2001), among others. Nanda (1996) argues that the various constructs within 
the RBV add confusion to its understanding and therefore limits its usefulness in 
strategic thinking. Hax and Wilde (2001) argue that the primary limitation of the RBV is 
its inherent vagueness. 
  
 Among the above concepts, agreement on the exact definitions of key terms, 
such as resources, competencies, core competencies, capabilities, and dynamic 
capabilities has yet to be accomplished (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002; Caloghirou et al., 
2004).34 Bontis (1998a) implies that because many researchers are simply positing new 
or slightly different definitions in order to seize a slice of academic recognition, 
disagreement on conceptual definitions will likely persist. Foss (1998) suggests that the 
RBV is far from being a coherent perspective, although important basic themes are 
shared, such as the focus on internal firm factors that cannot be copied or easily 
replicated.  
 
 Notwithstanding the attempts of scholars to utilize the RBV for improving and 
legitimizing the field of strategic management, the difficultly with such vagueness of 
constructs namely hinders the development of empirical research. Significantly, it 
hinders the repeatability of results (McGrath, 1996; Hoopes et al., 2003). For example, 
Wernerfelt’s (1984) suggestion that a resource can be anything that is considered a 
strength or weakness of the firm makes the attempt to operationalize resource constructs 
difficult. Hoopes et al. (2003) argue that how researchers operationalize resources for 
measurement varies extensively and has led to often disjointed results. Conner (1991, p. 
145) states that “in the end everything in the firm becomes a resource and hence 
resources lose explanatory power.”  
 
Furthermore, some scholars (see, for example, Penrose, 1959; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) suggest that resources are input factors 
                                                 
34 Foss (1998) suggests that there may not be a need to develop a common definition of terms within 
resource-based theory but that there may actually be sensible rationales behind distinguishing between the 
various terms and concepts. 
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into production, such as financial or physical assets while capabilities—and even 
dynamic capabilities—are something ‘other’ than resources; that is, capabilities are not 
resources because they are not input factors but rather are factors that leverage resources 
for achieving a particular end result. On the other hand, Ray et al. (2004), for example, 
define resources and capabilities in their research as interchangeable. To avoid such 
confusion, Fahy (2000) suggests that resources should be the term used to describe all 
firm-level factors, regardless of whether the factor is tangible or intangible, or is an asset 
or a capability (cf. Marino, 1996).  
 
The reality is, agreement among scholars as to just how to define and measure 
the constructs central to the RBV is clearly lacking and disjointed (Priem and Butler, 
2001a; Rugman and Verbeke, 2002; Hoopes et al., 2003). Such broad approaches to the 
definitions of the constructs that constitute the RBV create difficulty in the consistent 
operationalization and testing of the theory (Caloghirou et al., 2004). Thus, the 
vagueness argument leveled at the RBV may indeed limit its ability to be empirically 
verified (Foss, 1999; Priem and Butler, 2001a).  
 
 The second, and perhaps the most vigorous criticism leveled at the RBV, is one 
of tautology. Porter (1991), in one of the earliest criticisms leveled at the then budding 
RBV, suggested that the view is tautological: 
 
At its worse, the resource-based view is circular. 
Successful firms are successful because they have 
unique resources. They should nurture these resources to 
be successful. But what is a unique resource? What 
makes it valuable? Why was a firm able to create or 
acquire it? Why does the original owner or current 
holder of the resource not bid it away? What allows a 
resource to retain its value in the future? There is once 
again a chain of causality that this literature is just 
beginning to unravel. (p. 108) 
 
 
Elaborating on Porter’s (1991) charge of tautological reasoning, Mosakowski 
and McKelvey (1997, p. 66) argue that “the resource-based view represents tautological 
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reasoning of the sort that 1) rents are often used to define critical resources in that these 
resources are identified by comparing successful versus unsuccessful firms; and then 2) 
the question is asked whether critical resources generate rents, to which a resounding 
YES is heard.” Their argument suggests that the RBV is completely unfalsifiable. 
Similarly, Priem and Butler (2001a) argue that the main prescription of the RBV (as 
posited by Barney, 1991) does not meet the lawlike generalization standard as proposed 
by Rudner (1966). In other words, Barney’s (1991) claim that resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable are the only sources of competitive 
advantage is, according to Priem and Butler (2001a, b), ultimately true by nature and 
therefore is not amenable to empirical tests.  
 
 Resolving the tautological dilemma represents a formidable challenge to RBV 
researchers (Mosakowski and McKelvey, 1997). Accordingly, the issue of unraveling 
the charge of tautology requires the definition and empirical testing of what a unique 
resource is and what makes it valuable. Such an effort is difficult as uniqueness and 
value may be largely unobservable (Aharoni, 1993; Godfrey and Hill, 1995; Robins and 
Wiersema, 1995; Foss, 1998). 
  
The third major criticism leveled at the RBV is concerned with the unit of 
analysis. In the RBV, the basic unit of analysis is the resource (Black and Boal, 1994; 
Foss et al., 1995; Winter, 1995; Foss, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Williamson, 1999). 
By example, Barney’s (1991) and Peteraf’s (1993) seminal works on the RBV isolate 
resources at the individual level. Individual resources are isolated and evaluated in terms 
of their heterogeneity, whether they are acquired at a price below cost, and whether they 
are valuable or rare and so on. However, Foss (1998) argues that there may be dangers 
in taking the individual resource as the unit of analysis in resource-based thinking. 
  
Isolating the individual resource as the unit of analysis, may, under certain 
circumstances, be perfectly legitimate. For example, pharmaceutical firms wishing to 
examine the rent-yielding potential of a new patent have a legitimate cause for isolating 
and evaluating an individual resource. However, such a singular focus may overlook 
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“strong relations of complementarity and co-specialization among individual resources, 
so that it is not really the individual resources, but rather the way resources are clustered 
and how they interact, that is important to competitive advantage” (Foss, 1998, p. 143).  
  
Black and Boal (1994) also argue that focusing on the individual resource as the 
basic unit of analysis without reference to the system in which resources are embedded 
is of great risk. Similarly, Grant (1996b) suggests that it is only through the process of 
resource accumulation and integration that a firm’s ability to create a competitive 
advantage is cultivated. Thus, individual resources would appear to offer limited benefit. 
As such, RBV scholars have attempted to construct resource interconnectedness 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989), competency-based (Lado et al., 1992), resource 
configuration (Black and Boal, 1994), and complementary resource (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993) models of resources in order to focus attention away from individual 
resources. Others have developed novel frameworks within which to understand 
resources in the context of an entire ‘resource economy,’ rather than in the context of 
resources that are isolated within the confines of independent firms (Mathews, 2002).35 
 
Similarly, the notion of resource ‘interconnectedness’ can be found in the work 
of network theory, in which an organization’s development of its unique set of assets is 
seen as the result of the relationships both within and across the levels of factors, 
resources, and competencies (Berkowitz, 1982; McCallister and Fischer, 1983). Thus, 
Foss (1998) and Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) argue that performance may result from 
the clustering and interplay among individual resources, rather than from individual 
resources themselves. By way of example, Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) argue that 
tradable, imitable, and even homogeneous resources can impact significantly on firm 
success when ‘combined’ with other resources. 
  
                                                 
35 It should also be recognized that Dyer and Singh (1998) have posited a ‘relational view’ of the firm. The 
relational view essentially criticizes the RBV in that the overemphasis on resources that reside within the 
firm ignores the fact that no firm is an island, but rather is linked in a network of relationships with buyers, 
suppliers, strategic alliances, outsourcing partners, and even competitors. In the relational view, a firm’s 
success may in part be dependent upon the resources residing in other firms. 
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 To overcome the individual resource criticism, research within the RBV will 
need to focus on the relevant interactions among and between resources and their 
ultimate impact on firm success (Mathews, 2002). Furthermore, Foss and Knudsen 
(2003) argue that the RBV’s overemphasis on individual resources neglects the external 
environment, or industry structure, which may be a shortsighted position. Similarly, 
Dickson (1992) suggests that to rely on a single perspective (e.g., the RBV) to frame 
strategic decisions leads to perceptual biases that ignore other important considerations. 
To be sure, Black and Boal (1994) suggest that much work remains to dispel the 
criticism of focusing too exclusively on individual resources as the basic unit of 
analysis. 
 
The fourth and final major criticism leveled at the RBV is concerned with how 
new the theory actually is (see, for example, Deligönü and Çavuşgil, 1997). For 
example, as noted in the Background and History section on the RBV, the discussion of 
firm heterogeneity and unique resources as sources of superior performance goes back 
decades. For example, Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1993) note that in order to 
explain market imperfections, one must look to firm-specific resources, not market 
structures. In Austrian economics, the causes of innovation and high levels of 
performance are attributed to several factors, but most notably intangible resources 
(Jacobson, 1992). Indeed, explanations for performance heterogeneity, innovation, and 
firm efficiency have turned their attention to firm-specific resources, as exemplified in 
Austrian and Chicago School thinking, strategic choice theory, and the population 
ecology model (Hall, 1972; Conner, 1991; Jacobson, 1992). All of these theories far pre-
date the RBV.  
  
 Despite these criticisms, the RBV has, in the last decade, shifted a great deal of 
strategic management research away from external, structural determinants of firm 
success, to factors internal to the firm that afford favorable competitive positions within 
industries, regardless of the industry’s attractiveness. Mathews (2002) even suggests that 
the RBV may provide a good foundation for the transformation of the study of 
economics in the 21st century. However, the RBV is not without its critics and has much 
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developmental work to undergo to solidify its position as a widely accepted theory 
within the field of strategic management, if not economics. Having discussed the major 
criticisms leveled at the RBV, attention is turned to the empirical research within the 
RBV that is relevant to this study. 
 
The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Empirical Studies 
Rouse and Daellenbach (2002) suggest that over 100 articles per year are now published 
on the RBV, many of which they claim are empirical studies. While the number 
continues to grow rapidly, this section of Chapter II highlights the major empirical 
studies that are important to the present research. Particular effort is focused on studies 
that: 1) might help in uncovering insight into the development of a conceptual and 
operational foundation for the parameterization of hypotheses; and 2) might provide a 
methodology that may be useful in carrying out this research.   
 
Relevant Empirical Studies  
The RBV was originally cast as an alternative explanation to the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm of IO economics, which sought to explain why there are 
persistent performance differences among firms. However, the RBV is now being used 
to study a wide variety of strategic issues such as corporate environmental performance 
(Russo and Fouts, 1997), corporate diversification strategies (Robins and Wiersema, 
1995), and strategic alliance formation (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). While this 
dissertation has a rich source from which to draw empirical insight, the primary 
concentration is on studies that assessed the key determinants of firm success by 
investigating the effects of resources on various performance measurements.  
 
 Perhaps in one of the first studies to specifically undertake an examination of the 
contribution of resources to firm success, Aaker (1989), interviewing CEOs in northern 
California, finds that the top five resources in contributing to firm success across a 
variety of manufacturing and services firms are: reputation, customer service, name (i.e., 
brand name) recognition, employee retention, and low-cost production, respectively. 
However, inspection of Aaker’s (1989) study reveals that theoretical and statistical rigor 
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was lacking. For example, psychometric evaluation of the constructs or statistical tests 
of significance are not undertaken. The study does bring to light, though, the types of 
resources that may contribute most to firm success, particularly with respect to 
intangible resources. 
  
Hall (1992) analyzes the relative importance of intangible resources to firm 
success. He surveys CEOs in the United Kingdom asking them to rank, using an ordinal 
scale, the relative importance of thirteen resources.36 Company reputation, product 
reputation, employee know-how, culture, and networks rank as the top five most 
important determinants of firm success. While Hall’s (1992) study suggests the 
importance of intangible resources in contributing to firm success among both 
manufacturing and services firms, with the exception of one tangible resource (which is 
not defined or explained), only intangible resources are studied, thereby eliminating the 
observation of other resources—namely tangible resources—that may be potential 
determinants of firm success otherwise. Furthermore, although serving as a practical 
guide for future research, Hall’s (1992) study lacks theoretical grounding and statistical 
rigor (e.g., psychometric evaluation of constructs, tests of significance). 
  
In a follow up to his 1992 study, Hall (1993) further explores the impact of 
various intangible resources on firm success. Utilizing a case study approach, six firms, 
including both manufacturing and services firms, are studied to ascertain the intangible 
resources that are crucial to success. As with the 1992 study, the intangible resources 
deemed most important to firm success are: 1) company reputation; 2) product 
reputation; 3) employee know-how; 4) perception of quality standards (an attribute of 
organizational culture); and 5) ability to manage change (an attribute of organizational 
culture). Hall (1993) confirms the findings of his previous study, which is important 
from the aspect of replicability and generalizability. However, as with the 1992 study, 
theoretical grounding and statistical rigor (e.g., psychometric evaluation of constructs, 
tests of significance) are lacking. 
                                                 
36 The resources are company reputation, product reputation, employee know-how, culture, networks, 
specialist physical resources, databases, supplier know-how, distributor know-how, public knowledge, 
contracts, intellectual property rights, and trade secrets. 
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Miller and Shamsie (1996) investigate property-based resources and knowledge-
based resources, and their impact on firm performance, in two separate environments in 
the Hollywood film industry (1936-1965). They find that both property-based and 
knowledge-based resources increased performance in both stable and predictable 
environments (1936-1950) and changing and unpredictable environments (1951-1965). 
The model used by Miller and Shamsie (1996) includes the lagged dependent variable as 
one of the control variables the effect of which is not separated from the resource 
variables. Thus, it is difficult to reliably determine the impact of both property-based and 
knowledge-based resources in enhancing financial performance. However, the utility of 
this study lies in its ability to suggest that tangible assets such as physical property (e.g., 
movie theatres), intangible assets such as those that are legally protected (e.g., legally-
protected contracts), and intangible capabilities, or the creativity and skills of human 
individuals (e.g., percentage of Academy Awards won) may all significantly contribute 
to firm performance. In other words, the researchers find that both tangible and 
intangible resources are significantly important to performance—although the time 
period is a factor. 
  
Welbourne and Wright (1997) undertake a resource-based study in initial public 
offering (IPO) firms by investigating the relative predictive value of the resources 
culture, human resource management, management, product/marketing, and technology 
on firm stock price performance over time. The management resource is perceived as the 
most important contributor to firm performance overall, while management and 
technology have positive effects on stock price performance. Interaction effects between 
various resources and firm performance revealed that management and culture and 
management and HRM practices both interact to significantly affect firm performance. 
While Welbourne and Wright’s (1997) study confirms the presence of individual 
resource effects on firm performance, as set forth by Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991) 
and Peteraf (1993), the study also suggests that performance may be affected by the 
interaction of multiple individual resources, as posited by Dierickx and Cool (1989), 
Black and Boal (1994), and Amit and Schoemaker (1993). 
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In order to explore the contributions of information technology to firm 
performance, Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997) study three resources constructs; namely, 
information technology, and the complementaries of human and business resources. The 
focal industry is retail. The researchers test the contribution of information technology as 
a stand-alone resource in contributing to firm performance and in complement with both 
human and business resources. The results indicate that for overall firm performance, 
human resources have a positive and zero-order correlation, business resources have a 
moderate correlation, and technology resources have a negative but non-significant 
correlation. The data suggest that there is a no zero-order correlation between 
information technology and overall firm performance.37  
  
Powell and Dent-Micallef’s (1997) study suggests that a physical resource such 
as information technology, in and of itself, does not significantly impact on firm 
performance, at least in the retail industry. However, complementary intangible 
resources, such as human resources and to a lesser extent, business resources, may 
explain performance differences. The researchers suggest that in order to gain 
advantages from physical resources such as information technology, they must be 
integrated or interconnected with complementary intangible resources. The results of 
this study seem to indicate the importance of intangible resources in positively 
impacting on firm success.  
  
Following Hall (1992), Carmeli (2001) conducts a novel study that investigates 
intangible resource profiles of high- and low-performing firms. Studying ten Israel-
based public firms, CEOs of both high and low performance firms were surveyed and 
asked to rate—using an interval rating technique—how 22 intangible resources compare 
with respect to their value, rareness, inimitability, and nonsubstitutability (i.e., the VRIN 
criteria set forth by Barney, 1991). Firms are representative of both manufacturing and 
services industries. 
  
                                                 
37 Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997) do not adequately explain whether the information technology studied 
are conceptualized as physical assets, or customized, proprietary or held-in-secret intangible assets. 
 98 
Among high-performing firms, organizational strategy is perceived as the most 
valuable intangible resources, while low-performing firms rated marketing and selling as 
the most valuable. Know-how is perceived as the rarest intangible resource among high-
performing firms, while product/service reputation is the highest among low- performing 
firms. High-performing firms rate the ability to manage change as the most inimitable 
intangible resource, while low-performing firms rate product/service reputation as the 
most inimitable. Finally, the ability to manage change is rated as the most 
nonsubstitutable resource among high-performing firms, while know-how is perceived 
as the most nonsubstitutable among low-performing firms. However, as with Hall’s 
(1992, 1993) studies, statistical rigor (e.g., psychometric evaluation of constructs, tests 
of significance) is lacking.   
 
 Kale et al. (2002) study the role of alliances in determining firm success in a 
variety of industries. Using several statistical tests, the researchers find that a dedicated 
alliance function significantly explains abnormal stock market gains following alliance 
announcements. What is interesting about the Kale et al. (2002) study is the use of 
market-based metrics, namely stock price, to assess resource effects on financial 
performance. Based on the results of this study, institutional investors’ appear to factor 
for the value that may be created through alliances in determining the price of a firm’s 
stock. Such evidence suggests that developing and effectively managing relationships 
with external constituents may contribute to an otherwise independent firm’s overall 
success.38 
 
 Fahy (2002) analyzes firm-specific and country-specific resource effects on 
sustainable competitive advantage within the automotive parts industry.39 He finds that 
advanced country resources more significantly impact on firm performance than basic 
country resources. Interestingly, tangible assets more significantly impact on 
                                                 
38 See W.W. Powell (1996) for a corroborating finding. 
39 Independent variables used to test the hypotheses include cash on hand/at bank, cost reduction demands 
of buyers, registered designs, government incentives, innovative demands of buyers, design/engineering 
know-how, access to labor at low cost, access to educated/skilled workers, expertise of management 
people, process/product patents, plant and equipment, quality control systems, ability to work with 
customers, firm reputation, ability to work with suppliers, and ability to mobilize multi-functional teams. 
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performance than intangible assets. However, overall, firm-specific resources more 
significantly impact on performance than country-specific resources. Fahy (2002) also 
tests the impact of resources on low-performing versus high-performing firms using 
discriminant analysis. Top-performing firms ascribe significantly higher levels of 
importance to firm-specific capabilities (intangible resources) than low-performing 
firms. Fahy’s (2002) study, while generally confirming the theoretical predictions of the 
RBV, also suggests that resources other than intangible ones may be important 
contributors to firm success.  
 
 In a final study, modeled on Fahy (2002), Galbreath (2004a) studies the 
importance of intellectual property assets, organizational assets, reputational assets, and 
capabilities to firm success, relative to tangible assets. Using a questionnaire and 
surveying a small sample of managers, he finds, using t-tests, that organizational assets 
and reputational assets are statistically more important to firm success than tangible 
assets. No statistically significant differences are found between IPA and tangible assets. 
Lastly, capabilities are statistically more important to firm success than both tangible 
and intangible assets. However, the study is small (only 56 respondents) and lacks 
sophisticated multivariate techniques to analyze the data, thus the results are less than 
robust.    
  
In concluding the literature review, attention is turned to the types of studies 
discussed in Chapter II. With respect to an empirical verification of the RBV, if not the 
theory of industry structure, a strong emphasis among researchers has been the 
comparison between industry- and firm-specific factors, largely by examining industry 
versus firm performance measurements (see the IO criticism section above). Several 
studies in the Strategic Management Journal (see, for example, Rumelt, 1991; Powell, 
1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Mauri and Michaels, 1998; 
Brush et al., 1999; Hawawini et al., 2003), and journals such as Review of Industrial 
Organization (Gonzalez-Fidalgo and Ventura-Victoria, 2002) and The Journal of 
Industrial Economics (McGahan, 1999), have examined the industry- and firm-specific 
relationship with respect to understanding performance variation.  
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However, a major limitation of the methodology used in these research 
approaches is that it fails to untangle which resources—let alone which industry 
structure factors—account for major variations in the success of firms (Rouse and 
Daellenbach, 1999; Hoopes et al., 2003).40 Thus, empirical research within this stream 
does not adequately test the main prescription of the RBV because it does not 
appropriately test the VRIN criteria, which, logically, must be done by taking resources 
as the unit of analysis (Michalisin et al., 1997; Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999). Indeed, in 
order to untangle the true sources of competitive advantage, Mauri and Michaels (1998) 
call for researchers to conduct fine-grained analysis of resources at low levels of 
aggregation.41   
 
Coinciding with Mauri’s and Michael’s (1998) call for fine-grained analysis of 
the RBV, another stream of resource-based research has studied individual resources as 
the unit of analysis (see, for example, Hall, 1992; Huselid, 1995; Miller and Shamsie, 
1996; Schroeder et al., 2002). However, this stream of research is largely interested in 
selecting only certain resources to fit the domain of the specific study; namely, certain 
intangible resources, in order to examine resource effects on firm success. When 
statistical significance is found between the specific resource and the firm success 
construct, support for the RBV is offered. There are two potential problems with this 
research approach. 
 
First, firms are bundles of intangible and tangible resources (Barney, 1991) and 
are unlikely to compete on the basis of a single resource (Carmeli and Tishler, 2004). 
Thus, studying an individual resource, or just a few select resources to fit the domain of 
a specific study, may offer misleading—if not biased or overestimated—results. That is, 
while findings of statistical significance may indicate that a certain specific resource 
(e.g., reputation) is significantly associated with firm success, one must question 
whether the resource would explain the same statistical significance if the effects of 
other resources were simultaneously accounted for in the same study. Studies of this 
                                                 
40 McGahan (1999), for example, acknowledges that her study does not account for which firm resources, 
or even industry structure factors, explain performance variability. 
41 See Rouse and Daellenbach (1999) for a corroborating argument. 
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type in the empirical stream of the RBV may be giving short shrift to the complexities of 
competitive advantage.  
 
Second, with rare exception, only intangible resources are examined because 
these are most closely associated with the RBV’s VRIN criteria and are thus viewed as 
the only sources of competitive advantage (Michalisin et al., 1997)—or, at a minimum, 
the most unique (Teece, 1998a). However, some scholars (see, for example, Foss, 1997; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) suggest that tangible resources may be sources of 
competitive advantage. Foss (1997) argues that there are many examples of firms having 
attained, and sustained, competitive advantage by means of tangible resources.42 
Furthermore, Makhija (2003) suggests that it is entirely possible that tangible resources 
can be sources of above-normal returns. Recognizing a limitation of his study, Carmeli 
(2001), for example, implies that tangible resources should be included in RBV research.  
 
Overall, empirical research within the RBV stream has generally fallen short of 
adequately identifying which types of resources, or even which classes of resources, are 
the most important determinants of firm success, particularly in the context of the full 
compliment of resources firms utilize to pursue market strategies (cf. Das and Teng, 
2000; Hoopes et al., 2003). Foss (1997) suggests that taking intangible resources as the 
only appropriate unit of analysis in RBV research may be a matter of empirical 
generalization rather than strict logic. Thus, the researcher is confronted with examining 
potentially new empirical approaches in order to more precisely verify the main 
prescription of the RBV and to appropriately untangle just which firm factors may be the 
true sources of competitive advantage.   
 
Finally, with respect to the specific research presented under the relevant RBV 
studies section in this chapter, construct operationalization largely focuses on a limited 
number of explanatory variables. That is, with few exceptions, the above studies are 
either exclusively concerned with studying intangible resource constructs or only 
                                                 
42 Although clearly written from a practitioner point of view, Boulton et al. (2000) provide numerous 
examples—and compelling evidence—of firms who have turned tangible resources into sources of 
competitive advantage and superior performance. 
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selectively include tangible resources. In some cases, the definitions of various resource 
constructs are vague, which limits any attempts at replicating the results (cf. Hoopes et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, many studies do not present statistics on item reliability (e.g., 
Cronbach’s alpha) or validity (e.g., convergent, discriminant) and it is not known how 
reliable the various resource constructs are or whether or not they are measuring what 
they are predicted to measure. 
 
In spite of some of the limitations of these studies, they are important to the 
present  research for four major reasons: 1) they offer conceptual insight into the 
definition of a variety of potential resources that may be used in RBV research; 2) they 
demonstrate that using resource constructs (independent variables) is a valid method of 
investigating firm success constructs (dependent variables); 3) they suggest that 
intangible resources may not be the only significant contributors to firm success; and 4) 
they reveal a number of potential methodological procedures and statistical techniques 
that may be used to carry out this research. Thus, drawing upon the literature review and 
the empirical studies presented in the previous subsections, the development of a 
conceptual model, aimed at defining relationships between resources and firm success, 
and the development of the hypotheses used to carry out the research, are presented in 
the next chapter. 
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III. Conceptual Model and Research Hypotheses  
 
The purpose of this chapter is first to construct a resource-based model of firm success. 
The model specifically concentrates on and highlights the key resources firms bring to 
bear on executing strategies in the market. Following the development of the conceptual 
model, a series of theoretically justified hypotheses, which explore the relationship 
between the resource constructs and firm success, are posited. 
 
Defining the Resource Pool: Towards a Conceptual Model  
The RBV has as its central focus the exploitation of firm resources in order to gain a 
sustainable competitive advantage that affords the accrual of superior performance 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Hunt and Morgan, 1995). However, 
creating an ‘all inclusive’ list of resources is a daunting, if not impossible task, given the 
often diverse and disjointed conceptual definitions in the extant literature (Fahy, 2000; 
Hoopes et al., 2003). As Caloghirou et al. (2004, p. 234) note, “research on firm-specific 
assets and capabilities has not reached maturity. Consequently, the existing literature 
lacks widely accepted and consistent operationalizations of the relevant constructs.” 
 
Perhaps the main reason for the ambiguity is that the boundaries, constituents, 
and definitions of resources vary widely according to the perspective of different interest 
groups. Furthermore, 500 hundred year-old accounting practices and modern day 
accounting rules and standards have helped little to develop a definitive and robust 
categorization—if not definition—of resources beyond those that are tangible and that 
can be recorded on corporate financial statements.43  
  
 Given the lack of standardized nomenclature and the fact that resource 
definitions can vary widely depending on who is defining them and in what context, it 
stands to reason that when focusing on resources as the sources of competitive 
                                                 
43 The International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 does deal with select intangible resources and is a step 
in the right direction to define a variety of intangibles that may be recognized on financial statements 
(IASC, 1998). It should also be noted that a few countries (e.g., Australia) have fairly liberal policies 
regarding intangible asset valuation and disclosure (Wyatt, 2002). 
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advantage, “it may well be impossible to list the complete set…of sources of 
competitive advantage” (Collis, 1994, p. 147). Collis (1994) further implies that the 
“ultimate” underlying resource(s) of a firm’s competitive advantage will never be found.  
 
 Similarly, Barney (1991, p. 110) states, “although managers may have numerous 
hypotheses about which resources generate their firm’s advantages, it is rarely possible 
to rigorously test these hypotheses.” He goes on to state (p. 110), “as long as numerous 
plausible explanations of the sources of sustained competitive advantage exist within a 
firm, the link between resources controlled by a firm and sustained competitive 
advantage remains somewhat ambiguous.”  
 
Barney (1991) and Collis (1994) paint a rather bleak picture for empirically 
testing RBV theory. Indeed, because the RBV necessarily focuses attention on the 
unique, idiosyncratic, and largely unobservable resources of firms, “empirical testing of 
the resource-based theory faces great challenges” (Hoskisson et al., 1999, p. 442).44 On 
the other hand, this does not mean that controlled, systematic attempts to uncover 
theoretically predicted relationships between resources and firm success should not be 
undertaken or that such efforts will not have both empirical and practical benefit 
(Godfrey and Hill, 1995).  
 
For example, Levitas and Chi (2002) strongly encourage the undertaking of 
empirically based research on the RBV, even if resource constructs are difficult to 
operationalize (cf. Godfrey and Hill, 1995; Coff, 1999). They believe that the benefits of 
attempting to empirically examine and verify patterns of resource effects on firm success 
far outweigh the void of having no results at all. Fahy and Smithee (1999) suggest when 
studying resources, researchers should follow in the spirit of Aaker (1989) and Hall 
(1992).45 
  
                                                 
44 It is interesting to note that Austrian economists, for example, unlike their IO economist counterparts, 
believe that empirical studies cannot uncover the strategies that yield superior performance (Jacobson, 
1992). 
45 The studies of Aaker (1989) and Hall (1992) are examined in Chapter II of this dissertation. 
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Certainly, the link between resources and firm success is neither straightforward 
nor simple, and no single researcher or research study has defined the relationship fully. 
Instead, different scholars have studied different aspects of the connection. This study 
reflects one such approach. It must be recognized though, that the ability to study all 
potential resources that may or may not contribute to firm success would be beyond the 
scope of a single dissertation study.46  
 
 That the issue of defining resources within the RBV stream is difficult is clearly 
apparent. For example, Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) states, “by a resource is meant 
anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm” [emphasis 
added]. The use of the term anything suggests a potentially infinite number of resources. 
An unbound, infinite number of resources could impede empirical research in that the 
researcher simply could never investigate all the potential variables, especially in a 
single study.  
 
 Furthermore, given isolating mechanisms such as path dependency, causal 
ambiguity, and social complexity, competitors, let alone firm managers, may have 
difficultly in identifying the specific resources that are sources of firm success (cf. 
Barney, 1991; Donaldson, 2002). If this is a problem for firms and their competitors, this 
must surely be a problem for the researcher as well. It is recognized therefore, that “the 
boundaries between the concepts of resources, skills and capabilities are not clear” 
(Anderson and Kheam, 1998, pp. 164-165) [emphasis added]. Facing the inherent 
difficulty in defining resources, this research seeks a pragmatic, if not perfect, approach 
in identifying, analyzing, and developing a robust conceptualization of a firm’s resource 
pool.  
 
                                                 
46 This research, for example, examines only resources that are considered internal to the firm. However, 
some scholars argue that firm success may be impacted by resources that reside externally at the country-
level (Dunning, 1977; Porter, 1990). Other scholars argue that the success of an otherwise independent 
firm may be dependent upon resources that reside in other firms, such as the knowledge and skills of a 
joint-venture partner (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
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Introduction to Definitions of Resources 
In order to develop a conceptual model and to define resources so that hypotheses can be 
developed and tested, this dissertation emphasizes three fruitful avenues: 1) empirical 
studies that examine a variety of resource effects on firm success; 2) general theoretical 
and conceptual work in the extant literature that associate resources to competitive 
advantage and/or firm performance; and 3) respected practitioner views that are 
designed to guide strategic thinking on the exploitation of resources to achieve superior 
value creation. The research covers various streams from strategic management 
literature, marketing literature, intellectual capital and knowledge management 
literature, and accounting and finance literature.  
 
 Developing the conceptual model is achieved by a systematic process of: 1) 
conceptually defining resources; and 2) organizing resources into a coherent system (i.e., 
conceptual model) that can be used as a framework for the parameterization of 
hypotheses. Given the potential confusion as to exactly what a resource is and what the 
boundaries may or may not be for defining them, attention is turned to defining the 
various resource constructs. 
 
What is a Resource? Defining the Firm’s Resource Portfolio 
Fahy (2000) argues that there is significant ambiguity surrounding definitions, 
terminology, and conceptualizations of the rent-generating factors that constitute the 
central focus and theme of the RBV (cf. Hoopes et al., 2003). He suggests that in order 
to overcome this ambiguity, the label resources should be adopted as a general, all-
embracing term for rent-generating factors ascribed to the RBV.47 For purposes of this 
study, a resource is defined as a firm-level factor that has the potential to contribute 
economic benefit. 
                                                 
47 It is recognized that some scholars (e.g, Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Collis, 1994; Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003) might object to using the term resources to describe all the rent-generating factors of the firm. 
Certainly, such an objection highlights the disagreement among scholars as to just how to conceptualize, 
let alone operationalize, the constructs that constitute the RBV. By way of example, while the above- 
referenced scholars would not consider capabilities a resource, Marino (1996), in his attempt to develop 
consensus with respect to what firm competencies and capabilities are, suggests that while competencies 
and capabilities are distinct, they are both strategically important resources. Similarly, in their study, Hay 
et al. (2004) use resources and capabilities interchangeably. This highlights the conceptual—if not 
semantic—differences strewn throughout the RBV literature with respect to the definition of resources. 
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Resources are separated into two fundamental categories; namely, tangible 
resources and intangible resources (Fahy, 2000; Hay et al., 2004). Tangible resources 
include those factors containing financial or physical value as reflected in the firm’s 
financial statements. Intangible resources include those factors that are nonphysical, or 
nonfinancial, sources of economic benefit and are rarely, if at all, included in the firm’s 
financial statements. To further elucidate resources, the following subsections define the 
tangible and intangible resources used in this research. 
 
Resource Definitions 
Tangible Resources 
Tangible resources are defined as those factors that can be observed, are financial in 
nature, have physical properties, are owned and controlled by the firm, and contain an 
accounting value as recorded on the firm’s financial statements. Tangible resources have 
been described as the firm’s basic factor stocks (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). By their 
very nature, tangible resources have a tangible embodiment (i.e., they can be seen, 
touched, and measured by accounting standards). Anderson and Kheam (1998) argue 
that there is generally no disagreement over what encompasses tangible resources. 
Therefore, little effort is made to present an extensive amount of literature to define 
these resources. All definitions are drawn from Hofer and Schendel (1978), Short 
(1993), Boulton et al. (2000) and Vause (2001). For purposes of this research, tangible 
resources include: 
 
Financial Assets 
 Cash – includes currency (on hand or at the bank) earned from operations; 
 Raised financial capital – form of currency such as a financial loan (debt) or that 
resulting from the issuance of stocks or bonds (equity)48; and 
 Financial investments – investments such as money market funds, government-
issued instruments, marketable securities, and company shares.
                                                 
48 Boulton et al. (2000) argue that debt and equity are [financial] assets in that they create liquidity, which 
in turn enables the firm to create value by investing in other assets. 
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Physical Assets 
 Buildings – tangible structures including factories, offices, warehouses, stores, and 
showrooms—including the location thereof; 
 Equipment – any tool, piece of machinery, or other physical factor used to carry out 
a particular business task or to produce, deliver, or install a product or service; and 
 Land – a piece of real estate—including the location thereof—held for productive 
use or investment. 
  
Intangible Resources 
The concept intangible suggests something that cannot be perceived or measured. By 
their very nature, intangible resources, unlike tangible resources, are much more 
difficult to define (Blair and Wallman, 2001). Srivastava et al. (1998), for example, 
argue that tangible resources have historically been measured (i.e., financially valued) 
by firms and are presented on financial statements for the purpose of accounting 
disclosure. On the other hand, intangible resources are harder to measure, do not appear 
on a firm’s financial statements (with the exception of a few intangible assets)49 and 
therefore cannot be ‘directly’ measured or valued in the context of firm success 
(Srivastava et al., 1998). However, many scholars acknowledge that it is indeed 
intangible resources, rather than tangible resources, that contribute the most to firm 
success (Itami and Roehl, 1987; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Hall, 1993; Michalisin et 
al., 1997). Thus, the attempt to adequately define intangible resources is necessary for 
the parameterization of hypotheses that can be used to empirically test the main 
prescription of the RBV. 
  
Lev (2001, p. 5) defines an intangible resource as “a claim to future benefits that 
does not have a physical or financial (a stock or bond) embodiment.” The International 
Accounting Standards 38 (IASC, 1998, in Lev, 2001, p. 151) defines intangible 
resources as “nonmonetary assets without physical substance held for use in production 
or supply of goods and services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes that 
                                                 
49 For example, a dozen or so nations, including Britain and France, permit the recognition of brand names 
as assets in financial statements. Furthermore, Australia has fairly liberal accounting rules for the 
capitalization of intangibles (Wyatt, 2002).  
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are identifiable, that are controlled by an enterprise as a result of past events, and from 
which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.”  
  
 In a final example, Blair and Wallman (2001, p. 3) define intangible resources 
“as nonphysical factors that contribute to or are used in producing goods or providing 
services, or that are expected to generate future productive benefits for the individuals 
or firms that control the use of those factors.” This last definition will serve as a guide 
for the use of the intangible resource constructs in this research. 
  
For the purposes of this research, intangible resources are defined as those 
factors, held for both short-term and long-term value creation, that are nonphysical or 
intangible. Surprisingly, although several classification schemes exist for intangible 
resources, virtually no theoretical guidance has been offered to determine how to 
classify intangible resources or why they should be classified or categorized in any 
certain way. However, Hall (1992, 1993) is one of the few who offers a process for 
determining how and why one might go about classifying intangible resources.  
 
Hall (1992, 1993) suggests that intangible resources essentially fall into two 
categories: 1) assets; and 2) skills. If the intangible resource is something that the firm 
‘has,’ it is an asset. If the intangible resource is something that the firm ‘does,’ it is 
representative of the firm’s skills (know-how) or its capabilities.50 However, the 
distinction between assets and capabilities may not be easy to make (Anderson and 
Kheam, 1998). Some have suggested that intangible assets, for example, are what are 
left behind—once tangible assets are accounted for—after employees leave at night 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). Everything else then, would be considered a capability. 
Such guidance for discriminating between assets and capabilities may be grossly 
oversimplified. 
 
                                                 
50 Hall (1992, 1993), in his widely cited studies of intangible resources, used the terms skills, capabilities, 
competencies, and even know-how interchangeably. His definitional use illustrates the problem of 
operationalizing some of the key constructs central to the RBV, as noted above.  
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Given the wide-ranging conceptual definitions in the literature (Fahy, 2000; 
Hoopes et al., 2003; Ray et al., 2004), there appears to be a fine line as to whether some 
intangible resources are in fact assets or capabilities. However, Hall’s (1992, 1993) 
approach is adopted in that intangible resources are identified as either assets (what the 
firm has) or capabilities (what the firm does). The classes of resources described below 
are chosen for this study because they have appeared across a broad spectrum of studies, 
including the general management, strategic management, marketing, and economics 
literature and are of interest among many scholars. Furthermore, they serve as a 
foundation for testing the RBV (Hall, 1992; Barney, 1991). 
 
Intangible Resources that are Assets 
Intellectual Property Assets  
Intellectual property assets are intangible assets protected by law, or may be unpatented 
systems or inventions held-in-secret. They are largely derived from the intellectual and 
innovation capacity of human know-how and consist of: 
 
 Copyrights – copyrights do not protect inventive ideas but rather legally protect the 
embodiment or expression of ideas; literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, 
sound recordings, pictorial, graphic and sculptural work, films and broadcasts, and 
computer software may be copyrighted by law (Hodkinson, 1987; Brooking, 1996). 
 Patents – a patent is an exclusive, legally-protected property right which is granted 
by the state to its inventor in respect of useful, new, and inventive products and 
processes (Brooking, 1996; Valentin, 2001) 
 Registered designs – these are the legal protection of the novelty or the features of 
shape, configuration, pattern, or ornamentation of a two dimensional (e.g., fabric 
print) or three dimensional (e.g., beverage bottle) commercial article (Hall, 1992; 
Brooking, 1996). 
 Proprietary (or held-in-secret) technology – this encompasses all forms of 
proprietary or held-in-secret information, manufacturing, and other technology 
(including software) specifically designed and/or developed to fit a firm’s particular 
business model (Porter, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Itami and Roehl, 1987; Hall, 1992, 
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1993; Brooking, 1996; Hill, 1997; Boulton et al., 2000; Hurwitz et al., 2002; Kotha 
et al., 2002; Schroeder et al., 2002).51 
 Trademarks – trademarks include registered, legally protected product, service, and 
corporate brands (Hall, 1992; Brooking, 1996; Valentin, 2001); a trademark is a 
sign, including devices, aspects of packaging, names, phrases, sounds, letters, 
words, signatures, pictures, scents, symbols, or logos used to distinguish the goods 
or services of one party from another (Hall, 1992; Brooking, 1996; Bosworth and 
Rogers, 2001). 
 
Organizational Assets 
Organizational assets encompass a broad range of assets (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
For example, firms engage in a variety of contractual arrangements with market-based 
constituents in order to establish strong and defendable positions in the market. Hall 
(1992) argues that organizational contracts (e.g., franchise agreements, licensing 
agreements) can be one of the most important intangible assets for some firms, because 
contracts are legally enforceable by law and therefore help to build and sustain a 
competitive advantage. 
 
Other organizational assets contribute order, stability, and quality to a firm. 
These assets may be thought of as the ‘glue’ of the organization (Brooking, 1996; 
Boulton et al., 2000). However, it is not that these particular organizational assets are 
considered the most important or valuable assets of the firm, but rather that they provide 
the strength and cohesion between ‘higher-order’ resources (i.e., capabilities) and other 
tangible and intangible resources (Brooking, 1996; Boulton et al., 2000). Indeed, such 
organizational assets are an important link between what the firm does and how it does 
it (Fernandez et al., 2000). 
                                                 
51 A distinction is drawn between proprietary technology and standard, tangible equipment (i.e., tangible 
physical assets). Proprietary technology is uniquely customized to fit the firm’s business model and is 
highly context specific (Williamson, 1985; Kotha et al., 2002). Thus, unlike commodity-type equipment 
or technology (e.g., a laptop computer, a delivery van), proprietary technology cannot be readily 
purchased in fungible factor markets. The development and customization of technology over time makes 
it idiosyncratic to individual firms and may be legally-protected (proprietary) or held-in-secret (Kotha et 
al., 2002). The value of proprietary technology is not fully captured, or reflected, in the firm’s financial 
statements and therefore has intangible value (Lev, 2001). 
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The following organizational assets may be best thought of as those resources 
that help the firm to create new or expanded market opportunities; facilitate a positive 
environment for achieving goals and objectives; acquire, develop, and retain the human 
talent of the firm; and provide an efficient structure for day-to-day operations. Brooking 
(1996) and Boulton et al. (2000) suggest that without strong organizational assets, the 
firm will undermine expanded market and revenue opportunities, constrain productivity, 
deliver poor quality products and services and have inferior human talent. For purposes 
of this research, organizational assets include: 
 
 Contracts – contracts are agreements between two or more parties that create a legal 
obligation between the parties which is enforceable by law (Hall, 1992); contracts 
include agency agreements, franchise agreements, licensing agreements, property 
leases, and distribution agreements (Hall, 1992; Brooking, 1996). 
 Culture – culture embodies the complex pattern of beliefs, expectations, ideas, 
values, attitudes, and behaviors shared by the firm, which set its decision-making 
patterns and distinguishes it from other firms (Barney, 1986b; Itami and Roehl, 
1987; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Trice and Beyers, 1993; Chatman and Jehn, 1994; 
Hofstede, 1997; Welbourne and Wright, 1997; Robbins, 1998). 
 Human resource management policies – the policies that comprise a firm’s 
employee-related practices including hiring, compensation, education, incentives, 
rewards, and training (Lado and Wilson, 1994; Welbourne and Wright, 1997; 
Becker and Huselid, 1998a). 
 Organizational structure – the operating and reporting structure of the firm (Barney, 
1991; Boulton et al., 2000; Grant, 2002); structure includes authority, role and task 
definitions, accountability, and liaison devices (Galbraith, 2000). 
 
Reputational Assets 
According to Roberts and Dowling (2002), reputation is considered a valuable, 
intangible asset that allows a firm to achieve lasting profitability. Although reputation 
can take on many dimensions, Podolny and Phillips (1996, p. 455) argue that “reputation 
is determined by the value (quality) of the actor’s previous efforts.” As such, managers 
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engage in a variety of activities for the explicit purpose of building a good reputation 
over time (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Reputation then, is the extent to which a firm is 
held in high esteem or regard (Weiss et al., 1999).  
 
Although reputation is considered an asset of the firm—something it has versus 
what it does—marketing scholars suggest that it is associated with and derived from 
external sources (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Keller, 1993; Srivastava et al., 1998; 
Srivastava et al., 2001). That is, reputation is manifested in the perception of external 
constituents such as customers, shareholders, distribution channels, and even 
governments (Michalisin et al., 1997; Srivastava et al., 2001). In this respect, 
reputational assets can be distinguished from the other intangible assets (i.e., intellectual 
property and organizational assets) in that although a reputational asset is something the 
firm has, it is external in nature. 52  For purposes of this research, four dimensions of 
reputation are highlighted:  
 
 Brand name reputation – brands include product, service, and corporate names or 
symbols used to distinguish one brand from another and to give a firm meaning and 
recognition in the market(s) it serves (Park, et al., 1986; Oster, 1990; Aaker, 1991; 
Kamakura and Russell, 1991; Brooking, 1996). 
 Company reputation – company reputation is the overall embodiment of 
characteristics that firms signal to their key stakeholders in order to maximize their 
socioeconomic and moral status (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990); company reputation 
includes public perception of factors such as trustworthiness, investor credibility, 
workplace diversity, managerial credibility, social and environmental responsibility, 
and regulatory accountability (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Hall, 1993; Michalisin et 
al., 1997; Petrick et al., 1999; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
 Customer service reputation – this is the public perception of the quality and 
reliability of post-sale support that takes place following a sale, delivery, or 
installation of a product or service (Hammer, 2001; Shoebridge, 2002; Ross; 2002). 
                                                 
52 Marketing scholars refer to reputational assets as market-based assets (Srivastava et al., 1998; 
Srivastava et al., 2001). 
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 Product/service reputation – this is the public perception of product/service 
innovations, product/service quality and reliability, and overall product/service 
image (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Hall, 1992; 1993). 
 
Intangible Resources that are Skills 
Capabilities   
Perhaps of all of the resource constructs that constitute the RBV, capabilities remain the 
most amorphous and difficult to define, having been operationalized in multiple and 
inconsistent ways (Hoopes et al., 2003). Collis (1994, pp. 144-145) states that “there are 
almost as many definitions of organizational capabilities as there are authors on the 
subject.” Amit and Schoemaker (1993), for example, refer to capabilities as 
organizational processes. Day (1994) argues that although closely intertwined with 
organizational processes, capabilities are separate and can be defined as bundles of skills 
and accumulated knowledge (cf. Hall, 1992). On the other hand, various measures of 
capabilities have been studied including alliance management (Kale et al., 2002), 
entrepreneurship (Hult and Ketchen, 2001), integrated production (Song, 2002), 
innovation (Yeoh and Roth, 1999), and even financial measures such as activity, 
liquidity, and leverage (Lawless et al., 1989).  
 
According to Grant (2002), whether defined as organizational processes (or 
organizational routines) or as firm-level ‘activities’ such as research and development, 
marketing, customer service, etc., know-how is the fundamental building block of 
capabilities (see Grant [1996] and Foss [1999] for a corroborating explanation). Know-
how involves knowledge that is tacit, complex, causally ambiguous, and difficult to 
codify (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Crossan et al. (1999) suggest that know-how is 
mainly held and exercised by individuals (e.g., employees, managers) and ‘collectively’ 
by teams and even the firm at large. Thus, it can be argued that know-how is the basis of 
capabilities, whether conceptualized as routines or specific firm-level activities.     
  
Given the above discussion, capabilities may be best understood as those factors 
that are built upon or are reflective of know-how, both tacit and explicit, which 
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individuals and teams posses and exercise, including routines (Fahy, 2000). In some 
cases, the know-how may reside in individuals; in other cases the know-how may be 
reflective of groups and the firm at large. For the purposes of this research, capabilities 
include: 
 
 Employee know-how – employee know-how encompasses the collective learning, 
knowledge, innovative thinking, decision-making and problem-solving skills, 
experience, and creativity of employees (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Itami and Roehl, 
1987; Fredrickson, 1990; Hall, 1992; Langlois, 1992; Foss, 1993; Garvin, 1993; 
Levinthal and March, 1993; Loasby, 1993; Oster, 1990; Hitt et al., 1999). 
 Managerial know-how – managerial know-how encompass the intellectual, 
tactfulness, communicative, planning, and organizational skills of managers (Yukl, 
1981; Kotter, 1988; Day, 1990; Day, 1994; Brooking, 1996; Welbourne and Wright, 
1997; Teece, 1998a; Coff, 1999; Petrick et al., 1999).  
 Relational abilities53 – this includes relationships established and maintained with 
external constituents for the advantage of the focal firm (Charan, 1991; Hall, 1992; 
Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Verdin and Williamson, 1994; Saint-Onge, 1996; Shapiro 
and Varian, 1998; Kogut, 2000; Eneroth and Malm, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002; Kale 
et al., 2002); building and maintaining relationships is used to define the capabilities 
construct in this study as it represents a collective or group effort of the know-how 
of many different employees and managers in a variety of contexts and situations 
(Slater, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998); relationships includes those with customers, 
distributors, outsourcing partners, strategic alliances, suppliers, and other business 
collaborations (Brooking, 1996; Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Das and Teng, 2000; Valentin, 2001; Day, 2002; Ireland et al., 2002; Kale et al., 
2002). 
 Routines – the series of repeatable or replicated operations, methods, actions, tasks 
or functions—the organizing principles of work—that facilitate identification of 
beginning and end states and implies all of the steps necessary to fulfill work 
                                                 
53 Relational abilities and relationships are used interchangeable in this research to define the capabilities 
construct. 
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activities in between (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Porter, 1991; Hammer and 
Champney, 1993; Davenport, 1993; Day, 1994; Hammer, 1995; Hammer, 1996; 
Lehmann, 1997; Srivastava et al., 1999; Zollo and Winter, 1999; Bhatt, 2000; Grant, 
2002); although routines may be codified (e.g., in manuals), they largely become 
flows of tacit know-how embedded within the firm, which are exercised by 
individuals, across teams, and the firm at large, helping to facilitate what the firm 
does and how it does it (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Zollo and Winter, 1999). 
  
The above conceptual definitions of the various resources serve as the 
foundation and basis of the empirical tests to be carried out by this research. However, 
in order to elucidate a more meaningful approach to the understanding of the resources 
used in this study, a conceptual model is posited that considers resources as an entire 
system, rather than as an amalgamation of separate, individual ones.  
 
Proposed Conceptual Model 
The literature reveals that firms may draw upon a wide variety of resources in the pursuit 
of firm success. Resources can be delineated by type, whether they are tangible or 
intangible. Thus, to create a meaningful conceptual model of the available resource pool 
of firms, common categorizations or groupings are developed into a representative 
system. 
  
Resources are divided into two categories, tangible resources and intangible 
resources and two groups, assets and capabilities (Hall, 1992). Hall (1992) suggests that 
assets are those factors that are owned by the firm. Factors that are not assets are 
considered to be capabilities. Capabilities are factors that essentially represent the know-
how (or skills) of the firm, or what the firm does versus what the firm has (Hall, 1992, 
1993). A stylized framework for conceptualizing the resource pool is presented in Figure 
11.
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Figure 11 Framework of the resource pool 
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With the definitions of resources now covered, the proposed conceptual model is 
presented in Figure 12. The conceptual model suggests that in the pursuit of firm 
success, firms leverage a variety of resources. This model does not reflect all the 
resources brought to bear in executing a given market strategy. Rather, the model is 
designed to represent the two common resource categories, along with specific 
resources within those categories, for the purpose of more precise empirical research 
(Michalisin et al., 1997; Mauri and Michaels, 1998). 
 
Reflecting on the conceptual model, while both tangible and intangible resources 
may be necessary to execute a given market strategy, the RBV theorizes that not all 
resources contribute equally in the attainment of firm success. The challenge for the 
researcher is to appropriately identify the necessary resources in order to put forth 
testable empirical assertions drawn from relevant theory. Thus, using the conceptual 
model, the following subsection develops the hypotheses used to carry out this research. 
 
Introduction to the Research Hypotheses 
Williamson (1999), Barney (2001a, b), and Priem and Butler (2001a) cite the need for 
systematic hypothesis testing as one of the most pressing concerns of the RBV. Levitas 
and Chi (2002) argue that one of the main efforts of researchers in the RBV stream 
should be to empirically verify patterns in various populations of firms in order to 
corroborate theoretical predictions about resource effects on firm success.  
  
Fahy (2002), for example, uses a methodology that is helpful not only for 
understanding the relative importance of different resources to firm success, but also for 
the design of future studies that can verify results across a broad population of firms. 
Following Fahy’s (2002) precedent, this dissertation aims to test the effect of a variety of 
resources on firm success. Specifically, drawing upon the conceptual model presented 
earlier, this research aims to investigate the relative importance of the different factors of 
a firm’s resource pool and the central relationship between resources and performance. 
Because the tangible and intangible resources, derived from the conceptual model, are 
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not specific to any single firm or industry, it is expected that the use of a large, multi-
industry sample will provide fruitful, and generalizable, results.54 
  
The hypotheses are developed to systematically explore various distinct 
associations, as theoretically predicted by the RBV, between intangible resources, 
tangible resources, and firm success. Foss (1997), for example, argues that while the 
RBV’s main prescription theoretically predicts that intangible resources are the greatest 
contributors to firm success, the prescription may be a matter of empirical 
generalization, not strict logic. Foss (1997) further suggests that there are ‘numerous’ 
examples of where physical assets—tangible resources—bring firms sustainable 
competitive advantages.55 Researchers might conclude from Foss’ (1997) observations 
that tangible resources need to be included in RBV research.  
  
Furthermore, the general theoretical view of many scholars, as brought to light in 
Chapter II, suggests that tangible resources—financial and physical assets—have 
essentially been commoditized in a new world economy. A new economy view 
generally favors intangible resources over tangible resources in contributing the most to 
firm success. However, to summarily dismiss tangible resources as unimportant or non-
consequential factors in effecting firm success may be illogical (Makhija, 2003). Testing 
the distinct association between various intangible resources, tangible resources, and 
firm success in the same study may help to more precisely validate the main prescription 
of the RBV and the general assumptions of new economy scholars. 
 
                                                 
54 Michalisin et al. (1997) suggest that using resources such as know-how, culture, and reputation, for 
example, is an appropriate avenue for RBV research because they are not specific to a single firm. Thus, 
the approach allows for the use of large, multi-industry samples which improves generalizability. On the 
other hand, Lockett and Thompson (2001) suggest that single industry studies generally allow for more 
detailed specifications of the relevant resource variables than would be possible in multi-industry samples. 
55 Srivastava et al. (1998) and Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) argue that although there is a market for 
tangible assets (i.e., they can be bought and sold in the factor markets), the value of such assets ultimately 
does not rest in their market or trade value, but rather in their value in use (cf. Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Value in use suggests that tangible assets may be very specific and idiosyncratic to individual firms, thus 
providing a potential source of competitive advantage. Value in use also suggests that there may be a 
nonlinear relationship between a firm’s resources and its performance (cf. Hult and Ketchen, 2001). That 
is, tangible assets may not necessarily be sources of competitive advantage as individual resources, but 
rather may offer a competitive advantage as part of a larger, interconnected system of resources (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Black and Boal, 1994; Foss, 1998; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b). 
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Theoretical Justifications and Research Hypotheses 
With respect to resource-based advantages, tangible resources are generally viewed not 
to be a source of competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece, 1998a; 
Barney, 2001b). There are two primary reasons for the argument. First, if resources can 
be readily obtained in the factor markets, the economic benefits of those resources will 
likely accrue to all firms, thus offering normal, as opposed to superior, returns (Barney, 
1986a). Second, because tangible resources, in theory, reflect the condition of 
observability, they can be easily imitated by competitors (Barney, 1991). Thus, above-
normal economic benefits gained from observable factors such as tangible resources 
would be quickly eroded by competitors. If, in theory, tangible resources can be readily 
obtained in the factor markets by any number of competing firms or can be easily copied 
by competitors, it may be expected that although these resources are leveraged by firms 
to compete in the market, resources other than tangible ones will be more important 
determinants of firm success. This argument is, in fact, consistent with the RBV’s main 
prescription (Barney, 2001b). 
 
Intellectual Property Assets and Firm Success 
The central proposition of the RBV holds that not all resources are of equal importance 
in contributing to firm success. Although the resource-based literature describes 
resources in terms of various special characteristics, Conner (1991) and Fahy (2002) 
imply that the so-called VRIN characteristics can be cumulatively attributed to resource 
position barriers (Wernerfelt, 1984), or barriers to duplication. Resource position 
barriers act to protect the erosion of the economic benefits gained from resources in the 
focal firm. Many scholars (Porter, 1980; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984; 
Hall, 1992; Hoopes et al., 2003) agree that one way in which resources can be protected 
from competitor duplication is via legal property rights.  
 
 Intangible assets such as copyrights, patents, registered designs, and trademarks 
are all afforded legal protection. Given this legal protection, competitors cannot 
duplicate these assets, which preserve their economic benefits from being eroded (Hall, 
1992; Hoopes et al., 2003). From a performance perspective, Bosworth and Rogers 
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(2001) find that patents, as an intangible asset stock, are strongly correlated to the stock 
market value of manufacturing firms. The authors also find that trademarks, as an 
intangible asset stock, are significantly associated with the stock market value of 
services firms.  
 
Other forms of intellectual property include proprietary (or held-in-secret) 
technology. Technology has become increasingly sophisticated and rapidly diffused in 
businesses, both large and small. All forms of technology (e.g., production machinery, 
information technology) can be readily purchased by any number of firms competing in 
the same market (e.g., all clothing retailers wishing to sell products over the Internet 
need and can readily purchase credit-card transaction software and computers). 
Commodity-type, or ‘off-the-shelf’ technology purchased in the factor markets is not a 
likely source of high levels of value creation or competitive advantage (Powell and 
Dent-Micallef, 1997; Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1999).  
  
However, technology specifically developed to fit the firm’s unique strategy and 
particular business model can lead to socially complex, context-specific assets that may 
be difficult to duplicate, let alone for competitors to understand (Williamson, 1985; 
Hodkinson, 1987; Barney, 1991; Bates and Flynn, 1995; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 
1997; Hax and Wilde, 2001; Kotha et al., 2002). The cross-docking system of retail 
giant Wal-Mart, for example, while comprised of many information technologies 
purchased in the factor market, has been customized over time and has largely become a 
socially complex and causally ambiguous resource which affords the firm a unique 
advantage over its rivals (Stalk et al., 1992). By way of example, Schroeder et al. (2002) 
find a positive relationship between proprietary manufacturing technology and 
performance.   
 
Given their legally enforceable protection or held-in-secret standing, intellectual 
property assets offer economic benefits to firms that are not as easily duplicated as 
tangible assets, thus:  
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H1: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, intellectual property assets will 
make a larger contribution to firm success.  
 
Organizational Assets and Firm Success 
Organizational assets (Barney, 1991; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Fernandez et al., 
2000) may also be intangible assets that can afford resource position barriers and thus 
resist the duplication efforts of competitors. For example, contractual arrangements 
reflect a firm’s effort to expand market and revenue opportunities through franchising 
and licensing agreements. Because contracts are legally enforceable, they may prevent 
competitors from replicating the economic benefits derived from such arrangements. 
  
Many scholars suggest that culture is vitally important to a firm’s success 
because it defines and underpins the values and behaviors of the firm (Smircich, 1983; 
Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983; Barney, 1986b; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Fiol, 1991; Kotter, 
and Heskett, 1992; Flamholtz, 2001; Fiol, 2001). The dynamic intersection of firm 
values and behaviors in turn creates an environment within which the firm’s employees 
can excel. Itami and Roehl (1987) suggest that the culture of the firm is powerful enough 
to shape the spoken and unspoken norms and rules that employees follow, whose actions 
in turn determine the firm’s performance. In this sense, culture is a resource that the firm 
has that impacts on its success while at the same time may be difficult for competitors to 
replicate because of the conditions of asset specificity and time compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). As an organizational asset, several studies 
conclude that culture is indeed an important determinant of firm success (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983; Denison, 1984, 1990). 
 
Human resource management (HRM) policies are also an intangible asset that 
may a source of competitive advantage. Schuler and MacMillan (1984) are among the 
first to argue that competitive advantage can be gained through HRM policies. More 
recently, Wright and McMahan (1992), Lado and Wilson (1994), Boxall (1997), Becker 
and Huselid (1998a) and Wright et al. (2001) argue that HRM policies are a source of 
competitive advantage. HRM policies not only reflect the firm’s policies as to the 
recruitment and selection of employees, but also to the various practices that nurture, 
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develop, and retain talent; namely, training, compensation, and recognition programs 
(Huselid, 1995). According to Becker and Huselid (1998a, 1998b), HRM policies are 
characterized by path dependency and specificity, thus creating a source of economic 
benefit that is difficult to duplicate by competing firms. Indeed, the empirical evidence 
does seem to demonstrate that HRM policies are associated with higher financial and 
operational performance (Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delery and Doty, 1996; 
Becker and Huselid, 1998a, b; Cappelli and Newmark, 1999; Lazear, 2000).  
  
Effective organizational structure, according to Grant (2002), is also a key 
intangible asset enabling the attainment and sustainability of a firm’s success. 
Organizational structure refers to the division of labor into various tasks within a firm 
and the accountability model from which individuals within the firm are ‘mapped’ 
(Mintzberg, 1993; Galbraith, 2000). The organizational structure of the firm may serve 
as the basis for synergistic development of product innovations across many 
departments, and even divisions, which competitors cannot easily imitate (Boulton et al., 
2000).  
 
Relative to tangible assets, organizational assets are difficult to duplicate as they 
represent high levels of asset specificity and time compression diseconomies (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). In a recent study, Galbreath (2004a) confirms this argument, thus: 
 
H2: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, organizational assets will make 
a larger contribution to firm success.  
 
Reputational Assets and Firm Success  
Marketing scholars have particularly emphasized the impact of reputation (e.g., 
company, product/service, brand name) on firm success (Day and Wensley, 1998; 
Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1993; Srivastava et al., 1998; Srivastava et al., 2001). Largely, 
reputational assets, in their various forms, “summarize a good deal of information about 
firms and shape the responses of customers, suppliers, and competitors” (Teece et al., 
1997, p. 521). Similarly, as signaling theory suggests, since consumers in many 
situations are not able to tell the quality of the goods offered for sale prior to purchasing, 
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reputational assets can inform them about the trustworthiness, credibility, and quality of 
the firm (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Shapiro, 1983). Therefore, reputational assets can be 
key drivers of consumers positive reactions toward a firm vis-à-vis its competitors, thus 
positively impacting firm success.  
 
Although not legally protected by property rights, reputation is argued to be a 
path-dependent asset that is characterized by high levels of specificity and social 
complexity, thus creating a resource position barrier (Caves and Porter, 1977; Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Srivastava et al., 1998; Petrick et al., 1999). In general, 
reputation has been shown to be positively and significantly related to firm performance. 
Using linear regression models, several studies find that reputation has a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with firm success (McGuire et al., 1988; McGuire et 
al., 1990; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Brown and Perry, 1994; Fryxell and Wang, 
1994; Brown and Perry, 1995; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Also, Galbreath (2004b) 
finds evidence that reputational assets are a more important determinant of firm success 
than tangible assets.   
 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue that reputation is built, not bought, suggesting 
that it is a nontradeable asset that may be more difficult to duplicate than tangible assets. 
Therefore, reputational assets are likely to have a higher impact on firm success than 
easily acquired or replicated tangible assets; thus, it is expected that:  
 
H3: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, reputational assets will make a 
larger contribution to firm success. 
 
Capabilities and Firm Success 
Capabilities, as ultimately reflected by the firm’s know-how (Grant 2002), are argued to 
be the single greatest contributor to firm success (Charan, 1991; Fiol, 1991; Nohria and 
Eccles, 1992; Quinn, 1992; Day, 1994; Grant, 1996b; Liebeskind 1996; Michalisin et 
al., 1997; Teece et al., 1997; Srivastava et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 1999; Soo et al., 2001; 
Bontis and Fitz-enz, 2002; McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002). Capabilities include the 
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know-how of employees, the know-how of managers, plus a firm’s collective know-how 
and its routines. 
  
 Extrapolating from Grant’s (1996a, 1997) knowledge-based theory of the firm, 
for example, one may surmise that firm success is overwhelmingly driven by the know-
how of employees. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and Itami and Roehl (1987) argue that 
employee know-how is the main driver of a firm’s capabilities and performance, because 
employees decide how, when, and where a firm will deploy its other resources. 
Similarly, Michalisin et al. (1997) argue that it is employee know-how that determines 
the selection, creation, and deployment of other all other firm resources.  
  
 From a managerial perspective, Penrose (1959) is perhaps one of the first to 
argue that a firm’s growth is limited only by the abilities and experience, or know-how, 
of its managers. Penrose (1959) suggests that in the struggle for survival in markets, the 
ability to generate both creative innovations and adaptive responses to competitive and 
environmental factors is contingent upon managerial experience and skill. In a similar 
observation, Castanias and Helfat (1991) and Lado et al. (1992) suggest that the 
generation of firm performance is critically linked and highly related to the know-how of 
managers. Coff (1999) also argues that managerial know-how is one of the most 
essential resources for generating a competitive advantage.   
 
 Employee and managerial know-how significantly influences what the firm does 
and how it does it. In the same vein, the development of relationships with customers, 
suppliers, or distributors, for example, is a shared effort of the know-how of the 
individuals and teams within the firm and must be cultivated over time in order to 
establish trust and loyalty that in turn can highly impact on firm success (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Reichheld and Sasser, 1990; Grant, 1996a; Zeithaml, 2000). Several 
scholars (Brandenburger and Nalebuff; 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000; 
Sawhney and Prandelli, 2000; Ireland et al., 2001) argue that because firms are not 
islands unto themselves competing alone in impersonal markets, they must effectively 
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build and maintain complex relationships with constituents in external networks, such as 
alliances and other partners, in order to drive business success. 
  
 Relationships represent a commodity that simply cannot be bought, but rather 
must be built through historical and path-dependent trajectories (Arrow, 1974; Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). Porter (1990), for example, argues that the ability to create close 
working relationships with suppliers over time affords a firm access to new information, 
new ideas, and new innovations—all of which can lead to advantages over rivals. Collis 
and Rukstad (2002) claim that the traditional notions of the firm’s boundaries have 
become severely blurred—and that expansion through alliances, distributors, and other 
relationships are now critical to a firm’s survival. From a customer perspective, Slater 
(1996, 1997) suggests that the ability to work well with customers, learning about them 
and from them, is essential to a firm’s survival.56 Indeed, developing superior 
relationships with customers harkens back to Drucker’s (1954) early work on 
management, in which he argues that the singular purpose of any firm is to create a 
satisfied customer.  
 
 The ability to build and maintain relationships external to the firm for mutual 
exchange and benefit is not only essential for competitive success (Powell et al., 1996; 
Ireland et al., 2002), but is largely reflective of the knowledge-generating, knowledge-
sharing, and learning ability of the firm (Slater, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998). In other 
words, building and maintaining external relationships is critical for the firm and largely 
consists of a collective, firm-wide effort of the know-how of a variety of employees and 
managers. Thus, these relationships constitute a socially complex—and unique—
interchange of tacit know-how between firms and their external constituents. Given the 
idiosyncratic nature of building and maintaining relationships, their specificity to 
individual firms, and their orientation to transacting highly specialized knowledge 
(Asanuma, 1989), it is a resource that cannot be traded on open markets (Williamson, 
                                                 
56 Marketing theorists describe this disposition towards customer relationships as a market orientation 
(Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990).  
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1979), and is not easily observable by competitors (Kotha et al., 2002), all of which 
creates a formidable barrier to duplication.  
   
Finally, Fahy (2002) argues that the efficient transformation of inputs into 
outputs (e.g., raw materials into customer-valued products) requires interactions between 
management and employees and between personnel and tangible assets. Routines are the 
guiding rules for how work gets completed and how inputs are transformed into outputs 
(Davenport, 1993; Day, 1994; Lehmann, 1997; Srivastava et al., 1999; Bhatt, 2000; Ray 
et al., 2004). Zollo and Winter (1999) and Ray et al. (2004) suggest that routines involve 
the execution of known (codified) procedures, such as the steps needed to fulfill orders 
received from customers; to create and execute a marketing campaign; or to develop a 
new product. In this respect, routines comprise the work activities that serve as a driving 
force of the firm’s productivity (Hammer, 1996). Although routines may be codified in 
explicit forms such as manuals, they largely become knowledge-based flows embedded 
within the firm which are carried out tacitly by individuals and across teams and, 
therefore, act as a critical facilitator of what the firm does and how it does it (Zollo and 
Winter, 1999). Because they are likely to be imperfectly understood by competitors, Day 
(1994), Zollo and Winter (1999), and Ray et al. (2004) argue that routines can be among 
the most critically important source of firm success. 
  
 According to Hall (1992, 1993), capabilities are the skills of the firm, or what the 
firm does as opposed to what it has. Capabilities are characterized by the know-how of 
employees and managers, the collective know-how of the firm such as that necessary to 
build and maintain relationships, and the firm’s routines. Capabilities are tacit in nature 
because they are inextricably embedded in organizational experience, learning, and 
practice (Kogut and Zander, 1996); therefore, capabilities are said to be the most 
difficult resources to duplicate, due to their possessing the highest levels of causal 
ambiguity (Michalisin et al., 1997; Johnson and Scholes, 1999; Teece, 2000). Indeed, 
the RBV literature—and resource-based theory in general—supports capabilities as the 
greatest single contributor to firm success with respect to the firm’s overall resource 
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pool. Given the proceeding discussions in the hypotheses section, three hypotheses 
concerning capabilities are offered.  
 
First, tangible assets are described as observable, easy to acquire, and easy to 
replicate (Teece, 1998a). However, given the above discussions, capabilities are argued 
to be tacit in nature, causally ambiguous, and very difficult to duplicate. Furthermore, 
prior research (Fahy, 2002; Galbreath, 2004a) does suggest that capabilities impact on 
firm success more greatly than tangible assets, thus:  
 
H4a: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, capabilities will make a larger 
contribution to firm success.  
 
Second, capabilities are viewed as a ‘superior’ resource in the firm’s resource 
pool because they characterize the dynamic, nonfinite mechanisms that enable the firm 
to acquire, develop, and deploy all other assets—including those that are intangible—to 
achieve success relative to competitors (Itami and Roehl, 1987; Dierickx and Cool, 
1989, Michalisin et al., 1997). Furthermore, intangible assets have been described as 
resources that are created as a result or outcome of capabilities. For example, Michalisin 
et al. (1997) argue that intellectual property assets are an outcome of the firm’s know-
how. Hall (1992) and Fombrum (1996) suggest that reputational assets are a result of 
previous events stemming from the prior actions of the firm’s managerial capabilities.  
 
Capabilities are argued to be the most tacit and possess the highest levels of 
causal ambiguity of any resource suggesting that similar to tangible assets, they are more 
resistant to competitor duplication than intangible assets. Previous research (Fahy, 2002; 
Galbreath, 2004a) reveals that capabilities contribute more to firm success than 
intangible assets, therefore:   
 
H4b: Compared to the contributions of intangible assets, capabilities will make a 
larger contribution to firm success.  
 
Thus far, hypotheses exploring distinct associations between capabilities and 
tangible and intangible assets have been posited. However, capabilities are 
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predominately viewed as, overall, the most important contributor to firm success 
(Charan, 1991; Fiol, 1991; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Quinn, 1992; Day, 1994; 
Liebeskind 1996; Michalisin et al., 1997; Teece et al., 1997; Srivastava et al., 1998; Hitt 
et al., 1999; Soo et al., 2001; Bontis and Fitz-enz, 2002; McEvily and Chakravarthy, 
2002).  Logically, if capabilities are more resistant to competitor duplication than 
tangible or intangible assets due to their substantial isolating mechanisms, and if 
capabilities underpin the development and deployment of both tangible and intangible 
assets, then:  
 
H4c: Compared to the combined contributions of tangible and intangible assets, 
capabilities will make a larger contribution to firm success.  
 
 
The above hypotheses reflect the general theoretical propositions of the RBV and 
are depicted in Figure 13. The arrows represent each hypothesis, suggesting that,  
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according to the RBV, intangible resources are the key drivers of firm success. By 
specifying distinct associations between different types of resources and firm success, it 
may be possible to add precision to the research. Such distinctions will help avoid the 
empirical ambiguities that have been highlighted in the extant literature (Foss, 1997).  
 
 Of notable exception, however, in the conceptual model, is any depiction of 
competitive advantage or sustainable competitive advantage. Such an omission may 
seem illogical as the RBV is put forth as a theory of sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Foss and Knudsen, 2003). However, as evidenced in 
footnote one in Chapter 1, competitive advantage and sustained competitive advantage 
are often synonymously and interchangeably used with performance and superior 
performance. Indeed, according to Porter (1991), competitive advantage is defined by 
above-average performance. Thus, within the RBV context, what is a competitive 
advantage? What is a sustained competitive advantage? Is it superior performance or 
something else?  
 
Of particular interest to the above questions, while Barney (1991) discusses 
resources in the context of developing strategies that improve a firm’s efficiency and 
effectiveness, is it the firm’s strategy, the firm’s efficiency or effectiveness, or the firm’s 
resources themselves—or all three—that generate a sustained competitive advantage? 
This is not always clear (Foss and Knudsen, 2003). However, what is clear is that 
performance, whether in the short or long-run, is the measurement by which an 
advantage is determined to be present in the RBV (Peteraf, 1993). Indeed, Peteraf and 
Barney (2003, p. 310) state, “Our frameworks (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) were 
developed to provide an explanation of performance differences among competing 
firms, attributable to the differences in their resources” (italic added). Similarly, in their 
assessment of studying the RBV, Michalisin et al. (1997, p. 379) argue that researchers 
must “Empirically [test] the relationship between [resources] and firm performance [as 
this would] provide evidence as to the validity of RBV’s main prescription.”  
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In strategic management research in general and with few exceptions in the RBV 
literature (e.g., Ray et al., 2004), performance is the dependent variable of interest. Thus, 
to measure the presence of a competitive advantage, whether in RBV studies or not, 
strategies researchers have taken to measuring the association between the independent 
variable of interest and performance variability (Rumelt et al., 1991; Levinthal, 1995; 
Mehra, 1996; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Hawawini et al., 2003). One can, therefore, 
deduce that in order to verify whether or not a particularly resource variable of interest is 
a source of competitive advantage, or even sustained competitive advantage, one must 
analyze its statistical significance in association with performance. Such is the approach 
taken in this study.
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IV. Methodology 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodology used to test the hypotheses. 
The chapter addresses the development of an appropriate procedure for the research 
including a description of the process used to develop the survey questionnaire, pilot 
study procedures, and the final sample selection.  
 
Leedy (cited in Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 285) states that a methodology 
represents an operational framework within which to conduct research and “within 
which the facts are placed so that their meaning may be seen more clearly.” The 
development of an appropriate methodology for this study of the RBV involves a 
consideration of the broad, alternative methodological approaches, whether qualitative 
or quantitative, inductive, or deductive. 
 
From a research perspective, the field of strategic management seeks to explain a 
variety of complex issues and organizational phenomena. Many of the research 
methodologies reflect this complexity. By way of example, strategic management research 
has employed a variety of methodologies depending on the questions under study; these 
methodologies include sample selection models (Barnett et al., 1994), heterogeneous 
diffusion models (Greve, 1996), network analysis (Gulati, 1995), panel data analysis 
(Gimeno and Woo, 1996), cognitive mapping (Barr et al., 1992), event history analysis 
(Blodgett, 1992), and structural equation modeling (Hitt et al., 1996). Hitt et al. (1998) 
argue that different types of research methods will continue to be used by strategy 
researchers depending on the research questions under study.  
 
Historically, early strategic management (then known as business policy) researchers 
employed specific methodological techniques to examine organizational phenomena. For 
example, the works of Ansoff (1965) and Andrews (1971), among others, particularly 
focused on the normative aspect of strategy, in which knowledge could be imparted to 
practitioners, rather than pursued purely for scientific advancement. The belief was that 
because firms are so individually unique and the variables so uncontrollable, the scientific 
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approach to research was inappropriate, if not impossible (Learned et al., 1969). 
Furthermore, many of the early researchers believed that generalizability was infeasible and 
undesirable, given the complexities of each firm studied. Thus, the preferred methodology 
for research was qualitative, focusing on detailed case studies of single firms or industries 
(Hoskisson et al., 1999). Where generalization was required, it was accomplished through 
means of induction, built upon comparative studies of multiple cases (Rumelt et al., 1991).  
 
Induction involves the inference of a generalized conclusion from the patterns 
observed between particular instances (Remenyi et al., 1998). Using an inductive process, it 
is entirely acceptable to formulate a research topic or question from experience or intuitive 
notions rather than reflection on established theory and concepts. A lack of ‘theory’ and the 
heavy emphasis on normative approaches to research plagued the early years of strategic 
management, during which time its viability as a management ‘science’ was under question. 
With the heavy emphasis on qualitative and inductive reasoning approaches among early 
strategy researchers, criticism was encountered from other academic disciplines. This was 
due to the lack of a more robust scientific method, by which empirical tests of theory could 
allow for broader generalizations. Schendel and Hatten (1972) argued that in order for the 
field of strategic management to advance, new theories would need to be developed from 
which hypotheses could be derived and empirically tested.  
 
As the development of the strategic management field progressed, economics 
(particularly IO economics) heavily influenced the research agenda, shifting methodologies 
from qualitative, inductive case-based studies to positivistic, deductive approaches, which 
helped elevate the field to a more rigorous, scientific academic discipline (Hoskisson et al., 
1999). The adoption of a quantitative, in preference to a qualitative, approach, usually 
requires a clear understanding of the type of evidence required, and how to collect and 
analyze that evidence within a well-defined theoretical framework.  
 
In the case of developing an appropriate research method, a framework may be 
derived either from a review of the literature or from previous research that is sufficient 
enough to enable the researcher to start with a clear expectation of how a particular 
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phenomenon is likely to behave, from which the researcher can formalize a model or 
paradigm (Dubin, 1976; Remenyi et al., 1998).  Thus, given the research question(s) under 
study and the availability of different methodological options, whether they are qualitative, 
inductive procedures or quantitative, deductive procedures, a suitable methodology based on 
precedent wherever possible—unless a suitable case can be made for a new methodological 
approach—must be selected (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
With respect to the methodological choice for this study, a quantitative, positivistic 
approach is used. A positivistic approach is one concerned with positive facts, not 
speculation upon ultimate causes or origins (Popper, 1959; Flew, 1979; Astley, 1985; Bettis, 
1990; Deetz, 1996; Pfeffer, 1993). Positivistic research is based on three principles: 1) 
finding facts; 2) documenting facts; and 3) the use of scientific methods (Wicks and 
Freeman, 1998). In the first instance, if one assumes that there are underlying laws and 
principles that govern how things work in the world, then it is the task of the researcher to 
discover what these laws and principles are. In the second instance, once the laws and 
principles are discovered, the researcher documents and describes the facts. In the last 
instance, the means of discovery is through scientifically grounded study.  
 
The key advantage of the scientific method is that it “allows researchers to test their 
hypotheses and rely on objective measures (data) to support their findings” (Wicks and 
Freeman, 1998, p. 125). Such an approach avoids speculation and bias (Wicks and Freeman, 
1998). Furthermore, through the use of quantitative, scientific methods, data are generated 
that can then be replicated for verification purposes in future studies. Replication of results 
is critical for theory testing (Rudner, 1966; Flew, 1979). Thus, the positivistic approach 
offers opportunity for testing the main prescription of the RBV. 
 
As noted, the main prescription of the RBV asserts that only resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable can be sources of competitive advantage. 
With rare exception, such resources are described as intangible, rather than tangible. The 
question then becomes, is this assertion empirically correct? That is, can the RBV’s main 
prescription be verified and if so, what method should the researcher use to verify it? 
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According to the literature, several methods are prescribed and are, in fact, encouraged 
(Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Barney et al., 2001; Lockett and 
Thompson, 2001). These include ethnography, participant observation, and large-scale 
scientific studies. While ethnography and participant observation methods might “facilitate 
rich depictions of organizational phenomenon, they are not adept at generating empirically 
robust conclusions” (Barney et al., 2001, p. 637). To generate empirically robust 
conclusions from one’s data, scientific approaches are recommended as they afford the 
systemic interpretation of results (facts) across large samples (Astley, 1985). 
 
In the attempt to verify the RBV’s main prescription, a positivistic, scientific 
methodology is important for three main reasons. First, in order to measure the effect of a 
particular resource on firm success, it must be measured quantitatively. By quantitatively 
measuring an independent variable’s (i.e., a resource’s) effect on firm success, one derives 
factual data that is useful for verifying RBV theory. Verifying theory is the purpose of 
empirical research (Popper, 1959; Rudner, 1966). Second, the RBV research stream tends to 
be idiosyncratic in that studies focus on a very limited set of resource variables or single 
firm or industry contexts. While such studies are beneficial, they are limited in their 
generalizability (Michalisin et al., 1997). By quantitatively studying resource effects across 
a large sample of multiple industries and firms, the results improve generalizable findings 
for the RBV. According to Michalisin et al. (1997) and Levitas and Chi (2002), this is an 
important need in RBV research because it adds broader, more robust tests of the theory.  
 
In a final consideration, many claims have been made with respect to which 
resources are the most important determinants of firm success, both within the RBV and 
new economy literature. However, as pointed out in Chapter II and according to Hoopes et 
al. (2003), tests of the main prescription of the RBV are very short in supply. By seeking to 
verify the main prescription of the RBV through a positivistic approach, this study aims to 
add to the quantifiable, empirical research base. This both addresses the need for scientific 
facts with respect to testing resource-based theory as well as for generating results that can 
be studied in future research for the purpose of replication and verification.           
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Procedure   
According to Remenyi et al. (1998), when carrying out empirical research, methodology 
precedents should be used wherever possible. Although Kor and Mahoney (2000) list 
nearly 50 empirically based articles covering various aspects of the RBV, virtually none 
have examined the determinants of firm success, in a single study, in relation to the 
broad context of resources that are available to the firm. However, one study more 
broadly examines the relative importance of a variety of resources to business success.  
   
As discussed in Chapter II, Fahy (2002) undertakes a resource-based analysis of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Using a field-based survey questionnaire, CEOs in 
the automotive components industry were surveyed in Ireland, Japan, the United 
Kingdom,57 and the United States. The CEOs were asked to rate on a four-point Likert 
scale the relative importance of 16 resources in contributing to sustainable competitive 
advantage, with the performance construct covering a five-year period (covering two 
different measurement periods). Firm performance was self-reported and included two 
measures of financial performance: 1) return on total assets;  and 2) return on total 
equity.  
 
Fahy establishes that: 1) multiple resource constructs can be used to measure 
organizational phenomena; 2) survey questionnaires using Likert-type scales to collect 
data on resource and performance constructs are a valid method in RBV research; and 3) 
the relationships among the various resource (independent) variables can be used to 
explain performance levels.  
 
Fahy’s (2002) study sheds specific insight into the development of a 
methodology to study the present research question. Perhaps the key feature of Fahy’s 
(2002) study is that it demonstrates that a nonexperimental field survey can be used to 
ask CEOs to directly assess individual resources (in order to measure broader resource 
                                                 
57 Fahy (2002) does not specify if this includes firms in all other parts of the United Kingdom (e.g., 
Britain, Scotland) besides Ireland. 
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classes such as tangible assets and capabilities) and their impact on firm success.58 In 
this respect, Fahy (2002) relies on the judgment of the highest level of informant 
(Phillips, 1981; Kumar et al., 1993) within the organization to collect research data. 
 
Research Design 
The primary objective of this research is to assess the effect of different resources on 
firm success through a series of theoretically justified research hypotheses. To test the 
posited hypotheses, a cross-sectional field study is used. According to Kerlinger (1992), 
field studies are nonexperimental scientific inquires designed to discover the relations 
among variables in real social structures, such as communities, institutions, and 
organizations. Cross-sectional—and specifically sample survey field studies—are 
particularly useful for gaining a representation of the reality of a social structure utilizing 
a single administration research instrument. A number of advantages of sample survey 
research are identified. 
 
Cross-sectional sample survey research, first, allows the researcher to gather a 
sizeable amount of information from a relatively large sample (Kerlinger, 1992). 
Second, Scandura and Williams (2000) suggest that sample survey research maximizes 
the representative sampling of population units studied and therefore improves the 
generalizability of the results. Third, sample survey research, compared to experimental 
research, is strong in realism, which can be very important in studying dynamic, real-life 
business situations (Kerlinger, 1992). Finally, information obtained in sample survey 
research, even subjective measures of firm performance, is often very accurate, because 
the instrument is specifically designed to address the research question(s) (Dess and 
Robinson, 1984; Slater, 1995).   
 
Instrumentation 
A major consideration of field-based survey research is the development of valid and 
reliable measures of the unobservable constructs (Churchill, 1979). For example, many 
research studies within the field of strategic management have sought to measure the 
                                                 
58 Das and Teng (2000) argue for a similar approach to the study of resource constructs. 
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unobservable constructs of industry structure and firm-specific effects on performance 
variability in order to validate both resource-based and industry structure theories. 
Studies that have sought to examine the relative effects of industry- and firm-specific 
factors on performance variability generally compare the profits of industries, firms, 
corporations (i.e., parent companies), and even strategic groups. However, because these 
studies mainly draw their data from secondary sources such as PIMS, Compustat, FTC, 
and other large databases, they are extremely limited in their ability to study resources at 
the individual level.59  
 
 The use of secondary data sources (e.g., Compustat) to study resource effects on 
firm success is largely an issue with respect to intangible resources (Das and Tang, 
2000). Unlike tangible resources, there are no generally accepted accounting standards 
that afford firms an opportunity to report the value of their intangibles. Without robust 
data on intangible resources, researchers are left with only a few proxy measures such as 
investments in advertising or research and development to use in the analysis. 
Furthermore, Das and Tang (2000) argue that the difficulty in measuring many 
unobservable resource constructs, namely intangible resources, makes it hard to use and 
assess secondary data with sufficient validity. Thus, alternative means of capturing data 
on resource constructs is required. One approach is the use of a questionnaire, which is 
the most common method of data collection in field research (Stone, 1978). According 
to Slater and Atuahene-Gima (2004), the survey-based (i.e., questionnaire) approach is 
in many cases the only appropriate method for gathering data in order to address some 
strategy research questions. 
 
Survey Questionnaire Development 
The difficulty of conducting resource-based research is compounded by the fact that 
many resource construct spaces are unobservable if not unbounded (Cameron and 
Whetten, 1983; Godfrey and Hill, 1995; McMillan and Joshi, 1997; Webster, 2002). 
Cameron and Whetten (1983) suggest that constructs that are unbounded may best be 
tapped by measuring limited domains of the construct. This research faced the problem 
                                                 
59 For a critique on the use of these databases, particularly the Compustat database, see McGahan (1999b). 
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of unobservable and unbounded constructs given the plethora of resource definitions 
identified in the literature review. To address the problem, a conceptual model, derived 
from the extant literature, is put forth in Chapter II.  The conceptual model served as the 
overall framework for the development of items from which the resource constructs are 
operationalized.  
 
Item Generation 
To develop survey items for the resource constructs, a multi-staged approach has been 
used as described by Dillman (1978) and Frazer and Lawley (2000). In order to develop 
scale items that best capture the domain of each construct, items from other instruments 
(Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Hall, 1992, 1993; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; 
Welbourne and Wright, 1997; Dawes, 2000; Vorhies and Harker, 2000; Carmeli, 2001; 
Spanos and Lioukas, 2001; Fahy, 2002; Kaleka, 2002) are reviewed.  
 
In order to select the items, item reliability (where reported) is first checked to 
ensure that it meets minimum acceptable thresholds (e.g., Cronbach alpha of .60 or 
greater). Second, both convergent and discriminant validity are examined (where 
reported) to determine if the resource items predicted to measure a particular construct, 
in fact, do measure that construct. Lastly, after all items are generated, theoretical 
guidance and judgment is used to select the items that best meet the domain of the 
specific construct as defined in this study. However, where possible, the scales 
encapsulate items used in previous studies to maintain consistency. The tables displayed 
later in this Chapter identify all the sources of the items used in this study. 
 
Frazer and Lawley (2000) have argued that questionnaires should be simple, to 
the point, and easy to read. Therefore, item language is developed at a high school level 
of comprehension. Furthermore, items do not exceed medium-length (16-24 words) as 
suggested by Horst (1968), Andrews (1984) and Oppenheim (1986). The overall length 
of the questionnaire is well below 12 pages, which is acceptable for administration via 
mail (Hoinville and Jowell, 1978; Frazer and Lawley, 2000). Finally, business leaders in 
the field were contacted to assess clarity, relevance, and face validity of the 
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questionnaire (Gay and Diehl, 1992) prior to the administration of a pilot study. A 
current CEO in Australia and a former CEO in the United States both provided their 
assessment and feedback. Generally, no one particular problem concerning the 
questions, wording, or relevance of content was identified.  
 
Independent Variables 
Resource Constructs  
The following subsection describes the items used to operationalize each construct. 
Operationalization of a construct describes its characteristics in order that it may be 
measured (Sekaran, 2000). Operationalization of the constructs includes tangible 
resources, intangible resources, firm success, and control variables. 
  
Tangible Resource Constructs 
Tangible resources consist of those resources that can be observed, are financial in 
nature, have physical properties, are owned and controlled by the firm, and are recorded 
on the firm’s financial statements. Generally, tangible resources are categorized as either 
financial assets or physical assets (Short, 1993; Boulton et al., 2000). Anderson and 
Kheam (1998) argue that there is generally no disagreement over what encompasses 
tangible resources.  
  
For this research, tangible resources include a variety of factors comprising of 
both financial and physical properties. Those factors with financial properties largely 
constitute the financial resources of the firm and are represented on the firm’s financial 
statements by an accounting-based monetary value. Financially based factors generally 
represent the firm’s current assets and can be taken as being either cash or capable of 
being converted to cash (Vause, 2001). Operationalization of the financial assets 
construct consists of three items and capture various currency (or monetary) and 
liquidity characteristics of the construct.  
 
Other tangible resources include those factors that contain physical properties, 
can be ‘seen’ and ‘touched,’ are captured on the firm’s financial statements, and are 
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represented by an accounting-based monetary value. Factors with physical properties are 
generally described as fixed assets held for use in the production or supply of goods and 
services (Vause, 2001). Normally, fixed (physical) assets are depreciated, amortized, or 
written off over their useful life. Operationalization of the physical assets construct 
consists of three items that capture physical location, use in the production/supply of 
goods and services, and service delivery characteristics of the construct.  
 
Intangible Resource Constructs 
The RBV theoretically predicts that intangible resources are the most important sources 
of firm success (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Hall, 1993; Michalisin et al., 1997; Conner, 2002). 
However, intangible resources are hard to observe and are largely non-codifiable (Reed 
and DeFillippi, 1990), thus making it difficult for the researcher to measure them. 
Godfrey and Hill (1995) argue that difficulties in operationalizing intangible resource 
constructs should not, however, impede empirical tests. To advance RBV theory, Levitas 
and Chi (2002, p. 961) state, “one must empirically verify patterns in populations of 
firms to corroborate researchers’ conjectures about the existence and sustainability of 
alleged advantages.” Such an effort requires the testing of intangible resources, even if 
the construct is difficult to operationalize (Godfrey and Hill, 1995).  
 
 Following theoretical and conceptual precedent (Williamson, 1985; Barney, 
1986b; Barney, 1991; Day, 1994; Brooking, 1996; Michalisin et al., 1997; Welbourne 
and Wright, 1997; Becker and Huselid, 1998a; Srivastava et al., 1999; Zollo and Winter, 
1999; Grant, 2002; Hammer, 2001; Kotha et al., 2002; Schroeder et al., 2002), 
intangible resources consist of four constructs: 1) intellectual property asset construct; 2) 
organizational asset construct; 3) reputational asset construct; and 4) capabilities 
construct.  
  
Intellectual property assets include those resources that have a proprietary 
embodiment and can, therefore, be protected by law. Operationalization of the 
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intellectual property asset construct consists of the five items that capture various 
characteristics of ideas, brands, inventions, and technology.  
 
Organizational assets contribute order, stability, and quality to the firm and they 
provide a mechanism for exploiting new market and revenue opportunities. The 
organizational asset construct is operationalized using four items that capture the 
characteristics of expanding or creating new market opportunities, facilitating a positive 
environment for achieving goals and objectives, acquiring, developing, and retaining the 
human talent of the firm, and providing an efficient structure for day-to-day operations.  
 
Reputational assets are the result of prior management actions. Reputational 
assets largely reflect the extent to which the firm is held in high esteem or regard. This 
construct is operationalized using four items that focus on different dimensions of a 
firm’s reputation, including its brand, product/service, customer service, and overall 
company reputation.  
 
Finally, capabilities consist of the know-how that underlies a firm’s ability to 
choose, develop, implement, and realize value-creating market strategies. Other 
resources are developed, used by, support or are a result or outcome of the capabilities of 
the organization. Operationalization of capabilities consists of four items that capture the 
dimensions of employee and managerial know-how, the development and sustainability 
of advantageous relationships, and the regular patterns of coordinated activities between 
individuals and teams. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Firm Success Construct  
Many scholars have argued that the primary goal of strategic management research is to 
understand and explain why some firms are more successful than others (Aaker, 1989; 
Porter, 1991; Rumelt et al., 1991; Carroll, 1993; Levinthal, 1995; Mehra, 1996; 
Schendel, 1996; McGahan, 1999a; Cockburn et al., 2000). However, firm success is 
defined as a multidimensional construct, tapping financial, market, operational, and 
  
143 
customer-related performance domains (Chakravarthy, 1986; Prescott et al., 1986; 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Day and Wensley, 1988; Bharadwaj et al., 1993; 
Venkatraman, 1989; McMillan and Joshi, 1997; Srivastava et al., 2001).  
 
In resource-based research, various measures are used as the dependent variable 
to measure firm success including market share (Miller and Shamsie, 1996; Spanos and 
Lioukas, 2001), profitability (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 
1997; Wilcox-King and Zeithaml, 2001; Fahy, 2002), innovation capacity (McEvily and 
Chakaravarthy, 2002), sequential investment decisions (Song, 2002), stock price 
increases (Welbourne and Wright, 1997; Kale et al., 2002), market-to-book ratios 
(McMillan and Joshi, 1997), and sales growth (Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Spanos 
and Lioukas, 2001). An analysis of resource-based studies reveals that the firm success 
construct is operationalized on essentially two domains, namely external or market-
based performance (e.g., market share, market-to-book ratios, sales growth) and internal 
or financially based performance (e.g., profitability).  
 
 In this study, firm success is operationalized by adapting a scale from Spanos 
and Lioukas (2001) and consists of two scales covering different aspects of 
organizational performance. As the dependent variable, firm success includes a scale for 
market-based performance and a scale for financially based performance.  To 
operationalize market-based performance, two items are used: market share and sales 
growth. To operationalize financially based performance, one item is used: profitability.  
  
 The justification of the choice of performance measurements stems from RBV 
theory, suggesting that the possession and deployment of unique, inimitable resources 
will lead to the attainment of a competitive advantage, which is ultimately measured by 
performance indicators (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Bates and Flynn, 1995; Michalisin 
et al., 1997; Bowen and Wiersema, 1999; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Rouse and 
Daellenbach, 1999). In the RBV, the central strategic concern is the deployment of 
resources to earn profits exceeding the cost of deploying those resources. However, 
other researchers suggest that profitability as well other measurements of firm success, 
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including market share and sales growth—are jointly determined by firm resources 
(Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). For example, Brush and Artz (1999) and Spanos and 
Lioukas (2001) find that firm resources are positively associated with sales growth 
and/or market share.   
 
With respect to RBV and performance, several RBV researchers (e.g., Miller and 
Shamsie, 1996; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001), in fact, 
include both profitability and market-based measures (e.g., sales growth, market share) 
to study the association between resources and firm success. Thus, while profitability 
may be most related to the theoretical domain of the RBV, this study, following several 
precedent studies, treats the firm success construct as multidimensional and has an 
interest in explaining the association between resources and market-based performance 
as well.60 By doing so, this study will offer evidence that either does or does not 
corroborate previous findings. Replicability of RBV studies has been called an issue of 
primary concern among scholars in the field (Levitas and Chi, 2002) and the present 
study aims to support this need. Lastly, by including market-based measurements, this 
study will help to establish the range and robustness of RBV theory beyond a single 
performance construct. 
 
In summary, the following tables provide a summary of the operationalization of 
the resource and performance constructs used in this study:
                                                 
60 It is noted that in the Spanos and Lioukas (2001) study, the researchers find that firm resources have a 
significantly positive association with market performance, but are nonsigificantly associated with 
profitability. Thus, while the central concern of the RBV is the deployment of resources to earn profits 
exceeding the cost of deploying those resources, there is conflicting evidence that this tenet always holds 
true.  
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Study Constructs 
 
Tangible Resources 
 
Scale Item Source 
1. Cash (on hand/at bank) earned from operations  
2. Raised financial capital (e.g., debt from 
secured bank loans, equity from the issuance 
of shares or bonds)  
3. Financial investments (e.g., in interest bearing 
accounts, in company shares, in equity 
positions in other companies, in government 
instruments)  
Fahy (2002) 
New item 
 
 
New item 
 
Table 5 Financial assets scale 
Scale Item Source 
1. Buildings and other physical structures (e.g., 
factories, offices, warehouses, stores, 
showrooms), including their location  
2. Physical equipment and other physical assets 
(e.g., machinery, tools, vehicles)  
3. Land, including its location 
New item 
 
 
(Fahy, 2002) 
 
New item 
Table 6 Physical assets scale 
 
Intangible Resources 
 
Scale Item Source 
1. Legally-protected copyrights 
2. Legally-protected patents 
3. Legally-protected designs 
4. Proprietary or held-in-secret technology (e.g., 
software developed in-house, specialized 
manufacturing technology, databases) 
5. Legally-protected trademarks 
Hall (1992) 
Hall (1992); Fahy (2002) 
Hall (1992); Fahy (2002) 
Schroeder et al. (2002) 
 
 
Hall (1992) 
Table 7 Intellectual property assets scale 
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Scale Item Source 
1. Organizational contracts that the firm has 
established with market-based participants 
(e.g., joint-venture agreements, franchise 
agreements, distribution agreements) 
2. Shared organizational values, beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviors (i.e., firm culture)  
3. Organizational policies (e.g., recruitment, 
compensation, reward, training) designed to 
acquire, develop, and retain the human talent 
of the firm  
4. The organizational structure (i.e., the operating 
and reporting structure) of the firm  
Hall (1992) 
 
 
 
Welbourne and Wright (1997) 
 
Welbourne and Wright (1997) 
 
 
 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Table 8 Organizational assets scale 
 
Scale Item Source 
1. Brand name reputation  
2. Company reputation 
3. Customer service reputation 
4. Product/service reputation 
Hall (1992) 
Hall (1992) 
Welbourne and Wright (1997) 
Hall (1992) 
Table 9 Reputational assets scale 
 
Scale Item Source 
1. The overall skills, creativity, and know-how of 
employees 
2. The skills, expertise, and know-how of 
managers  
3. Relationships that employees and managers 
have established and maintained with external 
constituents for the firm’s benefit (e.g., 
customers, strategic alliances, suppliers, etc.) 
4. Operational [business] processes  
Hall (1992); Welbourne and 
Wright (1997); Fahy (2002) 
Fahy (2002) 
 
Welbourne and Wright (1997); 
Fahy (2002); Spanos and 
Lioukas (2001) 
 
Schroeder et al. (2002)  
Table 10 Capabilities scale 
 
Performance 
 
Scale Item Source 
1. Sales Turnover 
2. Market Share 
3. Profitability 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Table 11 Firm success scale 
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Control Variables 
According to several scholars, firm age can affect both short and long-term performance 
(e.g., Welbourne and Wright, 1997; Shane, 1998; Baum et al., 2000). Sanders and 
Boivie (2004) argue that because firms who have been in business for longer periods of 
time have more opportunity to create value, there is likely a positive relationship 
between firm age and firm success. Indeed, a number of studies (e.g., Evans, 1987; 
Dunne et al., 1989; Wagner, 1994) have found that there is a positive correlation 
between firm age and firm success. Therefore, to remove whatever affect it might have 
on firm success, age is systematically controlled for. 
 
In addition to age, there are a number of other variables that may affect 
organizational performance. These include seller concentration (Bain, 1959; Scherer, 
1980; Buzzell and Gale, 1987), intensity of competition (Porter, 1980), market 
turbulence (Oczkowski and Farrell, 1998), and technological change (Scherer, 1980). 
Although the literature review suggests that the impact of industry structure on firm 
performance is generally less significant than firm factors, in many cases it still 
represents an important determinant of performance.61 Narver and Slater (1990) claim 
that the unobservable variables of industry structure must be controlled for when 
analyzing a firm’s market and financial performance. Indeed, Porter (1980) argues that 
industry structure—as reflected in five industry forces—has a strong influence on 
determining the competitive rules of the game for rivals in a given industry, as well as 
their performance levels.  
 
Given that the specific nature of this study focuses on a wide-range of industry 
sectors, Porter’s (1980) five forces of industry structure are chosen as additional control 
variables. Inclusive of the discussion in Chapter II, the five forces include the threat of 
new entrants, competitive rivalry among incumbents, the threat of substitute products, 
                                                 
61 It is noted that in the overall results of many firm factor-industry structure comparison studies 
(presented in Chapter II), industry structure does have a positive and significant effect on firm 
performance. Therefore, the inclusion of industry structure factors in this study is necessary to control for 
their potential effects on firm success. 
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the bargaining power of buyers, and the bargaining power of suppliers.62 To control for 
the five forces of industry structure, a scale is adapted from Narver and Slater (1990), 
Oczkowski and Farrell (1998), and Spanos and Lioukas (2001).63 Table 12 displays the 
scales used for the industry structure control variables. 
Scale Item Source 
1. Our firm has been in business for:___years 
(AGE) 
2. In our industry, the degree to which 
competitors are roughly equal in size and 
power is (RIVALRY) 
3. Overall market growth in our industry is 
(RIVALRY) 
4. The number of competitors vying for 
customers in our industry is (RIVALRY) 
5. The fixed cost structure required to compete in 
our industry is (RIVALRY) 
6. The intensity with which competitors jockey 
for a better position in the industry is 
(RIVALRY) 
7. In our industry, the degree to which only a few 
competitors dominate the market is 
(RIVALRY) 
8. The extent to which price competition is used 
regularly in our industry is (RIVALRY) 
9. The degree to which competitors in our 
industry offer clearly differentiated 
products/services is (RIVALRY) 
10. How easy is it for new firms to enter and 
compete in your industry (ENTRY) 
11. To what degree is your industry threatened by 
substitute products/services (SUB) 
12. What level of bargaining power (i.e., ability to 
negotiate lower prices) do you have over your 
suppliers (SPOW) 
13. What level of bargaining power (i.e., ability to 
negotiate lower prices) do customers have over 
your firm (BPOW) 
Welbourne and Wright (1997) 
 
New item 
 
 
Narver and Slater (1990); 
Oczkowski and Farrell (1998) 
New item 
 
New item 
 
New item 
 
 
Narver and Slater (1990)  
 
 
New item 
 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
 
 
Narver and Slater (1990); 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
 
Narver and Slater (1990); 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
 
Narver and Slater (1990); 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) 
Table 12 Control variables
                                                 
62 Following Spanos and Lioukas (2001), the bargaining power of suppliers item is reverse-coded to read 
bargaining power over suppliers. 
63 Given the inclusion of a significant range of industries and the large sample size, strategic groups 
(Porter, 1980) were not included as a control variable. 
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Likert-type Scales  
Kent (2001) has observed that Likert-type scales are used to measure a wide variety of 
latent constructs, particularly in social science research. The majority of the RBV 
research studies discussed in Chapter II utilize Likert-type scales to measure various 
resources and performance constructs. Following previous research, Likert-type scales 
are used to derive a quantitative value for each construct. Appendices A-3 and A-4 
provide copies of the questionnaire (pilot study and final questionnaire) that display the 
Likert-type scales used to measure the various constructs in this research. 
 
 For the resource constructs, five-point Likert scales are utilized.64  Informants 
were asked to assess each factor for its comparative impact on the firm’s success. The 
firm success construct also utilizes a Likert-type scale. However, unlike the resource 
constructs, a seven-point scale is used for the firm success measurement. Using a seven-
point scale, as opposed to a five-point scale, provides for a wider delineation of 
performance responses, which is indicative of the broad range of performance levels in 
the market place (Aharoni, 1993). Informants were asked to evaluate their performance, 
across the three performance measurements, relative to close competitors (Birley and 
Westhead, 1990). Finally, for the five forces questions (control variables), five-point 
Likert scales are used (see Appendices A-3 and A-4). 
 
All the firm success measurements were self-reported by the sample population. 
Although this study is a cross-sectional one, quasi-longitudinal (Hall, 1992; Levinthal 
and Myatt, 1994; Maijoor and van Witteloostuijn, 1996) scales are utilized to ascertain 
the self-reported success measures for the previous three-year period, relative to 
competitors, in order to avoid bias from any temporal fluctuations and to proximate a 
notion of sustainability of firm success. However, it is acknowledged that a three-year 
period does not necessarily represent a measurement of sustained firm success (Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993).  
 
                                                 
64 The five-point scale used in this research ranged from 0 to 4. 
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With respect to the firm success measurement, although objective measures of 
performance would have been desirable, small firms are often reluctant to provide such 
data, which could have adversely affected the response rate in this study.65 Furthermore, 
self-reported, subjective measures of firm success are widely used in strategic 
management research (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Dess, 1987; Robinson and 
Pearce, 1988; Powell, 1992; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Spanos and Lioukas, 
2001), have been shown to be a reasonable substitute for objective measures of firm 
success (Dess and Robinson, 1984), and have a significant, albeit not perfect, correlation 
with objective measures of firm success (Pearce et al., 1987; Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1987; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Geringer 
and Hebert, 1991; Judge et al. , 1995). 
 
Pre-Dissertation 
Following responsible survey research practice (Hinkin, 1995; Frazer and Lawley, 
2000), the instrument was tested, through the administration of a pilot study, to assess 
the wording, construct reliability and validity, and to improve its psychometric 
characteristics.  
 
From an ordering perspective, it is believed that ordering resource-based 
questions by category (e.g., capabilities first, reputational assets second, organizational 
assets third, etc.) potentially introduce order bias, such that informant’s answers would 
be influenced by the order of response categories (Frazer and Lawley, 2000). Therefore, 
following Fahy’s (2002) methodology, resource-based questions appear in random order 
in the questionnaires and are not rotated. 
 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study questionnaire (Appendix A-2) was administered to a sample of 53 students 
in the MBA program at the Graduate School of Business, Curtin University of 
                                                 
65 By way of example, in a study of 187 small and medium-sized firms, Spanos and Lioukas (2001) report 
that 80 firms (57 percent of the sample) did not answer questions pertaining to detailed, objective financial 
information. Thus, the use of Likert-type scales to gather subjective measurements of performance, as 
opposed to asking informants to supply raw performance data, is preferred to eliminate potential 
nonresponse problems with the firm success construct. 
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Technology. Respondents were generally middle- to lower-level managers representing 
a range of industries. These managers were reasonably knowledgeable about the 
objectives of the research although in some cases they passed on the survey to a higher-
level manager to complete.66 
 
In order to assess and improve the readability and clarity of the pilot study 
survey, the last section provided the respondents with space to suggest ways in which 
the survey could be improved. Additionally, a post-hoc, in-person review with the 
respondents was used to collect feedback for further refinement of the survey.67  
 
Discussion of Pilot Study Results 
The specification of which items belong to which resource constructs reflects theoretical 
analysis and reasoning. However, to assess the psychometric characteristics of the 
measurements for each of the constructs, a series of tests are conducted to explore their 
reliability and validity. 
 
Reliability 
Reliability examines whether the measurement of a given construct can be repeated; that 
is, reliability assesses whether the measurement of a construct can be duplicated over 
time instead its being a random event (Hair et al., 1995). As suggested by Nunnally 
(1978), the reliability of the measures is tested using Cronbach’s alpha. Reliability 
should be the first measure calculated to assess the quality of the instrument (Churchill, 
1979). From a construct reliability perspective, although Powell and Dent-Micallef 
(1997) claim that no precise ranges exist to evaluate the Cronbach alpha, the most 
commonly cited minimum threshold is .70 (Nunnally, 1978). However, other scholars 
(Churchill, 1991; Sekaran, 1992; Slater, 1995) have suggested that reliability 
coefficients (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) as low as .60 are acceptable for hypothesis testing.  
                                                 
66 One pilot study respondent did comment that the survey seemed to require the specialist knowledge of 
the CEO or CFO in order to respond to some of the questions. However, the same respondent suggested 
that the questionnaire was easy to read, clear, and sensible. 
67 One respondent recommended changing the sales turnover question (in the demographic section) to 
reflect a wider turnover range. This recommendation was included in the final version of the 
questionnaire. 
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In order to gain the highest possible reliability coefficient, select items are 
dropped from select constructs. For the physical assets construct, the physical equipment 
item is dropped. For the reputational assets construct, the brand name reputation item is 
dropped. For the capabilities construct, the organizational routines item is dropped. For 
the rivalry construct (control variable), three items are dropped: 1) overall market 
growth in the industry; 2) degree to which a few competitors dominate the industry; and 
3) the degree to which competitors in the industry offer clearly differentiated 
products/services. After excluding unreliable items, the reliability coefficients for the 
pilot study data range from .62 to .92, all within the acceptable range described in the 
literature.68 Lastly, no anomalies are found between the reliability coefficients in the 
pilot study and other like RBV studies (Galbreath, 2004a; Galbreath and Galvin, 2004). 
 
Validity 
To assess the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs, factor analysis with 
VARIMAX rotation is conducted. VARIMAX rotation is used because it centers on 
simplifying the columns of the factor matrix. Here, there tend to be some high loadings 
(i.e., closer to 1) and some low loadings (i.e., closer to 0). Interpretation is easiest when 
the variable-factor correlations are either closer to 1, indicating a clear association, or 
closer to 0, indicating a poor association (Hair et al., 1987). In order to assess that the 
items relate to their stipulated constructs, they are forced into six factors.  
 
In the main, the items load on their predicted construct, thus confirming convergent 
validity. Loadings were at the .50 level or higher, which is considered very significant 
(Hair et al., 1987). With respect to discriminant validity, all items load higher on their 
predicted constructs then on their cross-loadings, thus suggesting a good fit. Lastly, no 
anomalies are found between convergent and discriminant validity in the pilot study and 
other like RBV studies (Fahy, 2002; Galbreath, 2004a; Galbreath and Galvin, 2004). 
 
                                                 
68 Alpha coefficients below .70, but no lower than .60, are acceptable for hypothesis testing (Churchill, 
1991; Sekaran, 1992; Slater, 1995). 
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Dissertation Methodology 
Sampling Frame  
Swartz et al. (1992) suggest that researchers need to move beyond analyzing the 
variance of organizational phenomena between manufacturing and services industries. 
However, no study is identified that investigates the relationship between a broad range 
of intangible resources, tangible resources, and firm success by examining both 
manufacturing and services industries, of various sizes, in the same study. Therefore, 
rejecting the Swartz et al. (1992) argument, a sample is drawn from both manufacturing 
and services industries in order to derive new empirical insight into RBV theory and to 
maximize the generalizability of the results (Michalisin et al., 1997).  
  
The justification for selecting a sample of manufacturing and services firms of 
various sizes is the fact that resource-based theory, in general, is concerned more with 
resource-based advantages than monopoly power or specific industries within which 
resources may be applied (Fahy, 2002). Fahy (2002) argues that an important research 
agenda within the RBV stream should be to investigate what types of resources are 
associated with firm success in different contexts. Furthermore, a primary purpose of 
this study is to generalize results beyond a particular industry or sector to the population 
of for-profit business firms operating in markets that are not particularly regulated, 
protected, or controlled by government. 
  
In this study, the unit of analysis is the resource. Specifically, for-profit business 
firms operating in Australia are surveyed to assess the relationship between resources 
and firm success. To develop the sample, the exploratory nature of this research 
necessitates particular parameters for sample selection, including: 
 
1. Only firms with 20 or more employees; 
2. Only firms that had been in business for at least three years; and 
3. Only firms within manufacturing and services classifications. 
 
The justification of the above sample parameters is three fold.  
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First, to ensure a minimum operating structure, only firms with 20 or more 
employees have been included (Soo et al., 2001; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). Firms 
employing less than 20 people are considered less likely to be able to answer questions 
relating to the constructs used in this study. Furthermore, although 20 employees is used 
as the minimum number for inclusion in the sample, a wide range of firm sizes is still 
able to be examined (through stratified random sampling), which is important for RBV 
research. Fahy (2002), for example, argues that the RBV does not emphasize 
discrepancies between firm sizes, as its main concern is resource-based rather than 
monopoly-based (i.e., size-based) advantage. 
 
 Second, only firms that had been in business for at least three years are included 
(Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999; Cockburn et 
al., 2000; Helfat, 2000; Fahy, 2002). Previous resource-based research studies have used 
three years in order to proximate the sustainability of firm success (Hall, 1992; 
McMillan and Joshi, 1997; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). 
Rouse and Daellenbach (1999) and Spanos and Loukas (2001) argue that if researchers 
are going to pin-point the true sources of competitive advantage, examining only single-
year measurements of success may bias results.  
  
Finally, given the specific focus of the sample frame, only those firms classified 
as operating in either a manufacturing or services industry are included. Other 
organizations, such as agriculture, mining, public administration, and community 
services are excluded due to their lack of relevance to this study. Also, the inclusion of 
both manufacturing and services is considered necessary to ensure an adequate sample 
size and generalizability of the results (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). Appendix A-1 
displays those industries included in the final sample. 
 
Sample Size 
A database with executive names, company names, and addresses of the firms was 
obtained from Kompass Australia. In order to select a broad, representative sample of 
firms operating in Australia, a stratified random sample was used (Hoinville and Jowell, 
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1978). First, firms were stratified into manufacturing or services categories, based on 4-
digit ANZSIC classifications.69 Next, firms within the manufacturing and services 
classifications were further stratified by two size categories: 20 to 199 employees and 
200 plus employees.70 To ensure that the firms selected from each group were as discrete 
from each other as possible, the survey mailing list was compiled by systematic 
sampling. A final random sample, consisting of 1000 manufacturing and 1000 service 
firms, for a total of 2000 firms, was used to administer the questionnaire. A large sample 
size and a wide variety of firms were adopted for this exploratory study in order to offset 
an anticipated low response rate of 10-12 percent71, and to maximize the generalizability 
of the results (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
Justification of the Selected Sample 
Three reasons support the selection of the sample. First, there is an extensive body of 
empirical research that studies the impact of various hypothesized determinants of firm 
performance (Capon et al., 1996). However, the studies are dominated by data from the 
United States and to a lesser extent data from other large economies such as Japan and 
the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a search in the top-tier journals that have most 
extensively covered the RBV in the last ten years, namely the Academy of Management 
Journal, Journal of Management, and Strategic Management Journal, failed to uncover 
any substantial empirical efforts exploring the RBV with Australian data. Thus, 
expanding the empirical efforts of the RBV, particularly beyond those in the United 
States, is warranted to test the theory outside of a limited domain. 
 
 The second reason for selecting an Australian sample is with respect to 
Australia’s economic performance over the last several years. Specifically, this research 
examines the effects of a variety of resources on firm success. Given that informants are 
asked to report on their firm’s performance for a previous three-year period, using a US-
based sample could have been potentially problematic given the strong economic 
                                                 
69 ANZSIC is the Australia New Zealand Standard Industry Code classification system. 
70 The Australian Bureau of Statistics classifies medium-sized businesses in Australia as those with 20-199 
employees while large businesses are classified as those with 200 or more employees. 
71 The response rate of 10-12 percent was anticipated based on a similar study (Hall, 1992) that achieved 
an 11 percent response rate using a similar informant base. 
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reversal of firms in that economy after the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2000. That 
is, sampling U.S.-based firms could have resulted in skewed performance 
measurements, particularly on the low-end. By comparison, Australia weathered the 
economic shocks of 2000-2002 fairly well (OECD, 2003). Thus, it is thought that using 
an Australian sample would offer more evenly distributed performance measurements.   
  
Finally, the choice of an Australian sample is for practical reasons. Given the 
nature of the research, namely a dissertation study, certain limitations with respect to 
conducting the empirical portion of the effort are imposed; i.e., time and budgetary 
constraints limited the collection of the data necessary to carry out the empirical tests to 
an Australian sample. 
 
Informant Selection 
According to Rousseau (1985), organizational concepts should be measured at the 
organizational level. However, Doving (1996) points out that surveys cannot be filled 
out by an organization; therefore, higher-level data must be inferred from a single 
informant. Phillips (1981) and Kumar et al. (1993) argue that informant selection must 
be done carefully. Informants must have adequate knowledge to answer questionnaires 
in survey-type research and the motivation and authority of the potential informant 
should be considered in order to enhance response rates (Phillips, 1981; Kumar et al., 
1993). Thus, selecting an appropriate informant for the objectives of the study is critical 
(Huber and Power, 1985). 
  
Given the objectives of this study, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or 
equivalent, is chosen as the key informant.72 Unlike participating respondents who 
report information about themselves (e.g., level of job satisfaction), participating 
informants offer their judgments and perceptions about specific organizational properties 
and activities, for example, firm success (Phillips, 1981). Slater (1995) suggests that key 
                                                 
72 Because this study included firms with as few as 20 employees, ‘CEO’ is not always the title linked to 
the highest-level employee in the firm. Therefore, where necessary, the highest-level employee in the firm 
(e.g., Managing Director, Director, Owner) is used as an equivalent substitute for the CEO. 
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informants are a reliable source of information about directly unobservable 
organizational variables.  
 
Although a single informant is used in this study, it is recognized that the use of a 
single informant could potentially bias the results by introducing measurement error 
(Phillips, 1981; Bagozzi et al., 1991). However, Hall (1992) and Fahy (2002) argue that 
the CEO is the only informant who has the specialized knowledge to adequately assess 
the firm’s resource base with respect to its performance. Huber and Power (1985) find 
that when several informants vary in their knowledge of issues, a simple average of 
responses is less accurate than the answers provided by a single knowledgeable 
informant. Lastly, Shortell and Zajac (1990) and Gatignon et al. (2002) argue that using 
a knowledgeable single informant is a valid approach to measuring strategy research 
questions and that the bias introduced by such an informant is likely to be negligible 
compared to multiple informant responses. 
 
The use of CEOs in organizational research is wide spread, since organizations 
are ultimately a reflection of their top management (Hambrick, 1981a, 1981b; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). Furthermore, the CEO is the most knowledgeable informant 
regarding the objectives of this study (Huber and Power, 1985). Therefore, the use of the 
CEO, or its equivalent, as the single best informant in this type of study was appropriate 
(Aaker, 1989; Hall, 1992; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001; Fahy, 2002). Addressing such 
issues as lack of consistency between multiple informants is considered beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
Data Collection 
The process of administering the questionnaire and collecting instrument data was two-
phased. In the first phase, a number of approaches were utilized. First, a cover letter was 
developed to describe the objectives of the study, to assure informants of their privacy 
and confidentiality, and to offer the summary results of the study. Delener (1995) 
suggests that the personalization of cover letters, an assurance of confidentiality, and the 
offering of incentives are positively associated with response rates. Furthermore, the 
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cover letter described the research as being associated with and sponsored by the 
Graduate School of Business, Curtin University of Technology. Sponsorship can be an 
important determinant of response rate (Delener, 1995). Lastly, Heneman (1974) shows 
that subjects are more likely to give unbiased responses when their anonymity is 
assured. Thus, all informants were assured anonymity. Appendix A-4 displays the cover 
letter used to solicit responses. 
 
 Given the particular target informant (i.e., CEOs), the questionnaire is designed 
to be to the point, easy to understand and read, while at the same time capturing the data 
necessary to carry out the research (Frazer and Lawley, 2000). The final version of 
questionnaire (Appendix A-3) contains 39 questions (32 scale items plus 7 general 
questions). The general flow of the questionnaire uses the ‘funnel approach’ as 
suggested by Sekaran (2000), where informants are asked general questions regarding 
organizational phenomena first and then questions regarding specific company 
information, such as the level of sales turnover and profitability, in the latter sections of 
the questionnaire. This approach is also used to help mitigate the effects of 
autocorrelation (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). 
 
The survey was conducted over the months of May and June 2003. After the 
final sample was determined, cover letters and questionnaires were printed. A completed 
survey kit (cover letter, questionnaire, and reply paid envelope) was mailed to all firms 
in the sample frame in the first phase. In the second phase, a reminder letter was sent to 
all firms in the sample frame two weeks after the initial mailing, accompanied with a 
new cover letter, explaining the objectives of the study, and the importance of each of 
the informants’ responses (Appendix A-5). If additional questionnaires were required by 
the informants, they were subsequently mailed for completion.
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V. Results and Analysis 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the empirical results of the main study 
conducted to test the proposed model and research hypotheses. The first section provides 
evaluations of the response rate, nonresponse bias results, and the general descriptives of 
the survey respondents. The next section examines and assesses the scales measuring the 
key constructs. Finally, the results of the statistical tests used to test the hypotheses are 
provided. 
 
General Characteristics of the Sample 
Response Rate 
Using the KOMPASS Australia CD-ROM database, 2000 firms, stratified and randomly 
selected from both manufacturing and services industries, composed the final sample. Of 
the 2000 surveys sent, 268 were undeliverable due to either the intended informant was 
no longer at the address or the business had moved (or had been acquired) with no 
forwarding address or contact available. Thus, the response rate is 19 percent (327 
completed and returned surveys divided by the 1732 in the usable sample), which is 
comparable to other resource-based studies using similar informants and industries (Soo 
et al., 2001; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). However, given Australia’s high level of 
survey fatigue (Birch, 2002), this relatively low response rate is not surprising. 
 
Of the 327 completed responses, 34 were ineligible because the company did not 
meet the minimum requirements of 20 or more employees and/or 3 or more years of age. 
Additionally, histograms, correlations, and frequencies were run to check for miscoded 
data and outliers. Two outliers were detected and removed due to the inconsistencies in 
their responses; responses to the resource questions were only 4s or 0s. Therefore, 291 
responses are used for the analysis. 
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Nonresponse Bias 
One key issue is commonly raised with respect to a survey methodology: nonresponse 
bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Nonresponse bias is a test to determine if 
respondents are any different than those in the sample who do not respond. To test for 
nonresponse bias, early versus late respondents are compared on key demographic 
variables. The rationale behind such an analysis is that late respondents (i.e., sample 
firms who respond late) are more similar to the general population than the early 
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). For the analysis, the early respondents (58 
percent of the sample) are compared with late respondents (42 percent of the sample) 
using an independent samples test. A comparison between early and late respondents 
reveals no significant differences on two key demographic variables; namely, firm size 
and age (Table 13). However, as an additional test, respondents are compared to the full 
sample population chosen for the study and no significant differences are found between 
firm size (t = -.829, p = .407) and age (t = 1.186, p = .236). Thus, the respondents appear 
to be representative of the broader population.  
Sig. Mean Std. Error
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference
Number of Equal 1.079 .300 -.772 285 .441 -88.92 115.148
full-time variances
employees assumed
Equal -.762 247.642 .447 -88.92 116.651
variances
not assumed
Number of Equal 1.403 .237 -1.290 289 .198 -5.79 4.490
years in variances
business assumed
Equal -1.244 225.100 .215 -5.79 4.656
variances
not assumed
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality
of Variances
t -test for Equality of Means
 
Table 13 Nonresponse bias 
 
Common Method Bias 
The measurement of the research constructs relies solely on the perceptual judgment of a 
single individual, in this case, the CEO or equivalent. Thus, the measurements of the 
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data are based on the responses of a single individual with no additional assessment 
taken from other individuals. Using such a measurement technique raises the issue of 
common method bias, which can be particularly dangerous when a single informant fills 
out items that tap into independent and dependent variables within the same survey 
instrument. However, the factor analyses that are reported below subsequently 
demonstrate that a single factor solution does not emerge, as evidenced by Harmann’s ex 
post one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Hence, there is unlikely to be any 
common method bias. 
 
Demographic Descriptive Statistics 
Number of Employees 
The number of full-time employees range from a low of 20—the required minimum to 
be included in the sample—to a high of 10,000 (Table 14). The mean number of 
employees is 324.77 and the standard deviation is 963.68. Four cases are missing for the 
number of employees data. 
Employees (#) 324.77 70 963.68 20 10,000
Age (years) 44.78 35 37.92 3 372
Maximum Item Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median
 
Table 14 Firm size and age 
 
Age of Firm 
The number of years in business range from a low of 3—the required minimum to be 
included in the sample—to a high of 372 (Table 14). The mean number of years in 
business is 44.78 and the standard deviation is 37.92. No cases are missing for the age of 
firm data. 
 
Ownership of Firm 
Firm ownership is predominately private (Table 15). Two hundred twelve firms are 
privately owned (72.9 percent), 55 are publicly owned (18.9 percent), and 23 are other 
(7.9 percent). One case is missing from the ownership data. 
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid privately owned 212 72.9 73.1 73.1
publicly owned 55 18.9 19.0 92.1
other 23 7.9 7.9 100.0
Total 290 99.7 100.0
Missing System 1 .3
Total 291 100.0  
Table 15 Firm ownership 
 
Type of Business 
Independent firms garner the majority of share in this sample (Table 16). One hundred 
eighty four firms are independent, 77 are a single business unit (SBU), 17 are corporate 
parents, and 13 are other. No cases are missing from the type of business data. 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid independent 184 63.2 63.2 63.2
SBU 77 26.5 26.5 89.7
corporate parent 17 5.8 5.8 95.5
other 13 4.5 4.5 100.0
Total 291 100.0 100.0  
Table 16 Type of business 
 
Primary Business Activity 
Manufacturing is the single largest business activity within this sample (Table 17). 
Manufacturing accounts for 134 firms, wholesale for 33, construction and transportation 
for 16 each, consulting for 15, retail for 13, and finance and banking for 1 each. ‘Other’ 
business activities account for 62 firms. No cases are missing from the primary business 
activity data.
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid banking 1 .3 .3 .3
construction 16 5.5 5.5 5.8
consulting 15 5.2 5.2 11.0
finance 1 .3 .3 11.3
manufacturing 134 46.0 46.0 57.4
retail 13 4.5 4.5 61.9
transportation 16 5.5 5.5 67.4
wholesale 33 11.3 11.3 78.7
other 62 21.3 21.3 100.0
Total 291 100.0 100.0  
Table 17 Business activity 
 
Sales Turnover 
The majority of sales turnover falls between $1 million and $50 million (Table 18). Two 
hundred firms earn between $1 and $50 million, one firm earns less than $1 million, 33 
firms earn between $50 and $100 million, 18 firms earn between $100 and $200 million, 
and 35 firms earn over $200 million. Four cases are missing from the sales turnover 
data. 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid less than $1M 1 .3 .3 .3
$1M - $10M 95 32.6 33.1 33.4
$10M - $50M 105 36.1 36.6 70.0
$50M - $100M 33 11.3 11.5 81.5
$100M - $200M 18 6.2 6.3 87.8
over $200M 35 12.0 12.2 100.0
Total 287 98.6 100.0
Missing System 4 1.4
Total 291 100.0  
Table 18 Sales turnover 
 
Majority of Sales Turnover 
There is a relatively even split between manufacturing and service firms in terms of the 
derivation of sale turnover (Table 19). One hundred fifty one firms represent 
manufacturing revenue, while 140 firms represent services revenue. No cases are 
missing from the majority of sales turnover data. 
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid manufacturing 151 51.9 51.9 51.9
services 140 48.1 48.1 100.0
Total 291 100.0 100.0  
Table 19 Majority of sales turnover 
 
Psychometric Evaluation of the Constructs 
The following section describes the tests undertaken to examine the constructs in this 
study. Specifically, tests for construct reliability, discriminant validity, and convergent 
validity are conducted. Construct reliability tests the degree to which individual items 
used in a construct are consistent in their measurements (Nunnally, 1978). Convergent 
validity tests the degree that items designed to load on the same construct do, in fact, 
load on that construct (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Discriminant validity tests the 
degree to which items measuring one construct relate exclusively to the construct and 
not to another (Churchill, 1979). As a final set of analysis, correlations, tolerances, and 
variance inflation factors are examined to assess the presence of multicollinearity.   
 
Reliability 
To test the reliability of the constructs, Cronbach’s alpha is used. A widely cited 
minimum threshold for the Cronbach alpha is .70 (Nunnally, 1978).73 However, 
Churchill (1991), Sekaran (1992), and Slater (1995) suggest that a reliability alpha as 
low as .60, but no lower, is generally acceptable. All of the constructs used in the final 
sample meet or exceed the .60 threshold. Although all the constructs meet the minimum 
coefficient threshold, in order to gain the highest possible alpha and thus reliability, 
select items are dropped. For the intellectual property assets construct, the proprietary 
technology item is dropped. For the organizational assets constructs, the organizational 
contracts item is dropped. For the rivalry construct (control variable), two items are 
dropped: the degree to which competitors are equal in size and the fixed cost structure 
required to compete. Table 20 displays each construct and its associated reliability 
coefficient. 
                                                 
73 It should be noted that Nunnally (1967) originally recommended a Cronbach alpha level of .60. It was 
changed to .70 in the 1978 edition of his book without explanation. 
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Construct Initial Items Final Items Alpha
Financial Assets 3 3 0.6075
Physical Assets 2 2 0.7750
Intellectual Property Assets 5 4 0.8811
Organizational Assets 4 3 0.6955
Reputational Assets 3 3 0.7349
Capabilities 3 3 0.6044
Rivalry (industry control variable) 5 3 0.6820
Firm Success (dependent variable) 3 3 0.7744
Reliability Analysis
 
Table 20 Reliability coefficients 
 
Convergent Validity 
Carmines and Zeller (1979) suggest that factor analysis provides a suitable means to 
examine convergent validity. In factor analysis, loadings are used to detect whether or 
not an item appropriately loads on its predicted construct. Typically, loadings of .50 or 
greater are considered to be very significant (Hair et al., 1987). Using SPSS, all resource 
items have been forced into six factors and rotated using the VARIMAX rotation 
method to assess their loadings. For all six resource constructs, items meet or exceed the 
.50 significance-loading threshold (Table 21). When items constructed to load on the 
same construct do, in fact, load on that construct, one may surmise the existence of 
convergent validity. For this data set, the evidence suggests support for convergent 
validity. 
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Item Mean Standard Loading Item to Total
# Deviation Correlation
A8 1.9440 1.3560 0.6660 0.3641
A16 0.7620 1.1828 0.7620 0.4802
A18 0.7440 1.0727 0.7440 0.3968
A7 2.0828 1.2113 0.8700 0.6326
A14 1.5552 1.2584 0.8750 0.6326
A5 1.3916 1.3274 0.8140 0.6727
A11 1.2238 1.2307 0.8580 0.7459
A15 1.0315 1.2520 0.8900 0.7934
A17 0.9231 1.1306 0.8510 0.7534
A3 2.6319 1.0309 0.7580 0.5069
A4 3.0972 0.8620 0.8040 0.5226
A6 2.7639 0.9806 0.7230 0.4998
A10 3.5552 0.6270 0.7810 0.5082
A12 3.4138 0.6716 0.7160 0.5272
A19 3.5897 0.5586 0.7830 0.6312
A9 3.4948 0.6725 0.6450 0.3418
A13 3.3979 0.6488 0.7520 0.4227
A20 3.4533 0.6056 0.5660 0.4698
Organizational 
Assets Construct
Reputational Assets 
Construct
Capabilities 
Construct
Financial Assets 
Construct
Physical Assets 
Construct
Intellectual Property 
Assets Construct
 
Table 21 Convergent validity 
 
Discriminant Validity 
One way to test discriminant validity is to assess whether the items that measure a 
construct do not correlate too highly with measures from other constructs from which 
they are supposed to differ (Churchill, 1979). To assess discriminant validity, factor 
analysis is used. To evaluate the measures, a comparison was made between the loading 
of an item with its associated factor (construct) to its cross-loading. All resource items 
are found to have higher loadings with their corresponding factors in comparison to their 
cross-loadings (Table 22). Thus, the evidence suggests the existence of discriminant 
validity.
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Table 22 Discriminant validity 
 
Correlations between Key Measures 
The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of all the variables used to 
test the hypotheses are summarized in Table 23. Given that correlations between 
predictor (independent) variables can cause problems with multicollinearity in 
regression analysis (Mason and Perreault, 1991; Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993), 
examining the significance of the correlation coefficients takes on added importance. 
Although there are some significant inter-correlations between the predictor variables, 
all of the correlation coefficients are below the level considered to be serious, which is 
generally accepted as .80 or higher (Licht, 1995).74 Thus, independence among the 
predictor variables appears not to be in violation and multicollinearity is unlikely a 
problem. However, two final tests are conducted to assess the presence of
                                                 
74 Other scholars (see, for example, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) suggest that a bivariate correlation of .70 
or higher among predictor variables may indicate multicollinearity. Either way, the correlations among 
predictor variables are below the problematic threshold point.  
Item FA PA IPA OA RA Capabilities Item
# Construct Construct Construct Construct Construct Construct #
A8 0.666 0.277 0.081 -0.100 -0.140 0.185 A8
A16 0.762 0.126 0.035 0.137 0.181 0.023 A16
A18 0.744 -0.080 0.115 0.088 0.207 -0.085 A18
A7 0.095 0.870 -0.015 0.167 0.048 0.099 A7
A14 0.125 0.875 0.076 -0.028 0.145 -0.016 A14
A5 -0.059 0.067 0.814 0.125 0.084 -0.201 A5
A11 0.100 -0.041 0.858 0.003 -0.028 0.080 A11
A15 0.110 -0.003 0.890 -0.025 -0.091 0.112 A15
A17 0.093 0.067 0.851 0.069 0.089 0.014 A17
A3 0.142 0.016 0.064 0.758 0.141 0.036 A3
A4 -0.074 0.024 -0.040 0.804 0.094 0.124 A4
A6 0.08 0.101 0.126 0.723 0.071 0.226 A6
A10 0.136 0.037 0.011 0.071 0.781 0.047 A10
A12 0.108 0.103 0.070 0.108 0.716 0.201 A12
A19 0.021 0.093 -0.016 0.120 0.783 0.246 A19
A9 0.013 -0.071 -0.120 0.086 0.252 0.645 A9
A13 0.055 -0.017 0.178 0.240 0.125 0.752 A13
A20 0.024 -0.056 -0.038 0.141 0.499 0.566 A20
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Table 23 Correlation analysis 
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multicollinearity. First, the tolerance values (designated as TOL in the regression models 
below) for each predictor variable is calculated and none are found to be below .60. 
Tolerance values at .10 or below indicate high correlation (Hair et al., 1995). Second, 
the variance inflation factors (designated as VIF in the regression models below) for the 
independent variables are calculated and are below two, which is well below the 
guideline of ten recommended by Mendenhall and Sincich (1993). Given the VIF and 
tolerance levels found in the analysis, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem.   
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed for this study reflect general propositions theoretically 
predicted by the RBV. The hypotheses allow for a more intricate level of analysis than 
previously tested. However, as noted at the beginning of Chapter IV, the study does not 
examine all of the potential resources within a firm’s resource pool. Based on the logic 
of Cameron and Whetten (1983), items that are representative of largely unbounded 
constructs, particularly in the case of intangible resources, are identified in the literature 
in order to tap into the domain of the construct. The set of resource variables is 
representative, not exhaustive. 
 
Statistical Technique for Hypothesis Testing 
To test the relationships between various resources and firm success, regression 
analysis—specifically, multiple hierarchical regression analysis—is used. Multiple 
regression analysis is a statistical technique that provides an index of the degree of 
relationship (1 = perfect relationship, 0 = no relationship) between the criterion 
variable(s), on the one hand, and the weighted combination of the predictor variables as 
specified by the regression equation, on the other hand—that is, R (Hair et al., 1995). 
Regression analysis predicts changes in a dependent variable by simultaneously 
accounting for the impact of various independent variables via their weighted 
combination. Interpreting the results of regression analysis may be more easily evaluated 
by examining the R-squared (R2)
 
statistic, which indicates the proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable that is shared by the weighted combination of independent 
variables (Hair et al., 1995).  
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Following the hierarchical regression procedure, each model is first assessed to 
determine if the particular variable of interest improves the prediction of the dependent 
variables beyond that of either tangible assets or intangible assets, or both, depending on 
the hypothesis and level of analysis. This is done by entering the variables into two 
separate blocks for analysis. Second, to assess the unique, individual contribution of the 
resource variable of interest in predicting the dependent variables, the standardized beta 
coefficient of that variable is compared to the standardized beta coefficients of the other 
resource variables in the model. Independent variables with larger coefficients are more 
important to the solution, and make a stronger unique contribution to explaining the 
dependent variable(s), than those with lower values (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  
 
Using hierarchical regression analysis allows the researcher not only to 
understand the explanatory power of a specific variable of interest in improving the 
prediction of the dependent variable(s), after controlling for the effects of other 
variables, but also permits the exploration of the unique contribution of each 
independent variable in explaining the dependent variable(s). By running a series of 
separate hierarchical regressions to test the hypotheses in this study, as opposed to a 
single regression, the analysis affords the opportunity to more fully explore distinct 
relationships between different classes—specifically intangible and tangible—of 
resources and their relative importance to firm success. This technique allows for a more 
precise and stark comparison of the magnitude of the importance of the focal resources. 
Such a procedure follows Fahy’s (2002) approach to studying resources and offers fine-
grained testing of the RBV as prescribed by Mauri and Michaels (1998).  
 
Finally, the use of hierarchical regression analysis is typically predicated upon 
entering the variables of interest in a predetermined order based on theoretical grounds 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). However, the assumption that the independent variables 
are orthogonal and have been entered on the basis of a clear causal ordering is not 
appropriate to this study. The justification for using hierarchical regression analysis is 
based on the interest in analyzing the magnitude of intangible resources in predicting 
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firm success after accounting for the effects of tangible resources. For research of this 
type, hierarchical regression analysis is appropriate (Hair et al., 1995).  
 
Mathematical model for Hypothesis 1 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7FA + β8PA  
 
(Model 2) + β9IPA 
 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry  
FA = Financial assets 
PA = Physical assets 
IPA = Intellectual property assets 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Model Assessment. Across all the dependent variables, changes in R2s for each model are 
non-significant (Table 24). For sales turnover, p = .742, for market share, p = .415, and 
for profitability, p = .113. Thus, IPA do not account for any additional explanatory 
power to the prediction the dependent variables after simultaneously accounting for the 
effects of tangible assets and the control variables.  
 
Variable Contribution. IPA do not make a unique, individual contribution to firm 
success, after accounting for the effects of tangible assets and the control variables 
(Table 24). Across all three of the independent variables, the IPA coefficients are non-
significant. However, in this particular data set, financial assets are significantly and 
negatively associated with market share (p <.05) and profitability (p <.05). Thus, the 
data do not offer support for Hypothesis 1. 
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Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 7.982*** - - - 7.258*** - - - 7.552*** - -
Age .018 .306 .968 1.034 .049 .826 .968 1.034 .056 .942 .963 1.038
Entry -.080 -1.222 .789 1.268 .030 .451 .789 1.268 -.016 -.238 .790 1.266
Sub -.104 -1.735* .945 1.058 -.006 -.093 .945 1.058 -.170 -2.853** .942 1.061
SPOW .071 1.191 .950 1.052 .059 .971 .950 1.052 .065 1.093 .946 1.057
BPOW -.193 -2.910** .769 1.301 -.036 -.543 .769 1.301 -.016 -.240 .783 1.276
Rivalry .052 .737 .674 1.483 -.002 -.024 .674 1.483 -.078 -1.112 .688 1.454
FA -.085 -1.350 .858 1.166 -.135 -2.122* .858 1.166 -.155 -2.491* .864 1.157
PA .017 .266 .864 1.158 .074 1.171 .864 1.158 -.019 -.305 .863 1.159
IPA .020 .330 .882 1.133 -.051 -.816 .882 1.133 .098 1.589 .882 1.134
Model 1 (w/out IPA)
R .245 .173 .259
R -Squared .060 .030 .067
F 2.232 * 1.079 ns 2.472 *
Std. Error of Estimate 1.439 1.334 1.622
Model 2 (with IPA)
R .246 .179 .275
R -Squared .060 .032 .075
Change in R -Squared .000 .002 .008
F 1.990 * 1.032 ns 2.49 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.442 1.335 1.617
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; ns: not significant model
Sales Turnover Market Share Profitability
 
Table 24 Statistics for Hypothesis 1 
 
Mathematical model for Hypothesis 2 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7FA + β8PA  
 
(Model 2) + β9OA 
 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry 
FA = Financial assets 
PA = Physical assets 
OA = Organizational assets 
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Hypothesis 2 
Model Assessment. Changes in R2s across all the dependent variables are significant 
(Table 25). By introducing organizational assets into the analysis, the change in the R2 
for sales turnover is .055 (p <.01), for market share the R2 change is .037 (p <.01), and 
for profitability, the R2change is .041 (p <.01). Thus, organizational assets account for 
significant additional explanatory power to the prediction of the dependent variables 
after simultaneously accounting for the effects of tangible assets and the control 
variables. 
Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 6.228*** - - - 5.862*** - - - 5.794*** - -
Age .015 .268 .967 1.034 .047 .798 .967 1.034 .054 .926 .963 1.038
Entry -.053 -.855 .828 1.208 .035 .558 .828 1.208 .025 .402 .831 1.203
Sub -.096 -1.670* .962 1.039 -.008 -.136 .962 1.039 .152 -2.609* .959 1.043
SPOW .067 1.173 .965 1.036 .048 .807 .965 1.036 .075 1.285 .962 1.040
BPOW -.196 -3.049** .769 1.300 -.041 -.627 .769 1.300 .014 -.220 .784 1.276
Rivalry .035 .514 .673 1.485 -.019 -.272 .673 1.485 .092 -1.338 .685 1.460
FA -.114 -1.886* .863 1.159 -.170 -2.731** .863 1.159 -.168 -2.756** .869 1.151
PA -.011 -.173 .854 1.172 .051 .820 .854 1.172 -.040 -.643 .855 1.170
OA .242 4.148* .934 1.070 .200 3.346* .934 1.070 .208 3.541** .940 1.063
Model 1 (w/out OA)
R .245 .173 .259
R -Squared .060 .030 .067
F 2.232 * 1.079 ns 2.472 *
Std. Error of Estimate 1.439 1.334 1.622
Model 2 (with OA)
R .338 .259 .328
R -Squared .115 .067 .108
Change in R -Squared .055 ** .037 ** .041 **
F 4.011 ** 2.238 * 3.683 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.400 1.310 1.589
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; ns: not significant model
Market ShareSales Turnover Profitability
 
Table 25 Statistics for Hypothesis 2 
 
Variable Contribution. Organizational assets have among the largest beta coefficients of 
any of the independent variables, in any of the regression models in this study. In 
Hypothesis 2, organizational assets have a larger beta coefficient, across all of the firm 
success measures, than tangible assets. For sales turnover, the organizational asset beta 
coefficient is .24 (p <.05) versus -.11 (p <.05) financial assets. For market share, the beta 
coefficient for organizational assets is .20 (p <.05) versus -.17 (p <.01) for financial 
assets. Finally, for profitability, the beta coefficient for organizational assets is .21 (p 
<.01) versus -.17 (p <.01) for financial assets. These results suggest that organizational 
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assets are more important to explaining firm success than tangible assets, thus offering 
confirmation of Hypothesis 2. 
 
Mathematical model for Hypothesis 3 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7FA + β8PA  
 
(Model 2) + β9RA 
 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry 
FA = Financial assets 
PA = Physical assets 
RA = Reputational assets 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Model Assessment. The addition of reputational assets to the model containing the 
control variables and tangible assets results in a significant change in R2 for sales 
turnover (∆R2 = .034; p <.01), market share (∆R2 = .026; p <.01), and profitability (∆R2 = 
.011; p <.05). Given the R2 changes, reputational assets account for significant additional 
explanatory power to the prediction the dependent variables after simultaneously 
accounting for the effects of tangible assets and the control variables (Table 26).   
 
Variable Contribution. With respect to the unique, individual contribution of 
reputational assets to explaining performance relative to the other independent variables, 
the results are mixed (Table 26). For sales turnover, the beta coefficient for reputational 
assets is .19 (p <.01) which is larger than the financial assets coefficient of -.11 (p <.05). 
However, the market share and profitability measures offer different results. For market 
share, the beta coefficient for reputational assets is .17 (p <.01) compared to -.17 (p 
<.01) for financial assets. For profitability, the beta coefficient for reputational assets is 
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.11 (p <.05) compared to -.16 (p <.05) for financial assets. With respect to this 
hypothesis, in only one of the three dependent variables do reputational assets make a 
larger unique contribution than the tangible resource, financial assets. Therefore, the data 
suggest only partial support of Hypothesis 3.   
Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 4.923*** - - - 4.654*** - - - 5.164*** - -
Age .034 .579 .961 1.041 .063 1.057 .961 1.041 .064 1.084 .958 1.044
Entry -.082 -1.315 .833 1.200 .011 .173 .833 1.200 .005 .076 .835 1.198
Sub -.111 -1.914* .960 1.042 -.021 -.358 .960 1.042 -.162 -2.741** .958 1.044
SPOW .059 1.009 .960 1.042 .040 .670 .960 1.042 .071 1.193 .958 1.044
BPOW -.194 -2.990** .769 1.300 -.040 -.605 .769 1.300 -.016 -.245 .783 1.276
Rivalry .021 .299 .662 1.510 -.032 -.454 .662 1.510 -.092 -1.309 .674 1.484
FA -.113 -1.841* .855 1.169 -.171 -2.712** .855 1.169 -.161 -2.569* .857 1.167
PA -.010 -.155 .849 1.178 .051 .807 .849 1.178 -.035 -.562 .845 1.183
RA .197 3.245** .881 1.136 .172 2.768** .881 1.136 .114 1.848* .873 1.145
Model 1 (w/out RA)
R .245 .173 .259
R -Squared .060 .030 .067
F 2.232 * 1.079 ns 2.472 *
Std. Error of Estimate 1.439 1.334 1.622
Model 2 (with RA)
R .307 .236 .280
R -Squared .094 .056 .078
Change in R -Squared .034 ** .026 ** .011 *
F 3.222 ** 1.833 * 2.596 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.416 1.318 1.615
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; ns: not significant model
Sales Turnover Market Share Profitability
 
Table 26 Statistics for Hypothesis 3 
 
Mathematical models for Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4a 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7FA + β8PA  
 
(Model 2) + β9CAP 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry 
FA = Financial assets 
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PA = Physical assets 
CAP = Capabilities 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7IPA + β8OA + β9RA  
 
(Model 2) + β10CAP 
 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry 
IPA = Intellectual property assets 
OA = Organizational assets 
RA = Reputational assets 
CAP = Capabilities 
 
Hypothesis 4c 
(Model 1) FS = ∞0 + β1AGE + β2ENTRY + β3SUB + β4SPOW + β5BPOW + 
β6RIVALRY + β7FA + β8PAA +β9IPA + β10OA + β11RA  
 
(Model 2) + β12CAP 
 
FS = Firm success, including sales turnover, market share, and profitability (all entered 
in separate regressions) 
∞ = Constant 
AGE = Number of years in business 
ENTRY = Ease of entry 
SUB = Threat of substitute products/services 
SPOW = Bargaining power over suppliers 
BPOW = Bargaining power of buyers 
RIVALRY = Industry rivalry 
FA = Financial assets 
PA = Physical assets 
IPA = Intellectual property assets 
OA = Organizational assets 
RA = Reputational assets 
CAP = Capabilities 
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Hypothesis 4 
The fundamental assertion that most RBV and new economy scholars have in common 
is that the most important resource of the firm is capabilities, which is reflective of its 
know-how. The firm’s capabilities are argued to be the greatest contributor to success. 
To test the theory, the regression equations were divided into three separate analyses: 
 
1. The association of capabilities with firm success factoring in the effects of tangible 
assets (financial and physical assets) (H4a); 
2. The association of capabilities with firm success factoring in the effects of intangible 
assets (intellectual property assets, organizational assets, reputational assets) (H4b); 
and, 
3. The association of capabilities with firm success factoring in the combined effects of 
tangible and intangible assets (H4c). 
 
Hypothesis 4a 
Model Assessment. By introducing capabilities into the analysis, the R2 change is 
significant for sales turnover (∆R2 = .033; p <.01), market share (∆R2 = .032; p <.01), and 
profitability (∆R2 = .029; p <.01). Thus, across all of the dependent variables, capabilities 
account for significant additional explanatory power to predicting the dependent 
variables after simultaneously accounting for the effects of tangible assets and the 
control variables (Table 27).  
 
Variable Contribution. Across all of the dependent variables, capabilities have larger 
beta coefficients than tangible assets (Table 27). For sales turnover, the capabilities beta 
coefficient is .19 (p <.01) while both the financial and physical asset coefficients are 
non-significant. For market share, the beta coefficient for capabilities is .18 (p <.05) 
versus -.16 (p <.05) for financial assets. Finally, for profitability, the beta coefficient for 
capabilities is .17 (p <.01) versus -.15 (p <.05) for financial assets. Thus, capabilities 
appear to be more important to explaining firm success than tangible assets. The data 
suggest support for Hypothesis 4a. 
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Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 4.985*** - - - 4.533*** - - - 4.614*** - -
Age .024 .415 .967 1.035 .055 .934 .967 1.035 .061 1.037 .963 1.044
Entry -.077 -1.239 .834 1.199 .015 .234 .834 1.199 .003 .054 .835 1.198
Sub -.106 -1.825* .962 1.040 -.017 -.291 .962 1.040 -.160 -2.727** .959 1.044
SPOW .050 .849 .950 1.053 .029 .493 .950 1.053 .057 .969 .948 1.044
BPOW -.215 -3.287** .760 1.316 -.061 -.912 .760 1.316 -.034 -.525 .774 1.276
Rivalry .016 .233 .658 1.520 -.040 -.566 .658 1.520 -.110 -1.570 .667 1.484
FA -.100 -1.635 .870 1.150 -.161 -2.587* .870 1.15 -.158 -2.584* .875 1.167
PA .029 .477 .860 1.163 .086 1.379 .860 1.163 -0.01 -.077 .858 1.183
CAP .193 3.198** .894 1.118 .189 3.083* .894 1.118 .179 2.951** .892 1.145
Model 1 (w/out CAP)
R .245 .173 .259
R -Squared .060 .030 .067
F 2.232 * 1.079 ns 2.472 *
Std. Error of Estimate 1.439 1.334 1.622
Model 2 (with CAP)
R .305 .249 .309
R -Squared .093 .062 .096
Change in R -Squared .033 ** .032 ** .029 **
F 3.186 ** 2.044 * 3.227 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.416 1.314 1.600
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; ns: not significant model
Sales Turnover Market Share Profitability
 
Table 27 Statistics for Hypothesis 4a 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
Model Assessment. In the three dependent variables, only one R2 change is significant, 
namely profitability (∆R2 = .012; p <.05) (Table 28). Changes in R2s for sales turnover 
and market share are non-significant (p = .271 and p = .231, respectively). Given the 
assessment of the regression models in Hypothesis 4b, capabilities offer little significant 
additional explanatory power to predicting firm success, after simultaneously accounting 
for the effects of intangible assets and the control variables.  
 
Variable Contribution. The assessment of the unique, individual contribution of 
capabilities to firm success, relative to intangible assets, reveals weak results (Table 28). 
Only with respect to profitability is there a statistically significant association (p <.05). 
However, in this measurement of firm success, the beta coefficient of organizational 
assets is both significant (p <.05) and of the same magnitude of capabilities (.13 versus 
.13). Thus, no evidence is found to support Hypothesis 4b. 
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Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 4.039*** - - - 3.730*** - - - 4.313*** - -
Age .037 .643 .969 1.032 .072 1.229 .969 1.032 .073 1.252 .967 1.034
Entry -.070 -1.091 .780 1.282 .041 .622 .780 1.282 -.015 -.231 .784 1.275
Sub -.103 -1.783* .941 1.063 -.003 -.052 .941 1.063 -.167 -2.814** .939 1.065
SPOW .039 .682 .947 1.056 .029 .492 .947 1.056 .030 .512 .948 1.055
BPOW -.203 -3.184** .784 1.276 -.061 -.935 .784 1.276 -.025 -.385 .801 1.249
Rivalry -.015 -.224 .679 1.473 -.060 -.855 .679 1.473 -.149 -2.143* .687 1.455
IPA -.025 -.408 .876 1.142 -.096 -1.555 .876 1.142 .051 .832 .874 1.144
OA .176 2.818** .810 1.235 .149 2.313* .810 1.235 .135 2.113* .816 1.225
RA .086 1.279 .700 1.428 .064 .930 .700 1.428 -.031 -.451 .694 1.441
CAP .077 1.103 .646 1.548 .087 1.199 .646 1.548 .135 1.892* .650 1.539
Model 1 (w/out CAP)
R .339 .246 .282
R -Squared .115 .060 .080
F 4.021 *** 1.989 * 2.648 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.399 1.315 1.614
Model 2 (with CAP)
R .344 .255 .303
R -Squared .119 .065 .092
Change in R -Squared .004 .005 .012 *
F 3.743 *** 1.937 * 2.763 **
Std. Error of Estimate 1.399 1.314 1.606
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
ProfitabilityMarket ShareSales Turnover
 
Table 28 Statistics for Hypothesis 4b 
 
Hypothesis 4c 
Model Assessment. The addition of capabilities to the model containing the control 
variables and the combined contributions of tangible and intangible assets results in a 
significant R2 change only for profitability (∆R2 = .009; p <.05). R2 changes in sales 
turnover and market share are non-significant (p = .337 and p = .221, respectively). 
Thus, in only one of the dependent variables do capabilities account for significant 
additional explanatory power to the prediction of firm success after simultaneously 
accounting for the effects of both tangible and intangible assets and the control variables 
(Table 29). 
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Variables (Model 2) β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF β t TOL VIF
Constant - 3.869*** - - - 3.521** - - - 4.119*** - -
Age .027 .473 .960 1.042 .057 .976 .960 1.042 .058 1.002 .957 1.045
Entry -.061 -.959 .773 1.293 .045 .695 .773 1.293 -.002 -.035 .776 1.289
Sub -.104 -1.801* .939 1.065 -.006 -.109 .939 1.065 -.165 -2.816** .937 1.067
SPOW .052 .904 .933 1.072 .040 .672 .933 1.072 .051 .873 .930 1.075
BPOW -.204 -3.175** .757 1.321 -.050 -.758 .757 1.321 -.031 -.474 .772 1.295
Rivalry .008 .111 .653 1.531 -.043 -.610 .653 1.531 -.118 -1.694* .663 1.509
FA -.132 -2.145* .832 1.202 -.176 -2.792** .832 1.202 -.187 -3.010* .835 1.197
PA .016 -.253 .819 1.221 .051 .801 .819 1.221 -.027 -.426 .812 1.231
IPA -0.01 -.098 .859 1.165 -.073 -1.174 .859 1.165 .077 1.252 .858 1.166
OA .192 3.044** .791 1.265 .159 2.468* .791 1.265 .154 2.434* .802 1.247
RA .114 1.659* .661 1.512 .086 1.214 .661 1.512 .014 .192 .647 1.545
CAP .068 .962 .626 1.598 .089 1.227 .626 1.598 .120 1.677* .626 1.598
Model 1 (w/out CAP)
R .363 .293 .339
R -Squared .132 .086 .115
F 3.823 *** 2.370 ** 3.231 ***
Std. Error of Estimate 1.391 1.302 1.588
Model 2 (with CAP)
R .367 .302 .352
R -Squared .135 .091 .124
Change in R -Squared .003 .005 .009 *
F 3.581 *** 2.302 ** 3.216 ***
Std. Error of Estimate 1.391 1.301 1.583
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
Sales Turnover Market Share Profitability
 
Table 29 Statistics for Hypothesis 4c 
 
Variable Contribution. With respect to the unique, individual contribution of capabilities 
to explaining firm success relative to tangible and intangible assets, the results are weak 
(Table 29). Only with respect to profitability is the capabilities construct significant (p 
<.05). However, compared to other statistically significant resources, its beta coefficient 
is smaller than organizational assets (.12 versus .15) and financial assets (.12 versus .18). 
Thus, the data do not suggest support for Hypothesis 4c. Interestingly, from an overall 
resource perspective, only financial assets and organizational assets remain statistically 
significant across all of the dependent variables in this hypothesis, while reputational 
assets is statistically significant (p <.05) with respect to sales turnover only. 
 
Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables, some of the variables employed in each of the 
regression models remain statistically significant throughout the series of analyses. The 
threat of substitute products is significantly and negatively associated with sales turnover 
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and profitability across all of the models, at either the p <.01 or p <.05 level. The 
bargaining power of buyers is significantly and negatively associated with sales turnover 
across all of the models at the p <.01 level. Finally, industry rivalry is significantly and 
negatively associated with profitability (p <.05) in the regression analysis for both 
Hypothesis 4b and Hypothesis 4c. Also, the data shows that in all cases, the threat of 
substitute products, the bargaining power of buyers, and industry rivalry have relatively 
comparable if not larger beta coefficients than those resource variables that are 
statistically significant. Finally, firm age, the threat of new entrants and the bargaining 
power of suppliers are non-significantly associated with firm success in all models. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, the hypotheses developed in Chapter III are tested using the 
methodologies outlined in Chapters IV and V. The hypotheses are developed to answer 
the broader research question with respect to the RBV, as posed in Chapter I, which is: 
are resources that are intangible in nature more important determinants of firm success 
than tangible resources? Based on the results of the statistical analysis, the research 
question can only be partially answered in the affirmative. The data suggest that in order 
to understand the impact of intangible versus tangible resources on firm success, and 
thus to verify the main prescription of the RBV, the level and type of analysis needs to 
be taken into consideration. To explore the findings further, the next chapter offers both 
the theoretical and practical implications of the results presented in Chapter V.
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VI. General Discussion 
 
The purpose of the final chapter is to summarize the results of the study, explain those 
results, describe limitations, and suggest possible future research directions. First, the 
chapter contains a discussion of the results presented in Chapter V. Second, the results 
of Chapter V are placed within the context of the current academic literature. Following 
the theoretical implications, a discussion of the study’s relevance to managers is 
presented. Next, the study’s limitations are highlighted. Finally, the last section suggests 
possible directions for future research.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
The central purpose of this research is to verify the main prescription of the RBV. To 
test this prescription, Mauri and Michaels (1998) call for researchers to conduct fine-
grained analysis of resources at low levels of aggregation in an attempt to untangle the 
true sources of competitive advantage. Consistent with Mauri and Michaels’ (1998) 
argument, this research examines the relationship between resources and firm success on 
a more fine-grained level than previously tested.  
 
 To address the research question, Fahy’s (2002) methodology for studying 
resources is utilized. Resources are operationalized across six constructs: financial 
assets, physical assets, intellectual property assets, organizational assets, reputational 
assets, and capabilities. A series of six hypotheses, which assert that resources of an 
intangible nature are more important determinants of firm success than those resources 
that are tangible in nature, are posited. Specifically, the hypotheses allow for a more 
precise analysis of resources and firm success with a particular interest in verifying the 
RBV’s main prescription. A summary of the findings of this study is provided in Table 
30.
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Hypotheses Findings 
H1: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, intellectual 
property assets will make a larger contribution to firm success 
H2: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, 
organizational assets will make a larger contribution to firm 
success 
H3: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, 
reputational assets will make a larger contribution to firm 
success 
H4a: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, 
capabilities will make a larger contribution to firm success 
H4b: Compared to the contributions of intangible assets, 
capabilities will make a larger contribution to firm success 
H4c: Compared to the combined contributions of tangible and 
intangible assets, capabilities will make a larger contribution to 
firm success 
Not supported 
 
Supported 
 
 
Partially supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not supported 
 
Not supported 
Table 30 Summary of results 
 
H1: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, intellectual property assets will 
make a larger contribution to firm success. 
 
The first hypothesis assesses the impact of intellectual property assets (IPA) on 
firm success controlling for the effects of tangible assets. According to theory, IPA more 
closely exhibit the characteristics of resource value, rareness, inimitability, and 
nonsubstitutability than tangible assets. Thus, IPA are argued to have a greater impact on 
firm success than resources that are tangible in nature. However, the results provide no 
evidence that IPA contribute more uniquely to firm success than tangible assets. In fact, 
the analysis reveals that after accounting for the effects of financial and physical assets 
(and the control variables), IPA have a non-significant association with sales turnover, 
market share, and profitability. Furthermore, changes in R2 across all models are non-
significant and thus IPA do not explain firm success. Therefore, IPA may not offer the 
level of value creating benefits that have been theorized. This is surprising given the 
literature’s frequent emphasis on the value and benefits of IPA as sources of competitive 
advantage. 
 
On the other hand, some scholars have been critical of firms in Australia for not 
adequately developing IPA. For example, Daley (2001) claims that while Australian 
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firms are rich in knowledge they have been poor at commercializing that knowledge via 
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, Daley (2001) notes that in terms of the 
proportion of GDP spent on business enterprise research and development, Australia 
ranks seventeenth among OECD countries with this proportion continuing to decline. 
Daley’s (2001) observation might provide further insight as to the non-significant 
parameters with respect to IPA and their relatively small beta coefficients. A final 
possible explanation for the rejection of Hypothesis 1 is that while IPA may be very 
important to a few firms and even to specific industries, given that many industries are 
analyzed, this results in a non-significant outcome. Of note in this model, physical assets 
are non-significant while financial assets are significantly and negatively associated with 
all of the dependent variables. 
 
H2: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, organizational assets will make 
a larger contribution to firm success. 
  
Hypothesis 2 follows the theoretical logic of the first hypothesis. Here, 
organizational assets were assessed against financial and physical assets to determine 
their relative impact on firm success. Like IPA, organizational assets are theorized to 
possess higher barriers to duplication than tangible assets, due to their VRIN 
characteristics; as a result they should have a greater impact on firm success. The 
hypothesis is confirmed. Organizational assets are not only significantly associated with 
sales turnover, market share, and profitability, but changes in R2 in all models are 
significant, after accounting for the effects of tangible assets and the control variables. 
Organizational assets, when taken in the context of all the hypotheses and regression 
models, also account for the largest beta values and the largest changes in R2 of any 
resource construct. Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that organizational assets are 
among the most important determinants of a firm’s market and financial performance. 
Of interest here is that similar to Hypothesis 1, financial assets remain significantly and 
negatively associated to sales turnover, market share, and profitability, while physical 
assets remain non-significant.
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H3: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, reputational assets will make a 
larger contribution to firm success. 
 
The third hypothesis examines the impact of reputational assets on firm success. 
Reputation—be it with respect to brand name, product, customer service, or company—
has long been argued to be an important determinant of the overall success of a firm. 
The question is: important compared to what? Hypothesis 3 tests the relative impact of 
reputational assets on firm success after accounting for the effects of tangible assets and 
the control variables. In this model, reputational assets are significantly and positively 
associated with sales turnover, market share, and profitability. Changes in R2s across all 
of the dependent variables are also significant with reputational assets, offering 
additional explanatory power to predicting firm success above the effects of tangible 
assets. However, only with respect to sales turnover did any of the coefficients make a 
larger unique contribution to explaining firm success relative to financial assets. Lastly, 
as with the previous two hypotheses, physical assets remain non-significant. 
 
Given the broader resource pool, reputational assets may not be as critical to firm 
success as predicted by theory (cf. Rose and Thomsen, 2004). One explanation might 
rest with asset interconnectedness (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). For example, reputation 
has been described as an outcome or the result of previous actions of a firm’s managerial 
capabilities (Hall, 1992; Fombrum, 1996). Thus, when taken in the context of the 
broader resources necessary to build a reputation, its impact on firm success might not 
be as significant as found by past studies, many of which isolate on reputation as a 
stand-alone resource. 
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H4a: Compared to the contributions of tangible assets, capabilities will make a larger 
contribution to firm success. 
H4b: Compared to the contributions of intangible assets, capabilities will make a 
larger contribution to firm success.  
H4c: Compared to the combined contributions of tangible and intangible assets, 
capabilities will make a larger contribution to firm success. 
 
The final hypothesis (four) offers the most fine-grained level of analysis in the 
research. In this hypothesis, the capabilities of the firm are analyzed with respect to both 
tangible and intangible assets. Capabilities are argued to be the most important 
determinant of firm success. However, the findings of this hypothesis are inconclusive.  
 
First, capabilities offer additional significant explanatory power to predicting 
firm success, after controlling for the effects of tangible assets and the control variables. 
In this hypotheses (Hypothesis 4a), the capabilities beta coefficient is larger than 
financial assets (physical assets are non-significant). Second, in Hypothesis 4b, 
capabilities offer limited additional explanatory power to predicting firm success—only 
with respect to profitability—after controlling for the effects of intangible assets and the 
control variables. In this hypothesis, the beta coefficient of capabilities is statistically 
significant only with respect to profitability and is equal, but not larger than, the beta 
coefficient of organizational assets. Finally, capabilities offer limited additional 
explanatory power to predicting firm success—only with respect to profitability—after 
controlling for the combined effects of tangible and intangible assets and the control 
variables. In this hypothesis (Hypothesis 4 c), while the beta coefficient of capabilities is 
statistically significant with respect to profitability, it is smaller than the beta coefficient 
of financial assets (.12 versus .18) and organizational assets (.12 versus .15), both of 
which are statistically significant.  
 
The association between capabilities and profitability is not surprising as it is this 
association that is central in RBV theory (Peteraf, 1993). While this finding confirms 
previous studies (Fahy, 2002; Galbreath, 2004a), the insignificant association between 
capabilities, sales turnover, and market share in Hypotheses 4b and 4c does not replicate 
the findings of Spanos and Lioukas (2001), although these authors do not include 
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tangible resources in their study. Thus, context-specificity might be a determining factor 
with respect to capabilities and its association with firm success (Collis, 1994, Brush and 
Artz, 1999).   
 
Given the above findings, the data suggest full support for only one of the three 
sub-hypotheses. Interestingly, in Hypothesis 4a, financial assets are significantly and 
negatively associated with market share and profitability, and in Hypothesis 4c, financial 
assets are significantly and negatively associated with all three dependent variables. As 
found in all other tests of the hypotheses, financial assets remain a unique contributor to 
firm success after accounting for the effects of all the independent variables. In all 
models, physical assets are non-significant.  
 
As for the control variables, the threat of substitute products, the bargaining 
power of buyers, and industry rivalry are significantly and negatively associated with 
firm success. Although not the specific focus of this study, the results tend to affirm 
Porter’s (1980) five forces framework, in that all three of these industry structure 
variables not only significantly impact on firm success, but impact on firm success in the 
expected direction, i.e., negatively. Furthermore, the comparatively large beta values of 
the threat of substitute products, the bargaining power of buyers, and industry rivalry 
suggest that industry structure offers a significant and unique contribution to firm 
success, confirming Porter’s (1980) theory. Lastly, this study confirms the study of 
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) which finds that important determinants of firm success, 
namely resources and industry structure, are two sides of the same coin. 
 
Surprisingly, however, with respect to industry structure, the threat of new 
entrants is found to have a non-significant association with firm success across all of the 
models. According to IO economic theory (Bain, 1959), and by extension, Porter’s 
(1980) five forces framework, barriers to entry are an important component to blocking 
new companies from entering the market and a key determinant of firm success, both for 
the attainment and sustainability of superior firm performance (where entry barriers are 
high) and/or for the perpetuation of average or below-average performance (where entry 
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barriers are low). However, in this sample, when factoring for other industry structure 
variables, firm age, and firm resources, the threat of new entrants produces a non-
significant parameter. One explanation might be that while industry rivalry is intense in 
Australia (cf. Rogers, 2002), the number of potential new entrants within any given 
industry (at any given time) is far less, for example, than in the United States.   
 
With respect to firm age, it has been argued that because older firms may have 
more time to create value, they might be at a performance advantage (Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004). However, in this study, firm age is non-significantly associated with firm 
success. A potential explanation might be that because the minimum age requirement for 
inclusion in the study was three years, the firms under study are demonstrating 
reasonable success levels. However, a more probably explanation rests with the 
Australian economy. The Australian economy has performed exceptionally well over the 
last several years (OECD, 2003) with all types of firms benefiting, which might account 
for reported sales and profitability levels.      
 
Finally, as noted, throughout all of the regression analyses for each hypothesis, 
physical assets are non-significant. However, financial assets are significantly and 
negatively associated with the dependent variables in virtually all of the regression 
analyses and consistently have among the largest, statistically significant beta 
coefficients. These two associations require explanation.  
 
One potential explanation of the significant yet negative association between 
financial assets and firm success focuses on debt as a resource. To gain an advantage 
over rivals, financial capital, in the form of debt, may be necessary to expand operations 
and to realize new growth.75 For example, in order to compete internationally a 
manufacturing firm may require new plant and equipment to increase its production 
capacity and geographic scope. While debt can be used as leverage here, it is not cost-
                                                 
75 There is no assumption that all competitors in any given industry will be able to secure debt. By way of 
example, global expansion may be necessary in order to gain a competitive advantage in a given industry, 
but not all firms may be successful at securing the necessary capital (e.g., through debt financing) for such 
expansion. Thus, in theory, those firms that secure debt for global expansion may be in an advantageous 
position over rivals. 
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free. That is, debt not only requires repayment but also comes at a cost, normally 
referred to as the cost of capital. Indeed, interest and other changes are incurred with the 
raising of debt. Thus, while debt is an asset that may be an important determinant of 
market and financial performance (Boulton et al., 2000), it is plausible that it might 
account for the negative association between financial assets and firm success in this 
study.76 However, there might be other potential explanations with respect to the 
significance of financial assets and its associated negative sign.  
 
Firms are subject to a variety of factors that impact on their success: competitors, 
the rules of competition, government policy, industry structure, resources, etc. Clearly, 
over time, not all firms survive in a given market. One mechanism that is used as a 
survival tactic (although the tactic does not necessarily guarantee survival in the long 
run), particularly when a firm is faced with cash flow problems, is to secure additional 
capital in order to cover short-term financial obligations. From an RBV perspective, the 
use of additional capital—a financial resource—to cover a cash-flow problem is not 
likely to be a source of competitive advantage. However, raising capital to cover cash-
flow problems might be another plausible explanation for the significant and negative 
association between financial assets and firm success in this sample.77 
 
Another explanation with respect to the association of financial assets with firm 
success in this sample might be time-based. For example, many of the industry structure 
versus firm-factor studies described in Chapter II include year effects as part of the 
analysis. Generally, the studies found that year effects account for less than five percent 
of the variance in the performance of firms, which is, in most cases, considerably less 
                                                 
76 A separate correlation was run between the three items constituting the financial assets construct and the 
dependent variables. Raised financial capital (including debt) was found to be more highly significant to 
firm success than the other two items, cash earned from operations and financial investments. 
Furthermore, as an additional test, the raised financial capital item was removed from the financial assets 
construct to examine the presence of changes in the regression analysis. Removing the raised financial 
capital item did not change the significance or sign of the financial assets coefficient. 
77 On the other hand, Folta and Janney (2004) suggest that raised financial capital, particularly in the form 
of private equity, can be a critical resource to firms and can have strategic benefits for both short- and 
long-term performance. Furthermore, a firm like Microsoft, with nearly $US60 billion in cash and 
investments accounted for in its financial statements (as of March 31, 2004), must surely view its financial 
assets as a strength, if not advantage, relative to rivals. 
  
190 
than the variance accounted for by industry or firm factors. However, in this study, given 
the quasi-longitudinal approach to measuring the firm success construct, it might be that 
with respect to the particular prior three-year period assessed by the informants, 
financial assets are significantly important relative to other resources.  
 
A final explanation with respect to the significance of financial assets with firm 
success might rest in the theory of asset interconnectedness. As several scholars 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Foss, 1998; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) have argued, the 
value of some assets may be dependent upon other assets. That is, resource 
combinations may be an important underlying factor of firm success. By way of 
example, building a strong product reputation in a global market not only requires that a 
firm build a quality product, but also that the firm promote the product. Promotion 
entails advertising expense; and in some cases, large amounts of advertising expense. In 
the case of the cola industry, for example, Coke’s and Pepsi’s advertising expense far 
outpaces their rivals as does their global share of the market (Yoffie, 2002). Although 
this research does not examine the issue of cause and effect, it might be that the 
statistical significance of some assets is a result of the interconnection with, or 
dependency on, financial assets.   
 
As for the non-significant association between physical assets and firm success, 
this finding might confirm both RBV theory and new economy rhetoric, which posit that 
tangible resources contribute little or nothing to a firm’s competitive advantage. Indeed, 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) and Michalisin et al. (1997), for example, suggest that the 
resources that drive a firm’s success are intangible, rather than tangible, in nature. 
Similarly, Soo et al. (2001) suggest that because most tangible resources are not 
valuable, rare, inimitable, or nonsubstitutable, they are rendered non-strategic to a firm’s 
success. The non-significant parameter with respect to physical assets in all of the 
models throughout the analysis may support the contention that at least some tangible 
resources are non-strategic to firm success.   
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Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
This section will highlight four important theoretical implications arising from the study. 
Specifically, this section will address: 1) a conceptual measurement of the RBV; 2) 
verification of the main prescription of the RBV; 3) the RBV as a framework for 
management research; and 4) the importance of firm capabilities. 
 
(1) The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) is perhaps the most dominant theory 
to emerge in the last decade to seek to untangle the most critical determinants of firm 
success (Priem and Butler, 2001a; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Hoopes et al., 2003; Miner, 
2003). The premise of the theory is that firms compete on the basis of resource 
endowments rather than on the structural characteristics of industries. Firm success, 
according to RBV theory, is largely driven by strategic, intangible resources and not by 
resources that are tangible in nature. If this is true, then intangible resources should, in 
theory, contribute more greatly to firm success than tangible resources. To verify such a 
theory, the researcher must first develop a conceptualization of resources from which to 
operationalize resource constructs. Given this requirement, the first important theoretical 
implication arising from this research is with respect to the operationalization and 
measurement of the RBV. 
  
According to Rouse and Daellenbach (2002), research that examines the RBV is 
fairly large and growing. Upon close inspection, most studies tend to be idiosyncratic in 
that they focus on a very limited set of resource variables; namely, individual intangible 
resources. However, firms do not compete on the basis of a single, intangible resource; 
rather, they compete with a multitude or system of resources (Foss, 1998; Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003b). Thus, the first important theoretical implication is that the study 
provides a robust measurement of the RBV in the context of a much broader resource 
base, rather than merely a specific intangible resource or single proxy measure.  
 
Given that firms are bundles or systems of tangible and intangible resources 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Foss, 1998), then testing the empirical assertions of 
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the RBV, in the context of the broader resource pool, is a logical and important step for 
validation of the theory (cf. Foss, 1997; Mauri and Michaels, 1998; Makhija, 2003). This 
study offers one of the first known tests of the RBV’s main prescription in which a more 
precise operationalization of multiple resource constructs is used rather than general 
proxy measures (e.g., advertising or research and development expenditures) or even 
isolated, individual resources. If, as Mehra (1996) asserts, resources are the building 
blocks of a firm’s success in the market, then verifying which ones are more important 
to success requires very precise measurement across multiple constructs including both 
tangible and intangible resources. Although difficulty in operationalizing the RBV is 
widely recognized, this study does help to answer Mauri’s and Michael’s (1998) call for 
more fine-grained analysis of resource-based theory. 
 
(2) The second important theoretical implication addresses the crux of RBV theory. 
RBV theory largely, if not exclusively, asserts that intangible resources are the major 
determinants of market and financial performance. Thus, according to the RBV and, as 
discussed in Chapter II, new economy suppositions, tangible resources are not 
significant determinants of firm success. To more precisely test the RBV’s main 
prescription, intellectual property assets (IPA), organizational assets, reputational assets, 
and capabilities are all regressed, in multiple equations, on three measures (sales 
turnover, market share, and profitability) of firm success after simultaneously 
accounting for the effects of tangible resources (financial and physical assets).  
 
Regarding the results of this study, they are mixed with regard to verifying the 
main prescription of the RBV and depend on the resources under study. The intangible 
asset, IPA, does not make a unique contribution to firm success after simultaneously 
accounting for the effects of tangible assets. Organizational assets and capabilities are 
both more important determinants of firm success than either financial or physical 
assets, but this depends of the level of analysis. Reputational assets, on the other hand, 
are a more important determinant of firm success than financial assets, but only with 
respect to one of the firm success measurements. The findings suggest that when taken 
in context of a firms broad resource pool, some intangible resources, but not all, might 
  
193 
be valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable factors and thus might exhibit 
resource position barriers.  
 
In this study, certain intangible resources do seem to have an important role in 
explaining firm success. The results here confirm the studies of Fahy (2002), Galbreath 
(2004a), and Galbreath and Galvin (2004), in which intangible assets and capabilities are 
generally found to be more important determinants of firm success than tangible assets. 
However, in the present study, financial assets are significantly associated with firm 
success in all models and offer among the most unique contributions to explaining firm 
success of any of the resource constructs, based on the statistical significance and size of 
the beta coefficients.  
 
The finding might offer some degree of confirmation of Foss’ (1997) argument, 
as described in Chapter III, that tangible resources might, in fact, constitute sources of 
competitive advantage. On the other hand, while the coefficients of financial assets 
throughout the regressions are significant and among the largest of any of the resource 
constructs, the sign is negative.78 Thus, the finding must be treated with caution. What is 
not known is whether financial assets might be contributing to competitive advantage in 
some unique way, are merely reflective of a resource that is necessary to maintain 
survival in the market, or are an effect of the specific time period which this study 
addresses.  
  
(3) A major debate in the literature is whether or not the RBV is useful as a 
theoretical lens for research work in management (Barney, 2001a; Priem and Butler, 
2001a, b). Key concerns include the RBV being tautological (i.e., in the RBV, successful 
firms are successful because they have unique resources; this is argued to be true by 
nature, and thus a tautology), the RBV lacking the empirical content criterion required of 
theoretical systems, and the RBV’s implicit assumptions about product markets, among 
                                                 
78 In their study of Greek firms, Caloghirou et al. (2004) find that financial assets are significantly related 
to firm success and have among the largest beta coefficients of the resources they study. However, the 
sign in their study is positive.  
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others (Priem and Butler, 2001a, b). The discoveries from this research suggest a few 
key points with respect to the RBV and its usefulness in management research. 
 
 Of particular interest, the RBV is a theory of sustained competitive advantage 
whose tenets are based on internal firm factors. Of course, a major criticism of the RBV 
is that it is too internally focused (Porter, 1991; Foss and Knudsen, 2003). The results of 
this study suggest that while some resources are important determinants of firm success, 
some factors of industry structure are also important. According to Porter (1980) and 
Dickson (1992), because the environment in which a firm operates is critically important 
to its ability to compete effectively, framing strategic decisions through a single 
viewpoint might lead to dangerous biases.  
 
Certainly, while the RBV points to resources as the most important determinants 
of firm success, this study proves otherwise in that some industry structure variables 
have just as much impact on performance as key resources, including capabilities and 
organizational and reputational assets. Thus, one of the potential theoretical implications 
to be drawn from this study is that resources should never be studied in isolation, but 
rather should be studied with respect to industry structure characteristics. As it is argued, 
resources are only valuable in the context of the industries in which they are applied 
(Barney, 1986a; Kay, 1993). In this respect, theorists might most appropriately view the 
RBV as a contingency theory of sustained competitive advantage. That is, resource 
value might be contingent upon the industry, and even country, context (Collis, 1994). 
 
Lastly, the results of this research raises theoretical implications with respect to 
whether specific resources are ‘universally’ important across all industries, or are 
context specific. Given the objective of verifying the main prescription of the RBV and 
choosing a broad industry sample so as to generalize results, the conceptualization and 
operationalization of resources in this study can be considered ‘generic.’ That is, the 
resources might be better viewed as a general representation of firm-level factors rather 
than specific, idiosyncratic factors important to any given industry or firm.  
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Based on the results in this study, organizational assets, given their statistical 
significance and large beta coefficients, might be a generic cluster of resources that is 
important to performance in the context of both manufacturing and services firms in 
Australia. On the other hand, reputational and financial assets would also appear to be 
important while intellectual property assets are unimportant and capabilities marginally 
important. The theoretical implication of the finding indicates that some resources, or 
clusters of resources, might be ‘universally’ important. However, further research is 
required to determine if the resources found to be important in this study apply to other 
contexts, such as for firms in the United States or China, for example (cf. Collis, 1994; 
Brush and Artz, 1999). Thus, the RBV, as tested in this study, might offer guidance to 
management researchers in that given such a wide range of resources posited in the 
literature, the results seem to point to specific groups of performance-enhancing 
resources that span all industry contexts.                       
 
(4) The fourth and final important theoretical implication addresses the most finite 
level of analysis in the research, namely Hypothesis 4. Here, the analysis focuses on the 
resource argued to be the most important to firm success. The resource is the firm’s 
capabilities, which are reflective of its know-how. Although capabilities contribute more 
greatly to firm success after factoring in the effects of tangible assets (Hypothesis 4a), 
results are weak when factoring in the effects of intangible assets (Hypothesis 4b) and 
even weaker when the combined effects of tangible and intangible assets (Hypothesis 
4c) are accounted for. In only of the measures of firm success (profitability) is the beta 
coefficients of capabilities significant, suggesting that capabilities offer very little unique 
contribution to firm success at this level of analysis. This finding is contrary to the 
results of previous RBV research, such as that of Welbourne and Wright (1997), Fahy 
(2002), and Galbreath (2004a), in which capabilities are found to be the most important 
determinant of firm success.79 The first reaction to the finding is that capabilities might 
not be as important as theory suggests (cf. Collis, 1994). However, further explanation is 
warranted.     
                                                 
79 However, it is noted that in the studies cited here, t-tests of the mean scores between independent 
variables, rather than regression analysis, is used to study resource effects on performance.  
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Although the case for independence among the predictor variables is found, what 
is not measured is the extent to which capabilities, for example, influence the strength 
(or weakness) of the other resources of the firm. The following questions suggest such 
possible relationships. Are reputational assets largely an outcome of employee and 
managerial capabilities? Is culture (an organizational asset) the reflection of the 
capabilities of individual managers or even a single leader (e.g., the CEO)? Is the ability 
to raise capital (debt) impacted by the results of previous management capabilities (e.g., 
the ability of a management team to historically demonstrate that they can not only 
effectively leverage debt for market success but to pay back lending institutions as 
well)? Similarly, do ‘hierarchies’ of resources exist within firms, which have not been 
captured by this research? For example, do the capabilities of a firm contribute to a more 
aggregate level resource such as culture, which may contribute to yet another even more 
aggregate level resource such as reputation?  
 
Given the above scenarios, the results of this study might under-represent the 
significance of capabilities. That is, how much of the effects of organizational assets or 
reputational assets, for example, can ultimately be attributed to or accounted for by 
capabilities? The answer to such a question might be explained by theory (see, for 
example, Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Black and Boal, 1994), but an empirical answer 
cannot be provided here. On the other hand, Collis (1994) has questioned the importance 
of capabilities as the ‘ultimate’ source of sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
Further to Collis’ (1994, p. 151) arguments, he suggests that while capabilities 
might meet the necessary conditions (e.g., causal ambiguity, inimitability) to be a 
source—if not the best source—of sustainable competitive advantage, they are “just 
another level in the explanation of sustainable competitive advantage with no greater 
claim to precedence than any other level.” The reason being is that he claims that 
capabilities are very context specific. That is, according to Collis (1994), some 
capabilities are more valuable in some places, industries, and time periods than others.  
Thus, depending on the industry, the time period, and perhaps even the country, 
capabilities might not be as important as other resources to firm success (cf. Brush and 
  
197 
Artz, 1999). The results of this study seem to offer some evidence in supporting Collis’ 
(1994) argument.   
 
In concluding the theoretical implications section, what can be said about the 
determinants of firm success with respect to a resource-based analysis? Answering this 
question seems to depend largely on the resources under study and the level and type of 
analysis. In this study, if organizational assets are compared to tangible assets (financial 
and physical) the evidence suggests that this intangible resource does seem to contribute 
more greatly to firm success. On the other hand, intellectual property assets do not make 
a unique contribution to firm success and reputational assets make a limited contribution 
after controlling for the effects of tangible assets. However, if the firm’s capabilities are 
compared with other types of resources, the results are mixed. As compared to tangible 
assets, capabilities make a greater contribution to firm success. As compared to 
intangible assets and the combination of the effects of intangible and tangible assets, 
capabilities uniqueness as a determinant of firm success is very limited, which is 
contrary to RBV theory.  
 
Interestingly, in virtually all of the regression analyses, financial assets remain 
significant and based on the beta coefficients, offered a unique contribution to firm 
success and in many cases, contribute more greatly than intangible assets and 
capabilities. However, while the finding might offer evidence against the RBV, it does 
not necessarily offer evidence for anything else. A better understanding of the exact 
nature and role of tangible resources in contributing to competitive advantage, 
particularly with respect to their interconnectedness or interaction with other resources, 
is called for.    
 
Based on the findings of this study, researchers might need to rethink their 
approach to RBV research. For example, the majority of studies within the RBV stream 
tend to either focus on studying firm versus industry factors in order to account for 
performance variance—with individual resources not being studied at all—or isolate on 
just one or two individual resources (usually intangible resources) as the unit of analysis. 
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When significant results are found, evidence for support of the RBV is highlighted. 
However, the results of such studies could potentially be misleading. For example, while 
researchers might conclude that capabilities are significantly important to firm success 
based on the research findings, how much confidence can ultimately be given to such 
results if capabilities—or any other intangible resource—are studied in isolation? That 
is, one-dimensional studies are likely to introduce bias associated with a focus on an 
individual resource because such studies do not simultaneously account for the effects of 
other resources (cf. Huselid, 1995). Results of such studies might offer overestimations 
of the explanatory power of the individual resource otherwise.   
 
As pointed out throughout this dissertation, firms compete on the basis of a 
variety of resources. When resources are considered as part of an entire system rather 
than in isolation, there may be “strong relations of complementarity and co-
specialization among individual resources, so that it is not really the individual 
resources, but rather the way resources are clustered and how they interact, that is 
important to competitive advantage” (Foss, 1998, p. 143). As a result, rethinking the 
way RBV research is carried out might be in order, particularly for researchers who 
assume a linear relationship between resources and firm success. 
 
Managerial Implications 
Competition is a dynamic phenomenon: markets change, the rules of competition 
change, technology changes, and therefore success is not permanent, let alone 
guaranteed. In fact, success in the marketplace can be erased in a relatively short period 
of time. Thus, a critical issue for managers is how they can guide their organizations to a 
consistent level of success. Of course, there are no definitive answers and this study does 
not provide any. However, the results of the present study provide insights that might be 
helpful to managers. This section highlights four important managerial implications 
arising from the study: 1) the value of intangible resources; 2) the role of intellectual 
property assets; 3) the role of industry; and 4) differences in high- versus low-
performing firms. 
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(1) The first and perhaps most obvious managerial implication is that the results 
suggest that organizational assets are among the most important resources in a firm’s 
resource pool. According to the findings in this study, organizational assets, which 
include culture, HRM policies, and organizational structure, have the greatest impact on 
firm success. Culture has long been seen as a major driver of firm success because it 
determines the attitudes, beliefs, customs, values, and habits that set the decision-making 
patterns of the firm (Barney, 1986b; Itami and Roehl, 1987; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; 
Chatman and Jehn, 1994; Welbourne and Wright, 1997). Therefore, one priority of 
management should be developing a unique culture; one that, through the shaping of the 
spoken and unspoken norms and rules of the firm, creates an environment for maximum 
worker productivity and performance. 
 
On the other hand, HRM policies are seen as important to the building of a 
competitive advantage (Schuler and MacMillan, 1984; Lado and Wilson, 1994; Boxall, 
1997; Becker and Huselid, 1998a, b). HRM policies are important in that they can 
reduce employee turnover and improve productivity, for example, thus positively 
impacting on firm success (Huselid, 1995). Also, given the changing nature of 
competition today, an organizational structure that creates speed and efficiency in 
responding to ever changing market and customer needs also seems important (Teece, 
2000). Hence, the results of this study confirm that ownership of effective HRM policies 
and the development of an organizational structure that is able to adapt to ever changing 
market conditions should be management priorities. 
 
Although not the greatest unique contributor to firm success, according to this 
study, reputational assets are nonetheless another type of intangible resource that 
appears to be an important determinant of the success of firms, which confirms previous 
research (McGuire et al., 1988; McGuire et al., 1990; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Brown and Perry, 1994; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Brown and Perry, 1995; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). Logically, the development of a good reputation, whether it be 
company, product, or customer service, is important to driving overall firm success. The 
results of this study suggest that reputational assets might exhibit characteristics of 
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resource value, rareness, inimitability, and nonsubstitutability. Thus, when considering 
developing those resources that might lead to a resource position barrier, management 
should consider crafting, nurturing, and leveraging a positive reputation to achieve such 
a benefit.    
 
While the above implications offer potentially helpful normative insight and 
offer confirmation of many previous studies, the results of this study also suggest some 
more difficult to interpret—if not cautious—managerial implications. For example, 
overall, capabilities do not make the greatest unique, individual contribution to firm 
success. This finding is surprising given the theoretical foundation for capabilities being 
the most critically important determinant of firm success (Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 
1996). Thus, when taken in the context of the larger resource pool necessary to execute a 
given market strategy, capabilities might not be as important as resource-based theory 
suggests (cf. Collis, 1994). Of course, as pointed out previously, the issue of how much 
of the value creating potential of the firms other resources are a result or outcome of its 
capabilities must be considered. Surely not paying strategic attention to the capabilities 
of the firm would be ill-advised and the findings of this study, with respect to 
capabilities, must be treated with caution from a managerial perspective. 
 
(2) Second, despite their theoretically predicted barriers to duplication, intellectual 
property assets (IPA) do not significantly explain firm success, after accounting for the 
effects of other resources and various control variables. According to the results of the 
present study, exerting effort to legally protect intellectual ideas might not be warranted, 
particularly with respect to the efforts directed at developing other classes of resources. 
However, many previous studies find a positive and significant relationship between 
IPA and firm success (see Bosworth and Rogers [2001] for a good review). Thus, 
although the efforts exerted by managers in determining whether or not to legally protect 
intellectual ideas (e.g., via patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc.) is warranted, they need 
to seriously evaluate if real economic benefits will be achieved from such efforts, 
particularly with respect to investments in other resources that may create value.  
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(3) Third, with respect to industry structure, industrial organization economists argue 
that external structural characteristics determine differences in performance between 
industries. Furthermore, Michael Porter’s five forces framework also suggests that the 
structural characteristics of an industry significantly influence its performance. Based on 
the results of this study, three of the five forces are found to significantly impact firm 
success. For managers, two implications arise.  
 
First, acquisition and diversification strategies, for example, might be well- 
directed towards developing opportunities in attractive industries, ones in which the 
potential for high performance exists. Second, if firms find themselves in unattractive 
industries, in which performance is weak or declining, then creating strategies that 
‘alter’ the structural characteristics of the industry in favor of the firm in order to 
appropriate higher levels of performance might be advised. Alternatively, firms may 
need to consider exit strategies if they find themselves locked into poorly performing 
industries. Overall, this study replicates the results of many other previous studies which 
confirm that industry structure is a significant determinant of firm success and thus, 
must be carefully considered and analyzed in the context of formulating strategy.  
 
(4) Finally, although not the primary focus of this study, an obvious area of interest 
to managers is understanding whether or not high-performing firms exhibit different 
characteristics, with respect to their resources, than low-performing firms. To determine 
if any differences do exist, the sample is divided into high- versus low-performers. 
Following Olson and Slater (2002), firms are categorized as either high-performers 
(overall measurement of 5 or higher on a 7-point scale) or low- performers (overall 
measurement of 4 or lower on a 7-point scale) across all three of the firm success 
variables. To test for differences between high- and low-performers, discriminant 
analysis is conducted. Discriminant analysis is used because it allows for statistically 
powerful comparisons between focal groups of interest (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
In other words, discriminant analysis determines whether groups differ with regard to 
the mean of a feature variable.  
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The final significance test of whether or not a variable discriminates between 
groups is the F-test (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Weslowsky, 1976). F is computed as 
the ratio of the between-groups variance in the data over the pooled within-group 
variance. If the between-group variance is significantly larger than the within-group 
variance then there must be significant differences between the means. In the case of this 
study, several variables are entered for analysis. Consequently, a matrix was produced of 
the total variances and covariances, and also a matrix of pooled within-group variances 
and covariances. These two matrices are compared via multivariate F-tests in order to 
determine whether or not there are any significant differences between groups. Based on 
the analysis, significant differences are found between high- and low-performing firms. 
The results are presented in Tables 31, 32, and 33.80 
 
Grouping # of Cases FA PA IPA OA RA CAP
High-Performers 156 1.577* 1.904 1.111 2.956 3.564 3.470
Low-Performers 134 1.699 1.720 1.185 2.679 3.468 3.424
F 1.316 1.961 .341 9.96 2.701 .664
Significance p  = .252 p  = .163 p  = .560 p  = .002 p  = .100 p  = .416
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients -.544 .322 -.211 .820 .341 -.189
Classification Results & Canonical Disriminant Function
Percent of "grouped" cases Eigen- Canonical Wilks' Chi-
correctly classified value Correlation Lamba Square df Sig.
59.30% .061 .240 .943 16.872 6 .010
* Mean score on a five point scale where 4.00 is the maximum contribution rating
Group Differences - Sales Turnover
 
Table 31 Differences between high-low performers – sales turnover 
 
The results suggest that organizational assets explain differences between high- 
and low-performers, specifically with respect to sales turnover, market share, and 
profitability. Indeed, the difference between the means of organizational assets for high- 
and low-performers, across all levels of firm success, is significant. Similarly, 
reputational assets are a discriminating factor between the high-performing group and 
the low-performers with respect to both sales turnover and market share. For 
                                                 
80 For sales turnover, one discriminating case is missing in the analysis. For market share, one 
discriminating case is missing in the analysis. And for profitability, five discriminating cases are missing 
in the analysis. 
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profitability, however, there is no significant difference between high- and low- 
performing group membership with respect to reputational assets. The findings seem to 
indicate that firms would do well to improve upon their organizational and reputational 
assets in order to obtain high performance. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that there is no significant difference 
between high- and low-performing firms with respect to capabilities (excepting 
profitability).81 This finding might suggest that regardless of one’s performance level(s), 
having skilled employees and managers—at least at some level in the firm—and the 
ability to develop and maintain relationships with external constituents (e.g., customers) 
might simply be a necessary requirement for business survival. On the other hand, as 
discussed in previous sections, organizational and reputational assets, for example, may 
be reflective of the outcome of the capabilities of firms and thus capture more significant 
differences between high- and low-performing groups in this analysis. 
  
Grouping # of Cases FA PA IPA OA RA CAP
High-Performers 164 1.575* 1.896 1.164 2.920 3.567 3.456
Low-Performers 126 1.709 1.718 1.121 2.709 3.458 3.439
F 1.563 1.821 .113 5.611 3.444 .091
Significance p  = .212 p  = .178 p  = .737 p  = .019 p  = .064 p  = .763
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients -.656 .316 -.068 .660 .589 -.371
Classification Results & Canonical Disriminant Function
Percent of "grouped" cases Eigen- Canonical Wilks' Chi-
correctly classified value Correlation Lamba Square df Sig.
61.40% .050 .219 .952 14.038 6 .029
* Mean score on a five point scale where 4.00 is the maximum contribution rating
Group Differences - Market Share
 
Table 32 Differences between high-low performers – market share 
 
Lastly, no significant differences between high- and low-performer group 
membership, with respect to financial and physical assets, might confirm the argument 
presented in Chapters II and III that tangible resources have become mere commodities 
                                                 
81 Fahy (2002) also finds differences between high- and low-performers, with respect to capabilities and 
profitability. 
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today and offer no real differentiated benefits. On the other hand, the fact that IPA do 
not discriminate between high- and low-performers might confirm Daley’s (2001) 
argument that Australian firms are not paying enough attention to the development and 
exploitation of such assets. The discriminant analysis results, however, must be weighed 
against the regression results presented earlier and should be treated with caution. 
 
Grouping # of Cases FA PA IPA OA RA CAP
High-Performers 162 1.586* 1.806 1.192 2.960 3.547 3.498
Low-Performers 124 1.720 1.867 1.093 2.669 3.476 3.391
F 1.550 .212 .596 10.933 1.431 3.581
Significance p  = .214 p  = .645 p  = .441 p  = .001 p  = .233 p  = .059
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients -.520 -.123 .178 .809 .099 .209
Classification Results & Canonical Disriminant Function
Percent of "grouped" cases Eigen- Canonical Wilks' Chi-
correctly classified value Correlation Lamba Square df Sig.
56.60% .057 .233 .946 15.64 6 .016
* Mean score on a five point scale where 4.00 is the maximum contribution rating
Group Differences - Profitability
 
Table 33 Differences between high-low performers – profitability 
 
Research Limitations 
No research study is without limitations and the present one is no exception. Therefore, 
this section highlights six limitations, including: 1) the methodology; 2) small R2 and R2 
change effects; 3) construct reliability; 4) the measurement of the capabilities construct; 
5) control variables; 6) the use of a single informant; and 7) the demographic scope of 
the study. 
 
(1) The first limitation may rest with the methodology. A recent debate within the 
RBV stream squarely focuses on the methods used to study the theory (Rouse and 
Daellenbach, 1999; Levitas and Chi, 2002; Rouse and Daellenbach, 2002). Specifically, 
Rouse and Daellenbach (1999), for example, argue that large sample studies based on 
secondary sources of data fail to untangle the resources that might provide sustainable 
advantage. Secondary sources of data, according to Rouse and Daellenbach (1999), 
simply do not provide the level of detail on resources; this must largely come from 
  
205 
research inside the firm (cf. Hoskisson et al., 1999). Indeed, Rouse and Daellenbach 
(1999, p. 490) call for researchers to consider ‘intrusive’ methods such as ethnography 
and fieldwork to study the RBV. However, ethnography and field-based (case) studies 
limit the generalizability of results and are not adept at producing empirically robust 
conclusions (Dess et al., 1990; Michalisin et al., 1997; Barney et al., 2001). 
 
With respect to the methodology employed in this study, it is recognized that the 
conceptual model designed to measure the effects of resources on firm success is 
‘generic’ and is imposed on all informants participating in the survey, regardless of 
industry or type of firm. Indeed, the questions used in the survey to tap into the domains 
of the various resource—and even industry structure—constructs are identical for all 
participants. Thus, while the methodology employed might improve the generalizability 
of the results, it does not offer the level of detail prescribed by Rouse and Daellenbach 
(1999).  
 
On the other hand, many observers have questioned whether researchers can 
empirically validate the RBV at all, regardless of the methodology employed (Levitas 
and Chi, 2002). To be sure, choices and tradeoffs must be made with respect to studying 
the RBV given the difficulty in trying to verify its main prescription (Godfrey and Hill, 
1995; Lewis and Gregory, 1996; Fahy, 2000; Lockett and Thompson, 2001). Based on 
the call to follow research precedents where possible (Remenyi et al., 1998), the 
methodology used in this study followed Fahy (2002) and represents one of the many 
potential research approaches to studying the RBV. According to Hoskisson et al. 
(1999), using multiple methods for studying the RBV is both encouraged and required.  
 
Lastly, with respect to measuring the constructs in this study, the reliance on 
subjective versus objective measurements is not without its limitations. However, using 
secondary sources (e.g., Compustat) to obtain objective data to study resource effects on 
firm performance is a problem regarding intangible resources (Das and Tang, 2000). 
Unlike tangible resources, intangible data are rarely, if at all, reported in financial 
statements. Without robust, objective data on intangible resources available via financial 
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statements, researchers are left with only a few proxy measures such as investments in 
advertising or R&D. Mauri and Michaels (1998), Hoskisson et al. (1999), and Das and 
Teng (2000) argue that more precise measurements of intangibles than those are 
required in order to tap into the underlying domains of the various resource constructs 
that constitute the RBV. Survey-based research that utilizes subjective measures, 
particularly when relying on the knowledge of a single informant such as the CEO, is an 
appropriate method for tapping into the unobserved constructs of the RBV (Spanos and 
Lioukas, 2001; Fahy, 2002). 
 
(2) Regarding the second limitation, only a small percentage of R2 and R2 changes is 
explained in the hierarchical regressions (especially with respect to market share).82 
Even in the last hypothesis (Hypothesis 4c), the highest R2 obtained is .135.83 
Furthermore, statistically significant R2 changes range from a low of .009 to a high of 
.055.84 Although these low values suggest that the results must certainly be treated with 
caution, one explanation of the results might be that there are many other resources 
underlying firms’ market and financial performance. The other resources might explain 
a larger proportion of the variation across the measurements of firm success.  
 
In this study, six resource constructs (comprising 18 factors) are analyzed. As 
pointed out in Chapter III, this research focuses only on resources that are internal to 
firms. However, according to Sanchez and Heene (1997) and Dyer and Singh (1998), 
resources that are external to the firm (e.g., resources of alliances or joint ventures) 
might also significantly impact on a given firm’s success. Furthermore, several scholars 
(Dunning, 1977; Ghoshal, 1987; Porter, 1990; Kogut, 1991; Fahy, 2002) suggest that 
external resources at the country level also affect firm success. In contrast to the broad 
discussion of resources in the literature, this study examines only a small portion of the 
resources that might potentially affect firm performance and does not perfectly measure 
                                                 
82 It is unclear whether market share is a particularly appropriate indicator of firm success in this sample. 
For example, it may be that the Australian firms in this sample are more concerned with sales growth and 
profitability than large market shares. 
83 Of course, the magnitudes of the R2 and R2 change effects (and even R) are relative as there is no other 
like study using the same variables and statistical techniques with which to compare the effects.  
84 According to Cohen (1977), changes in R2 range from 0.01 (small), to 0.09 (medium), to 0.25 or greater 
(large). Cohen (1977) claims that the majority of research uncovers small to medium effects. 
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resources as per theory. It may be that the six resource constructs—and even external 
structural factors—under study are but a small sample of the many relevant variables 
important to firm success, particularly with respect to a multi-industry sample. The issue 
of effect sizes in multi-industry samples is important and is examined next.  
 
Clearly, although many variables used in this study are statistically significant, 
overall, the resources in the confirmed hypotheses lack ‘large’ effects and offer only 
small, incremental explanatory power.85 However, the fact that a multi-industry sample 
is used in this study suggests that small R2s and changes in R2s might be expected. By 
way of example, Jaworski and Kohli (1993), in their use of a multi-industry sample, find 
that market orientation (an intangible resource) has a much smaller effect on firm 
success than the market orientation study of Narver and Slater (1990), which uses a 
single corporation.86 As Slater (1995, p. 263) notes, “Nevertheless, researchers and 
reviewers should expect lower R2s and higher p-values [non-significant parameters] in 
multi-industry studies. In fact, significant findings in a multi-industry study would 
generally indicate a rather robust theory, assuming a good research design otherwise.” 
 
The results found in this multi-industry study tend to confirm Slater’s (1995) 
argument. While R2s are small, in the main there are many statistically significant effects 
that offer both support and rejection of RBV theory, depending on the level and type of 
analysis. According to Slater and Atuahene-Gima (2004), if a relationship between a 
predictor and criterion variable is truly robust, significant effects will be found in multi-
industry studies. However, they caution that the influence of a strategic variable or set of 
variables is almost certain to decrease as more heterogeneity is found in a sample. It is 
also noted that the use of measures with lower reliabilities (e.g., Cronbach alpha’s lower 
than .70) are argued to ensure smaller effect sizes as well (Slater, 1995). This limitation 
is addressed next. 
 
                                                 
85 It must be noted that the primary purpose of this study is not to maximize variance explained, but rather 
to carefully examine important determinants (predictors) of firm success. 
86 The R2s in the Jaworski and Kohi (1993) study are .06 and .11 (the research examines two separate 
samples), while the R2 in the Narver and Slater (1990) study is .410. 
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(3) Appropriately, a critical test of any survey-based research effort is the reliability 
of the items used to operationalize theoretical constructs (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2001). Of the eight constructs that are submitted for reliability analysis (four 
constructs are single items and thus can not be tested for reliability) four are below the 
commonly cited minimum threshold (.70) for item reliability. Indeed, financial asset (α 
= .6075), organizational asset (α = .6955), capabilities (α = .6044) and rivalry (α = 
.6820) constructs are all below the reliability alpha normally prescribed, even after select 
items are dropped. This raises the issue of whether or not some of the operationalized 
items are indeed assets or capabilities or belong in the prescribed constructs. Ultimately, 
the issue is whether or not, based on the reliability coefficients, these constructs can be 
measured the same way consistently over time. 
 
By way of example, is culture an organizational asset (something the firm has) or 
a routine (something the firm does) and should thus be operationalized as a capability? 
Are HRM policies something the firm has (an asset) or something the firm does (a 
capability)? Thus, a third limitation of the study is that the measurement of half of the 
constructs that are submitted for reliability analysis fall below the normally prescribed 
threshold. This lack of ‘robust’ reliability might be yet a further cause of lower R2 values 
(Slater, 1995). However, although reliabilities below the .70 threshold are found among 
four constructs, strong evidence for convergent and discriminant validity is found, 
suggesting that the constructs measure what they were predicted to measure. A further 
cause for some of the low reliabilities might be that the constructs consisted of a small 
number of component items (Gainer and Padanyi, 2004). 
 
(4) The fourth limitation concerns the measurement of the capabilities construct. 
Resource-based theory largely suggests that capabilities are the single most important 
determinant of firm success. The findings of this research do not unequivocally verify 
this assertion. To measure the capabilities construct, items designed to tap into 
individual and ‘firm-wide’ know-how are used, as per Grant’s (2002) discussion of 
capabilities. However, while rating the item, the informants might have found it easier to 
assess the impact of obvious (less abstract) concepts, on firm success, such as reputation 
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and culture rather than more esoteric concepts such as managerial know-how or 
advantageous relationships established and maintained by the firm. Thus, by virtue of 
their impact on firm success being potentially ‘less’ understood, capabilities might 
simply not have been regarded as the most important resource. 
 
 While the above argument suggests that capabilities might not have been 
adequately measured or assessed, three counter arguments are put forth. First, the intent 
of this research is not to isolate on any given resource, but rather to afford all resource 
items ‘equal’ treatment in their assessment by the informants. Thus, capabilities have no 
more greater weighting than any other resource. Second, the mean score of capabilities 
is among the highest of any independent variable, suggesting that the informants did 
understand its relevance to firm success. Lastly, although the reliability coefficient for 
the capabilities construct is low, it is still within acceptable range for hypothesis testing, 
while convergent and discriminant validity is robust.  
 
(5) A fifth limitation is the exclusion of controlling for the effects of strategic groups 
on firm success. For example, Porter (1980) suggests that some firms within a given 
industry may have similar strategies, might enjoy barriers to entry, or mobility barriers, 
and might share common cultural characteristics. Thus, similar to the five forces of 
industry structure, the characteristics or structural forces of strategic groups might, in 
fact, affect firm success.87 However, clustering of strategic groups occurs at the single- 
industry level (Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999). Given that this study is more interested in 
maximizing the generalizability of the results—and thus includes both manufacturing 
and services firms—rather than studying a single industry, the very broad industry base 
and large sample population precludes the development of a typology to control for the 
potential effects of strategic groups on firm success.    
 
(6) The sixth limitation is the use of a single informant for the research. The 
measurement of the constructs relies solely on the perceptual judgment of the CEO. 
                                                 
87 There is some debate as to the predictive validity of strategic groups to the field of strategic 
management. See Hatten and Hatten (1987), Barney and Hoskisson (1990), and Wiggins and Ruefli 
(1995) for a discussion. 
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Using such a measurement technique raises the issue of common method bias, which 
can be particularly dangerous when a single informant fills out items that tap into 
independent and dependent variables within the same survey instrument. However, the 
factor analyses reported demonstrate that a single factor solution did not emerge, as 
evidenced by Harmann’s ex post one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Hence, 
common method bias is unlikely. 
 
(7) The final limitation is the narrow demographic scope of the study. Australia is a 
small (in population), isolated country in the Pacific Rim and may not be representative 
of the broader population of countries in the world. However, studies of the RBV tend to 
be dominated by data from the United States. Furthermore, a search in the top-tier 
journals that have a proclivity to publishing RBV research, namely the Academy of 
Management Journal, Journal of Management and Strategic Management Journal, 
failed to uncover any substantial empirical efforts exploring the RBV with Australian 
data. Thus, expanding the empirical efforts of the RBV, particularly beyond those in the 
United States, is warranted to test the theory outside of a limited domain.   
 
Future Research Directions 
Although there are many possible future research directions, the discussion below 
focuses on three prominent options. Specifically, the discussion centers on: 1) construct 
refinement; 2) expanding the resources under study; and 3) the study of resource 
interactions. 
 
(1) The first area for future research simply focuses on refining the constructs used 
in this study while replicating the research effort across additional countries. As pointed 
out, half of the constructs in this study are below the normally prescribed reliability 
threshold. Thus, future researchers should attempt to improve the reliability of the 
constructs through further testing and refinement of the scales used to operationalize 
various resource constructs. One potential way to achieve construct refinement is by 
testing the hypotheses posited in this study—or similar ones—across multiple countries.  
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Fahy (2002), for example, explores his resource-based study across four 
countries; similarly, the approach used to test resources in this study also needs to be 
replicated across multiple countries. As Levitas and Chi (2002) argue, one of the main 
efforts of researchers in the resource-based field should be to empirically verify patterns 
in various populations of firms in order to corroborate theoretical predictions about 
resource effects on firm success. Based on the results of this study, empirical replication 
is warranted and necessary not only for statistical verification, but to improve the 
psychometric characteristics of the resource constructs. Based on previous discussions, 
widely accepted and consistent operationalization of the relevant constructs of the RBV 
is far from mature and further work is clearly needed (Caloghirou et al., 2004). 
  
(2) The second direction for future research focuses on the resources themselves. 
The present study examined a general set of endogenous resources. However, a variety 
of other resources may be brought to bear in the quest for firm success, including 
additional endogenous as well as exogenous resources. For example, market orientation 
(Narver and Slater, 1990; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Hult and Ketchen, 2001), 
entrepreneurship (Naman and Slevin, 1993), market sensing (Day, 1994), informational 
assets (Valentin, 2001), and innovation (Hurley and Hult, 1998) are all internal resources 
that are not specifically operationalized in this study.88 Furthermore, the resources of 
other firms (Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998) and country-based 
(external) resources (Dunning, 1977; Porter, 1990; Fahy, 2002) are also resources that 
are argued to be determinants of firm success, but are not studied in this research. Thus, 
future research might expand the resource pool with a specific focus on continuing the 
fine-grained analysis of internal and even external resources. 
 
(3) The final and perhaps most significant area for future research lay in testing the 
relationships between resources. This study examines individual resources as the unit of 
analysis and assumes a direct linear relationship between the constructs and firm 
success. There may be dangers in taking individual resources as the unit of analysis 
                                                 
88 Of course, the researcher must face the issue of whether these resources are what the firm has or what 
the firm does. Furthermore, are these resources organizational assets, capabilities, or some other class of 
resources? 
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when ‘combinations’ of resources or their ‘interconnectedness’ is what is potentially 
most important to firm success (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Black and Boal, 1994; Foss, 
1998; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b).  
 
By way of example, Welbourne and Wright (1997), whose study is discussed in 
Chapter II, tested the relationship between resources and firm success but did so by 
examining the interactions of various resources (e.g., the effect of the interaction 
between managerial resources and culture on firm success). Furthermore, Hult and 
Ketchen (2001) find a non-linear relationship between resources and firm success. That 
is, Hult and Ketchen (2001) find that, in the case of their resource-based study—using a 
structural equation model—no individual resource creates a ‘positional advantage’ (Day 
and Wensley, 1988), but rather that resources in combination, or collectively, are 
responsible for a positional advantage that leads to superior performance. Thus, future 
empirical research within the resource-based stream should pay close attention to how—
and perhaps why—various resource combinations and interactions determine the 
performance of firms, as well as which combinations and interactions are more likely to 
lead to sustainable competitive advantage (cf., Foss, 1998; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). 
Of particular interest may be understanding the role that tangible assets play, if any, in 
generating competitive advantage when taken in the context of resource combinations, 
interactions, and recombinations and even resource value-in-use.   
 
Conclusion 
Building and sustaining a competitive advantage is a paramount task of the firm. Given 
this imperative, many theories within the academic community have been posited to 
explain why firms are able to obtain and sustain a competitive advantage. Recently, one 
theory, the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), has gained prominent attention in the 
literature. The RBV prescribes that competitive advantage stems from resources that are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable. Such factors are deemed strategic 
resources and are largely described as being intangible in nature. Similarly, much debate 
ensued in the decade of the 1990s with respect to a so-called ‘new economy.’ New- 
economy scholars have argued that competitive dynamics changed radically in the last 
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10-20 years and that in order to compete effectively, firms must pay near exclusive 
attention to their intangible, rather than tangible, resources. Thus, the focal resources of 
interest in the RBV—and in the new economy—are opposite from neoclassical 
economic theory, where land, equipment, buildings, machinery, and raw materials (i.e., 
tangible resources) are of paramount interest. 
 
 To test the main prescription of the RBV—and the assumptions of new economy 
scholars—this study examines the association between intangible resources and firm 
success, but only after simultaneously accounting for the effects of tangible resources. 
Rarely has such an empirical approach to studying the RBV been undertaken. The 
findings suggest that the main prescription of the RBV can not be unequivocally 
supported. Some intangible resources, such as organizational and reputational assets, do 
make a larger unique contribution to firm success than tangible assets. However, the 
contribution of intangible assets relative to tangible assets might be tied to the type of 
performance measurement examined.  
 
On the other hand, some intangible resources, such as intellectual property assets, do 
not have any impact on firm success after simultaneously accounting for the effects of 
tangible assets. Furthermore, although capabilities make a larger unique contribution to 
firm success than tangible assets, they are not the single most important determinant 
(contrary to theory), after simultaneously accounting for the effects of both tangible and 
intangible assets. Lastly, in the main, financial assets are statistically significant and 
make among the greatest unique contribution to firm success. However, the coefficients 
of financial assets are in an unexpected direction (i.e., negative), which makes 
interpreting this finding difficult. The results of this study, therefore, suggest several 
specific conclusions: 
 
1. Empirically investigating a resource in isolation does not appropriately account for 
the effects of other resources potentially important to firm success. Therefore, 
statistical results of many previous studies in the RBV stream might be biased 
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upwords (cf. Huselid, 1995) and might not offer as strong support for the RBV as 
claimed. 
2. While intangible resources can contribute more to firm success than tangible 
resources, and thus, may meet Barney’s (1991) VRIN criteria, they do not 
necessarily do so under all circumstances.  The level of analysis, and the types of 
resources under study, is important to consider with respect to claims made of 
empirically verifying the RBV. 
3. Tangible assets need to be studied more carefully, particularly with respect to asset 
interconnectedness and resource interactions, to determine the role they play, if any, 
in creating and sustaining competitive advantage (cf. Foss, 1997; Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003).  
4. When taken in context of a broader resource pool and contrary to most RBV 
scholar’s arguments, there might not be a ‘single’ most important determinant of 
firm success (Collis, 1994). 
5. This research represents one approach to studying the RBV and offers some findings 
that contradict the theory. As with this study, future studies should continue to 
systematically test the core propositions of the RBV (Rouse et al., 2003). On the 
other hand, the results of this study also suggest that another fruitful avenue for 
future research would be in studying resource interactions, combinations, and 
recombinations (Foss, 1998). Here, the relationship of financial assets, for example, 
with the broader resource base can be more adequately assessed.   
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Appendix A-1 
 
 
Industries Included in the Study* 
 
Manufacturing Services 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Textile, Clothing, Footwear, and Leather 
Wood and Paper Products 
Printing, Publishing, and Recorded Media 
Petroleum, Coal, Chemical, and Associated 
Products 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Metal Products 
Machinery and Equipment 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Accommodation, Cafes, and 
Restaurants 
Transport and Storage 
Communication Services** 
Finance and Insurance*** 
Property and Business Services 
* Although 2-digit ANZSIC industries are listed here, 4-digit codes were used to 
randomly select the sample. 
** Excluding Australia Post and Telstra. 
*** Excluding Central Banks. 
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Appendix A-2 
 
Pilot Study Questionnaire89 
 
Australian Business Survey: 
 
Exploring the Resources That Impact Business Success 
 
 
The Graduate School of Business is currently sponsoring a research project designed to 
explore the factors that contribute to business success. Specifically, the objective of this 
study is to analyze how a firm’s success is impacted by both its tangible and intangible 
resources. 
 
As this survey is designed to explore the relationship between tangible resources, 
intangible resources and firm success, we strongly encourage you to briefly examine all 
the factors in Section A prior to making your final responses. 
 
Please respond to each question by circling the single most appropriate response. There 
are four sections to be completed. 
 
All information in this questionnaire will be treated as strictly confidential.  
 
All data will be aggregated prior to analysis and all company information will be stored 
separately from survey item data.  
 
If you care to comment or make suggestions regarding any part of this survey, please 
feel free to do so in the space provided at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
Thank you for your help and cooperation. 
 
PLEASE RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE TO PETER GALVIN, GRADUATE 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS.  
 
                                                 
89 The questionnaire contained in this section is a simple, Microsoft WORD version. The questionnaire 
actually used was professionally designed and printed. 
  
263 
SECTION A. FIRM RESOURCES 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to explore how various tangible and intangible 
resource impact on your market success. A rating of 0 implies that the factor has, 
compared to other factors, no impact on your ability to successfully compete in the 
market, while a rating of 4 implies that the factor has, compared to other factors, high 
impact on your ability to compete successfully in the market. Please rate your 
assessment of each factor below, by circling the single most appropriate response. 
 
With respect to all other factors in Section A: 
 
      Comparatively                  Comparatively 
    no impact                   high impact 
                                                                               on our                on our   
                                                                              success                                success 
 
1. Contracts (e.g., agency 
agreements, franchise 
agreements, licensing 
agreements, property leases, 
etc.) have:  
 
2. Proprietary/held-in-secret 
technology (e.g., customised 
software, specialised 
manufacturing technology, 
software developed in-house, 
etc.) have: 
        
3. The operating and reporting 
structure of the firm has: 
 
4. The shared values, beliefs, 
attitudes and behaviours of 
employees and managers of the 
firm (i.e., firm culture) have:   
          
5. Legally-protected trademarks have: 
 
6. Brand name reputation has: 
 
7. Physical equipment and other 
physical assets (e.g., 
machinery, tools, vehicles, etc.) 
have: 
 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
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Comparatively                 Comparatively 
     no impact                   high impact 
                                                                                on our                on our   
                                                                                success                               success 
 
8. Employee recruitment, 
compensation, reward, and 
training policies (i.e., human 
resource management policies) 
have: 
                  
9. Buildings and other physical 
structures (e.g., factories, 
offices, warehouses, stores, 
showrooms, etc.), including 
their location, have:                              
       
10. Raised financial capital (e.g., 
secured bank loans, issuance of 
shares or bonds, etc.) has:  
 
11. Relationships that employees 
and managers have established 
and maintained with external 
constituents (e.g., customers, 
strategic alliances, suppliers, 
etc.) for the firm’s benefit have: 
 
12. Company reputation has: 
 
13. Legally-protected designs have: 
 
14. Customer service reputation has: 
 
15. The overall skills, creativity, 
and know-how of employees 
have: 
 
16. Land, including its location, 
has: 
 
17. Legally-protected patents have: 
 
18. Cash (on hand/at bank) earned 
from operations has: 
 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
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Comparatively                  Comparatively 
     no impact                   high impact 
                                                                                on our                on our   
                                                                               success                               success 
 
19. Operational [business] 
processes have: 
 
20. Legally-protected copyrights 
have: 
 
21. Financial investments (e.g., 
financial instruments, company 
shares, equity positions in other 
companies, etc.) have: 
 
22. Product/service reputation has: 
 
23. The skills and expertise of 
managers have: 
 
SECTION B. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The part of the questionnaire is designed to ascertain various characteristics of the 
industry within which your firm belongs. Please circle the single most appropriate 
response for each of the items listed below.  
 
 
                Very           Very 
                 low                                 high 
            
1. In our industry, the degree to 
which competitors are roughly 
equal in size and power is: 
 
2. Overall market growth in our 
industry is: 
 
3. The number of competitors 
vying for customers in our 
industry is: 
 
4. The fixed cost structure 
required to compete in our 
industry is: 
 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
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          Very          Very 
                 low                                 high 
 
5. The intensity with which 
competitors jockey for a better 
position in the industry is: 
 
6. In our industry, the degree to 
which only a few competitors 
dominate the market is: 
 
7. The extent to which price 
competition is used regularly in 
our industry is: 
 
8. The degree to which 
competitors in our industry 
offer clearly differentiated 
products/services is: 
 
     Very easy            Very difficult 
             to enter                            to enter 
 
9. How easy is it for new firms to 
enter and compete in your 
industry? 
 
           No                 Extreme 
              threat                                  threat 
 
10. To what degree is your industry 
threatened by substitute 
products/services?           
 
        Very weak              Very strong 
                  power                                power 
 
11. What level of bargaining power 
(i.e., ability to negotiate lower 
prices) do you have over your 
suppliers? 
 
12. What level of bargaining power 
(i.e., ability to negotiate lower 
prices) do customers have over 
your firm? 
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
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SECTION C. DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to collect general demographic information 
about your firm. Providing responses to these questions will help us to better compare 
and contrast the relationship between tangible resources, intangible resources, industry 
characteristics, and firm success across of variety of business settings in Australia. 
Please respond to each question as indicated. 
 
1. Our firm has:________ employees (please specify a number)  
 
2. Our firm has been in business for:________ years (please specify a number) 
 
3. We are a (circle corresponding number): 
 
1    privately owned firm   2    publicly listed firm 
 
4. We are (circle corresponding number): 
 
1    An independent business   2    a business unit (SBU) of a corporation 
 
3    a corporate parent 
 
5. The (core) business of our firm is (circle the corresponding number): 
 
1    Retail     2    Financial services  
 
3    Other services    4    Consumer products manufacturing 
 
5    Industrial products manufacturing 6    Other  
 
6. Our firm’s sales turnover is (circle the corresponding number): 
 
1    Less than $10,0000   2    $10,000,001 to $20,000,000 
 
3    $20,000,001 to $30,000,000     4    $30,000,001 to $400,000,000    
 
5    $40,000,001 to $50,000,000  6    Over $50,000,000 
 
7. We earn the majority of our sales turnover as a (circle the corresponding number): 
 
1    manufacturer    2    non-manufacturer
  
268 
 
SECTION D. FIRM SUCCESS 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to assess success levels. Please circle the 
number best estimating how your firm’s success compared to close competitors over the 
last three (3) years. 
 
Relative to close competitors, our firm: 
 
                       More         At about the       Much 
                      slowly                 same rate       faster 
                 over the last         over the last over the last 
                     3 years             3 years      3 years 
 
1. has been growing sales turnover: 
 
 
                        A smaller    About the same     A larger 
               market share       market share      market share 
                 over the last         over the last over the last 
                     3 years            3 years                  3 years 
        
2. has had:  
 
 
                   Less               About equally        More 
                   profitable             profitable    profitable 
                           over the last        over the last over the last 
                     3 years            3 years       3 years 
       
3. has been: 
1         2         3         4          5          6          7 
1         2         3         4          5          6          7 
1         2         3         4          5          6          7 
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COMMENTS 
 
If you have any comments regarding any part of this survey, please feel free to do so in 
the space provided below (please write clearly). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEY COMPLETION 
 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation in this study. Please make sure 
that you have completed all items. 
 
Once you have answered all the items, please return the survey to Peter Galvin at the 
Graduate School of Business.
  
270 
Appendix A-3 
 
Final Survey Questionnaire90 
 
 
The Graduate School of Business, Curtin University of Technology, is sponsoring a 
research project designed to explore the factors that contribute to business success. 
Specifically, the research will use data from a nation-wide survey to analyze how firm 
success is impacted by both tangible and intangible resources. 
 
To complete the survey, please keep the follow instructions in mind: 
 
 As this survey is designed to explore the relationship between tangible resources, 
intangible resources and firm success, we strongly encourage you to briefly examine 
all the factors in Section A prior to making your final responses. 
 
 For each item, please circle the number best corresponding to your answer. There are 
four sections to be completed (sections A, B, C & D). 
 
 If you care to comment or make suggestions regarding any part of this survey, please 
feel free to do so in the space provided at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
 Please complete the survey within two weeks of receipt, if possible. 
 
 After completing all the questions, please return the survey to the Graduate School 
of Business in the pre-paid envelope. 
 
 Thank you very much for your participation and cooperation.
                                                 
90 The questionnaire contained in this section is a simple, Microsoft WORD version. The questionnaire 
actually used was professionally designed and printed. 
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SECTION A. FIRM RESOURCES 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to explore how various tangible and intangible 
resources impact on your firm’s success. A rating of 0 implies that the factor has, 
compared to other factors, no impact on your ability to successfully compete in the 
market. A rating of 4 implies that the factor has, compared to other factors, high impact 
on your ability to compete successfully in the market. Please rate your assessment of 
each factor below, by circling the single most appropriate response. 
 
With respect to all other factors in Section A: 
                
        Comparatively                   Comparatively 
            no impact                high impact 
                                                                           on our              on our   
                                                                          success                                 success 
 
1. Organisational contracts 
established with market-based 
participants (e.g., joint-venture 
agreements, franchise 
agreements, distribution 
agreements) have:  
 
2. Proprietary or held-in-secret 
technology (e.g., software 
developed in-house, specialised 
manufacturing technology, 
databases) have: 
        
3. The organisational structure 
(i.e., the operating and 
reporting structure) of the firm 
has: 
 
4. Shared organisational values, 
beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours (i.e., firm culture) 
have:   
          
5. Legally-protected trademarks have:  
 
 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
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           Comparatively                  Comparatively 
                no impact                       high impact 
                                                                               on our                on our   
                                                                        success                               success 
 
6. Organisational policies (e.g., 
recruitment, compensation, 
reward, training) designed to 
acquire, develop, and retain the 
human talent of the firm have: 
 
7. Buildings and other physical 
structures (e.g., factories, 
offices, warehouses, stores, 
showrooms), including their 
location, have:         
 
8. Raised financial capital (e.g., 
debt from secured bank loans, 
equity from the issuance of 
shares or bonds) has:  
 
9. Relationships that employees 
and managers have established 
and maintained with external 
constituents (e.g., customers, 
strategic alliances, suppliers) 
for the benefit of the firm have: 
 
10. Company reputation has: 
 
11. Legally-protected designs have: 
 
12. Customer service reputation has: 
 
13. The overall skills, creativity, 
and know-how of the 
employees of the firm have: 
 
14. Land, including its location, 
has: 
 
15. Legally-protected patents have: 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
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            Comparatively                  Comparatively 
                 no impact                        high impact 
                                                                                on our                  on our   
                                                                         success                                success 
 
16. Cash (on hand/at bank) earned 
from operations has: 
 
17. Legally-protected copyrights 
have: 
 
18. Financial investments (e.g., in 
interest bearing accounts, in 
company shares, in equity 
positions in other companies, in 
government instruments) have: 
 
19. Product/service reputation has: 
 
20. The skills, expertise, and know-
how of the managers of the 
firm have: 
 
SECTION B. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The part of the questionnaire is designed to ascertain various characteristics of the 
industry within which your firm competes. Please circle the single most appropriate 
response for each of the items listed below.  
 
               Very                    Very 
                low                                high 
            
1. In our industry, the degree to 
which competitors are roughly 
equal in size and power is: 
 
2. The number of competitors 
vying for customers in our 
industry is: 
 
3. The fixed cost structure 
required to compete in our 
industry is: 
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
0         1         2         3          4
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
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         Very                  Very 
                low                              high 
 
4. The intensity with which 
competitors jockey for a better 
position in the industry is: 
         
 
5. The extent to which price 
competition is used regularly in 
our industry is: 
 
                            Very easy                       Very difficult 
            to enter                            to enter 
 
6. How easy is it for new firms to 
enter and compete in your 
industry? 
 
               Very low               Very high 
             threat                                  threat 
 
7. To what degree is your industry 
threatened by substitute 
products/services?   
       
   Very weak                           Very strong 
              power                               power 
 
8. What level of bargaining power 
(i.e., ability to negotiate lower 
prices) do you have over your 
suppliers? 
 
9. What level of bargaining power 
(i.e., ability to negotiate lower 
prices) do customers have over 
your firm? 
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
1         2         3         4          5
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SECTION C. DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to collect demographic information about your 
firm. Please respond to each question as indicated. 
 
1. Our firm has:________ full-time equivalent employees (please specify a number)  
 
2. Our firm has been in business for:________ years (please specify a number) 
 
3. We are a (circle corresponding number): 
 
1    privately owned firm 2    publicly listed firm 3    other 
 
4. We are (circle corresponding number): 
 
1    an independent business 2    a business unit (SBU) of a corporation 
 
3    a corporate parent  4    other   
 
5. What is the primary business activity of your firm (circle the corresponding 
number): 
 
1    Banking  2    Construction 3    Finance  4    Insurance  
   
5    Investment 6    Legal  7    Manufacturing 8    Real estate  
 
9    Retail  10 Transportation 11    Wholesale 12    Other 
  
10. Our firm’s sales turnover is (circle the corresponding number): 
 
1    Less than $1,000,000   2    $1,000,001 to $10,000,000 
 
3    $10,000,001 to $50,000,000     4    $50,000,001 to $100,000,000    
 
5    $100,000,001 to $200,000,000  6    Over $200,000,000 
 
7. We earn the majority of our sales turnover as a (circle the corresponding number): 
 
1    manufacturer    2    non-manufacturer  
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SECTION D. FIRM SUCCESS 
 
This part of the questionnaire is designed to assess success levels. Please circle the 
number best estimating how your firm’s success compared to close competitors over the 
last three (3) years. 
 
       More         At about the       Much 
                      slowly                 same rate       faster 
                 over the last         over the last over the last 
                     3 years             3 years      3 years 
 
1. has been growing sales turnover: 
 
              
                                                              A smaller     About the same     A larger 
               market share       market share      market share 
                 over the last         over the last over the last 
                     3 years             3 years      3 years 
        
2. has had:  
 
 
                   Less               About equally        More 
                   profitable             profitable    profitable 
                           over the last        over the last over the last 
                     3 years            3 years       3 years 
       
3. has been: 
 
COMMENTS 
 
If you have any comments to make regarding any part of this survey, please feel free to 
do so in the space provided below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1         2        3         4          5          6          7
1         2         3         4          5          6          7
1         2         3         4          5          6          7 
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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation in this study. Please make sure that 
you have completed all items. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETION 
 
Once you have answered all the items, please return the survey to the Graduate School 
of Business in the pre-paid envelope.  
 
If you have any questions, please contact Jeremy Galbreath 
(galbreathj@cbs.curtin.edu.au) or Peter Galvin on 61 8 9266-3389 
(galvinp@gsb.curtin.edu.au). 
 
 
SUMMARY COPY OF THE RESULTS 
 
Please provide your name and address or enclose your business card if you would like a 
copy of the summary of the results. 
 
Name:_________________________________________________________________ 
Post address:____________________________________________________________ 
City/Postcode:___________________________________________________________ 
email (for an electronic copy):______________________________________________ 
 
Please be assured that the above information will be used only so that we may send you 
a summary copy of the results, if desired.
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Appendix A-4 
 
Cover Letter 
 
 
Mr(s). <NAME> 
<POSITION> 
<FIRM> 
 
Dear Mr(s).: 
 
The Graduate School of Business, Curtin University of Technology, is currently sponsoring a 
research project designed to explore the factors that contribute to business success. Specifically, 
the objective of this nation-wide study is to analyze how a firm’s success is impacted by both its 
tangible and intangible resources. Towards this end, we are administering a questionnaire to a 
broad sample of manufacturing and services firms operating in Australia. 
 
Enclosed in this mailing, you will find a questionnaire to be completed by you, which based on 
pilot study results, should take no more than 10 minutes to finish. If you are personally unable to 
complete the questionnaire, we request that you select a person that you deem knowledgeable 
about the objective of the study who can complete it in your place.  
 
Responding to this nation-wide study is entirely voluntary. However, your response is critical 
and your input will provide valuable information regarding the validity of emerging 
management theories and business practices in Australia in the context of broader international 
trends, particularly those in the United States, Europe, and growing parts of Asia. In exchange 
for your participation, we will be happy to send you a summary of the results after the data are 
analyzed. Please note that you may withdraw your responses from this study at anytime, prior to 
data analysis. If you wish to withdraw, please contact one of the researchers listed below. 
 
Your privacy is a key concern. Please be assured that all information will be treated as strictly 
confidential. All data will be aggregated prior to analysis and all company information will be 
stored separately from other data. No information or any subsequent publication of the results of 
this study will be able to be traced to any company.  
 
On behalf of the Graduate School of Business, Curtin University of Technology, we look 
forward to receiving your completed questionnaire. If you have any questions regarding this 
study, please contact Jeremy Galbreath (galbreathj@cbs.curtin.edu.au) or Peter Galvin 
(galvinp@gsb.curtin.edu.au) on 61 8 9266-3389.  
 
Kind Regards, 
 
Jeremy Galbreath, M.B.A.   Peter Galvin, Ph.D. 
Project Coordinator    Senior Lecturer 
Australian Business Survey   Graduate School of Business 
  
279 
Appendix A-5 
 
Second Mailing Cover Letter 
 
 
Mr(s). <NAME> 
<POSITION> 
<FIRM> 
 
Dear Mr(s).: 
 
Recently, a questionnaire seeking your input on the impact of various tangible and intangible 
resources on your firm’s success was mailed to you. Your company was included in the 
population of a wide variety of businesses operating in Australia. 
 
If you have already completed and returned the questionnaire to us, please accept our sincere 
thanks. If not, as this is the last follow-up with you, we would appreciate you completing the 
questionnaire today. Although we understand that this is a very busy time of year, it is extremely 
important that information about your company and its resources be included in the study if the 
results are to accurately represent the broad base of businesses operating in Australia. The 
questionnaire should take no more than 10 minutes of your time to complete. 
 
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it has been misplaced, please contact 
Jeremy Galbreath (galbreathj@cbs.curtin.edu.au) or Peter Galvin on 61 8 9266 3389 and another 
one will be sent to you immediately. 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
 
Jeremy Galbreath, M.B.A. Peter Galvin, Ph.D. 
Project Coordinator Senior Lecturer 
Australian Business Survey   Graduate School of Business  
